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This dissertation is a historical account of wireless telecommunications policy in South 
Korea (hereafter Korea). It investigates how wireless telecommunications policy in Korea was 
transformed from 1993 to 2013. This dissertation relies on historical methods and user 
interviews, and examines contextual factors that shaped Korean policy change. There are two 
main arguments in this dissertation. One is that the interactions between the forces of global 
neoliberalism, the Korean developmental state, and domestic capital shaped a hybrid type of 
wireless telecommunications policy regime which this research sees as the “neoliberal-
developmental state.” The other is that online community culture gave rise to a new type of 
telecommunications user. This research calls them “networked users,” meaning users who are 
self-empowered in cyberspace and who are opposed to closed polices created by developmental 
goals and business interests. 
This dissertation first examines major policy cases, including privatization, licensing, 
deregulation and research and development of wireless technologies in Korea. This dissertation 
identifies that the state was not a relatively passive victim of transnational capitalism. The state 
was instead either an active supporter of neoliberal globalization or acts as one of the major 
strategic actors in reshaping the national economy and wireless telecommunications industries 
within its borders. The findings in this dissertation call for rethinking the “powerless state” thesis 
in globalization studies and moving beyond the dichotomous discourses on Asian regional 
development under globalization: neoliberal convergence vs. the return of the developmental 
state.  
This dissertation also examines the role of networked users during changes in mobile 
Internet standardization and wireless telephone numbering policy. This dissertation identifies 
that self-organized and self-informed users in online communities emerged as actors who 
influenced policy changes. Furthermore, in the case of wireless telephone numbering policy, 
networked users exhibited a new form of effective online democracy where online participation 
and legal mobilization for policy change were linked with each other. The findings in this 
dissertation call for rethinking the role of individual users in contributing to the open and 
democratic policy-making process.  
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This dissertation is a historical account of wireless telecommunications policy in South 
Korea (hereafter Korea). It investigates how wireless telecommunications policy in Korea has 
been transformed since the late 1990s. It also examines how interactions between global forces, 
the state, businesses, and users impacted the change. There has been a great deal of research in 
both globalization studies and policy studies, but this research has primarily focused on the 
“powerless state” and the overarching influence of globalization. This dissertation argues that the 
nation-state and domestic capital took on a significant role in shaping their own 
telecommunications industry during the relentless process of neoliberal globalization. At the 
same time, this research suggests that the role of individual users in the telecommunications 
policy-making process, which has garnered little scholarly attention in policy studies, should be 
reconsidered.  
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Globalization has become a widely accepted concept since the late 20th century because it 
encompasses multiple forms of radical change in many areas of social life, particularly politics, 
economics, and culture. Globalization has yet to achieve a generally accepted definition because 
it is a multifaceted and ongoing phenomenon that can be interpreted in various ways depending 
on which aspects are emphasized. The meaning, extent, and logic of the phenomenon have been 
suggested in different forms through the lens used by neoliberal economists, critical scholars, 
postmodernists, and other scholars. However, there appears to be an emerging underlying 
consensus on how to understand globalization among different theories: globalization has a 
negative impact on state power or promotes the retreat of the nation-state. 
Neoliberal economists often conceptualize globalization as a “desirable” form of 
economic integration in which technological innovation, including enhanced transportation and 
telecommunications, in conjunction with global entrepreneurship are the main forces driving 
globalization. Proponents of globalization have said that economic integration on a global scale 
will dismantle national capitalism, which has been characterized in terms of national institutional 
arrangements and industrial policies, and consequently bring about convergence into a single 
form of free-market capitalism (Fukuyama, 1992; Cable, 1995; Friedman, 1999; Friedman, 
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2005). The advocates of free market ideology claim that a largely unregulated capitalist system 
not only guarantees individual economic freedom but also optimizes economic performance 
(Hayek, 1944; Friedman, 1962). This belief system maintains that the scope of government must 
be limited and state power must be dispersed to market to reduce problems caused by state 
intervention. Neoliberal globalists predict the demise or retreat of state power as a byproduct of 
globalization, and expect unleashed markets to successfully fulfill the traditional functions of 
state power. Neoliberal advocates often postulate a negative view of the state in developing 
countries, depicting it as incompetent, corrupt, and inefficient (Mosley, et al., 1991).  
Unlike the apostles of globalization, critical scholars have analyzed the nature of 
globalization and warned against its negative aspects. Critical scholars focus on a new global 
production and financial system that transcends national forms of capitalism, and see 
globalization as a novel phase in the currently evolving system of world capitalism driven by 
non-state actors. Sklair (2000; 2002) highlights transnational capital, the transnational capitalist 
class1 and cultural elites as the primary agents of globalization, and assumes that state structures 
play no significant role in the global system. Robinson (2003; 2004) claims that the nature of 
globalization rests upon the transnational capitalist class’ hegemony over national and local 
fractions of capital in most countries. However, he does partially acknowledge that national 
states are components of a larger “transnational state apparatus” that promotes globalization. The 
emphasis on transnational forces as a single agent of capitalistic globalization can lead to the 
neglect of the roles played by other actors such as the nation-state, local capital, and even 
citizens in the dynamic process of globalization. 
Scholars using postmodern perspectives also conceptualize globalization as both the 
process and outcome of expanding global capitalism. However, unlike critical scholars, they do 
not postulate the existence of a key agent that promotes capitalistic globalization. Hardt and 
Negri (2000) see globalization as the reemergence of Empire, which differs from classical 
imperialism.2 There is no center-periphery but rather a ubiquitous or amorphous power structure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#8,#+./#+./&37#&9#:%&'(%#4(6)+(%)05-#+./#+3(,0,(+)&,(%#4(6)+(%)0+#4%(00#)0#2/9),/2#(0#(#,/;#4%(00#4&,0)0+),:#&9#0/</3(%#
0&4)(%#:3&160-#/(4.#&9#;.)4.#.(0#+./)3#&;,#</0+/2#),+/3/0+0#),#(,#/=6(,2),:#:%&'(%#4(6)+(%)0+#070+/5>#+./#/=/41+)</0#
&9#+3(,0,(+)&,(%#4&36&3(+)&,0-#:%&'(%)*),:#'13/(143(+0-#6&%)+)4)(,0-#(,2#63&9/00)&,(%0-#(,2#4&,015/3)0+0#/%)+/0#),#+./#
5/2)(#(,2#+./#4&55/34)(%#0/4+&3#?@A%()3-#BCCCD"##!E(32+#(,2#F/:3)#?BCCCD#(3/#8+(%)(,#(1+&,&5)0+0#;.&#1,2/30+(,2#G56)3/#(0#(#,/;#9&35#&9#0&</3/):,+7#H4&56&0/2#
&9#(#0/3)/0#&9#,(+)&,(%#(,2#0163(,(+)&,(%#&3:(,)050#1,)+/2#1,2/3#(#0),:%/#%&:)4#&9#31%/I#?6"#=))D"#J./)3#<)/;6&),+#)0#
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similar to a network, which forces local states to affiliate or integrate into the new world order 
for survival purpose. Their analysis is that the nation-state has increasingly less power to regulate 
global flows of money, technology, labors, and goods, and impose its authority over the 
economy (p. xi). Castells’ trilogy portrays globalization as the rise of new economy, where 
productivity is generated through global networks of interaction. Castells (1996) argues that the 
notion of transnational corporations as centralized structures, which drive globalization, is no 
longer valid and “should be replaced by the emergence of international networks of firms and of 
subunits of firms, as the basic organizational form of the informal and global economy” (pp. 
206-207). His theory of network society depicts nation-states as powerless entities destined to 
fade away or to become nodes in a network, and will eventually surrender their sovereignty. 
More particularly, some scholars see the state as increasingly powerless, or even 
obsolete, given globalization. Beck (1992; 2000) conceptualizes the rise of globalization as 
“second modernity,” which is characterized by denationalization. He sees positive aspects in the 
idea of globality, in which closed and limited spaces such as nation-states are becoming illusory 
due to the growing political and economic influence of transnational actors. Beck’s (1999) view 
is that the global risks such as ecological crises and the crash of global financial markets cannot 
be completely resolved by the state. Strange (1994) focuses on the “market-authority nexus” and 
argues that the global market has gained significant power in comparison with nation-states 
which are inflexible and limited to their geographic territories. In her book, The Retreat of the 
State (1996), Strange argues that the authority of all states has become diminished as a result of 
technological changes, global financial capitalism, and the integration of national economies into 
a global world economy. Kenichi Ohmae asserts in his two books, the Borderless World (1999) 
and The End of the Nation State (2000), that the nation-state is becoming obsolete because the 
nation-state is no longer the optimal unit for organizing economic activities within its borders 
due to the “borderless” regional and global economy.3  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As noted above, many globalization theorists appear to forecast the dissolution of 
national boundaries, corporations, industries, and economies, after which everything will 
converge into transnational organizations beyond the reach of nation-state power. Ironically, 
both neoliberal hyper-globalists and leftist critics appear to advocate or, at least, accept the 
“withering away of the state” thesis. The thesis may be correct and plausible as a grand theory or 
discourse that seeks to address social change on the global level. National economies and the 
political domain have become increasingly complicated in the context of globalization. Thus, the 
changing environment may weaken the capacity of states or reduce their roles as drivers of social 
change in comparison with transnational forces. In the context of many globalization theories, 
the image of the state is not that of a decision-maker but rather a decision-taker. However, if we 
investigate certain cases on the national level in a detailed manner, the thesis does not always 
turn out to be true. 
There are different viewpoints regarding the role of the state during the neoliberal 
globalization period. Stiglitz (2002) diagnoses that the sequencing and pace of globalization was 
neither fair nor appropriate, and neoliberal “reform” driven by transnational institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created serious problems in many national economies. In 
comparing Latin America and East Asia, he emphasizes that the capability of the state to control 
capital within its borders was crucial for rescuing the national economy while confronting “ill-
designed” neoliberal economic globalization. Weiss (1998) also argues that the capacities of 
states to engage in domestic transformative strategies influenced the successes of national 
economies under global capitalism, and the strength of external economic pressures was largely 
determined domestically.  
Some critical scholars offer clearer viewpoints concerning the role of the state during the 
capitalistic globalization. Woods (2005) points out that the nation-state has been an 
“indispensable instrument in the process of spreading capitalist imperatives” to every corner of 
the world (p. 137). Her analytical viewpoint is that the greater the degree to which the 
globalizing tendencies of capitalism increased, the more likely the world was to become a world !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of nation-states. Woods (2005) argues that, although the role of transnational corporations and 
various transnational institutions has been emphasized in explaining the spread of global 
capitalism, “there is little evidence that global capital is losing its dependence on national states” 
(p. 138). Harvey (2007) sees neoliberal globalization as being strongly associated with “the 
restoration or reconstruction of the power of economic elites” or “a political project to re-
establish the conditions for capital accumulation” on a global scale (p. 19). His analysis of 
neoliberal globalization asserts that the state plays a central role in introducing and promoting 
neoliberal regimes within its borders. The state takes a significant role in transforming the 
national economy into more capitalistic structure by creating and preserving an institutional 
framework that meets the needs of both domestic and global capital. !
Given this context, this dissertation takes a different stance against the perspective on 
globalization taken by many globalization theorists who neglect the role of the state. Many 
globalization theorists understand the state as lacking any choice, something which passively 
reacts to transnational forces or the new global order. In contrast with these views, this study 
takes the viewpoint of critical scholars such as Harvey, and argues that the state takes an 
important role in the context of regional circumstances although the role of the state fluctuates 
and changes depending on the political, economic, and social environment in which it operates. 
This does not argue that Korea has been immune to neoliberal globalization, which is 
characterized by open markets and the free flow of capital and labor and whose end result has 
been a high level of economic homogenization with respect to global capitalism. Korea is instead 
a model student who has actively integrated its national economy into the global capitalist 
system. This researcher’s investigation of wireless telecommunications policy changes in Korea 
since the late 1990s leads to the claim that the state is not a relatively passive victim of 
transnational capitalism, and is instead either an active supporter of neoliberal globalization or 
acts as one of the major strategic actors, along with transnational forces and domestic capital, in 
reshaping its national economy within its borders.  
Why does this dissertation examine wireless telecommunications policy in Korea? 
Telecommunications is an essential component in the expansion of transnational capitalism, 
which functions as global conduit of virtual goods and capital flows. Schiller (2000) points out 
that the worldwide transition to market-driven telecommunications aims to provide “the 
production base and the control structure of an emerging digital capitalism.” (p. 37). 
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Telecommunications has thus been a significant domain in neoliberal globalization. It is the 
place where transnational forces push nation-states to liberalize their telecom markets, reduce 
state interventions in industry, and connect local networks to a global telecommunications 
network. 
The state has a special relationship with telecommunications in several respects. First, 
telecommunications is a part of national infrastructure that is indispensable to the growth of the 
national economy (Röller & Waverman, 2001). It functions as a critical input during the 
production and delivery of goods and services in nearly every other industry sector. In addition, 
telecommunications is a vital component of national defense. National security concerns led to 
the development of a national telecommunications network that was closely tied to the military at 
the outset of telecommunications history as well as during the Internet era (Abbate, 2000; 
Headrick, 1991; John, 1995; Schiller, 2008; Winkler, 2008). Telecommunications is an essential 
tool for disaster relief. The state gave top priority to improving the reliability and resilience of 
the telecommunications infrastructure to be used during disasters within national borders. 
Telecommunications is often regarded as a basic function of the state, along with other essential 
networks such as roads, electricity and water. Public utilities are often state-owned and state-
operated because they are essential for human survival as well as maintaining a sustainable 
society.!
For these reasons, nation-states have not fully yielded to transnational forces and have 
attempted to maintain their interventionist power over their domestic telecommunication 
industry. For instance, some nation-states have set limits on foreign ownership in 
telecommunications due to concerns about national security while liberalizing their telecom 
markets. In addition, developing nations hope to retain their ability to intervene in the telecom 
industry. They use their telecommunications infrastructures and industries as a strategic tool for 
boosting national economic growth and social welfare. 
Thus, telecommunications has been an important battlefield, where the interests of 
nation-states and transnational forces conflict to a greater extent than is the case for other 
domains of globalization. More particularly, wireless communications has been the fastest-
growing and most profitable segment of the communications industry on both the global and 
national scale. The emergence and growth of wireless telecommunications occurred during the 
same period as the rise and diffusion of telecommunication liberalization worldwide. Wireless 
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communication recently became more important due to the rapid convergence of mobile and 
broadband. Investigating the changes in wireless telecommunications policies in a particular 
nation can uncover more of the nuanced and detailed dynamics between the state and global 
forces during the process of globalization.  
Furthermore, Korea has topped a global list that ranked countries on the basis of their 
state-of-the art broadband and wireless infrastructure, high level of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) access, usage and skills since the late 1990s. This success is 
often attributed to the active role played by the state, industry dynamics, and the unique online 
culture that exists in Korea. Examining wireless telecommunications policy in Korea provides a 
valuable case study for understanding complicated interactions between the state, global forces, 
domestic capital and other actors in the nation’s telecom policy landscape, and more broadly, in 
global telecommunications. 
This dissertation will also add users as possible actors in the telecommunications policy-
making process along with the nation-state, global forces, and domestic capital. In 
telecommunications, users are both the consumers of services that network operators provide and 
are also the indispensable components of the network itself. Users are a significant factor 
influencing telecommunications policy changes. For instance, Schiller (1982) reveals that large 
business users of telecommunications services were a major driving force in bringing about US 
telecommunications liberalization. This is important work because it focused on the emergence 
of business users, who both brought about a power shift in the US telecom industry and later 
became transnational forces in global telecom liberalization. However, few studies have 
examined the influence of individual consumers on the telecommunications policy-making 
process to date. This dissertation examines how individual users, who network in online 
communities, participated in the policy-making process in a neoliberal policy landscape. It also 
examines how they interact with other actors such as the government and business players by 
providing case studies on mobile Internet standard policy and wireless number allocation policy 
in Korea.  
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A variety of researchers have attempted to analyze Korea’s political economy and 
industrial policy as a valuable case study for examining power-relations between state and 
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capital. Yet the inconstant trajectory of policy regimes in Korea led researchers to misread the 
nature of policy regime change and the role of state, domestic capital, and other actors. For 
instance, some scholars assert that Korea provides indisputable evidence of a powerless state that 
abandoned its developmental strategy and relinquished its heavy-handed market intervention 
after neoliberal globalization (Kim, 1999; Minns, 2001; Pirie, 2008). On the contrary, some 
scholars argue for “the return of the state,” in the sense that post-crisis Korea regained the power 
to reform the private sector and coordinate the interests of business players, while it generally 
conformed to the tenets of neoliberalism (Hundt, 2005). These different and contradictory 
interpretations regarding Korean political economy and policy come from researchers’ static 
analyses that focused on specific periods and policies. This dissertation pays a great deal of 
attention to the history of wireless telecommunications policy change without confining the 
scope of the research to a single period. 
Furthermore, there have been unproductive dichotomous perspectives that have been 
used in attempts to understand Asian regional development under globalization. A popular 
viewpoint in political economy studies4, often referred as “the end of the developmental state” 
thesis, proposes that East Asian states have converged into a “neoliberal regulatory state” since 
the late 1980s (Haggard, 2000; Pang, 2000; Amyx, 2004; Jayasuriya, 2005; Pirie, 2005a; 2005b). 
It understands that nation-states in the region ceased traditionally strong intervention in markets 
and passively converged upon the neoliberal model of capitalism under the pressure of 
globalization. On the other hand, a different view posits that there has been a greater degree of 
continuity with the “developmental” past than substantial changes, despite neoliberal reforms 
(Hundt, 2005; Lee and Han, 2006; Thurbon and Weiss, 2006; Vogel, 2006; Walter 2006).   
These views prevent us from acquiring a balanced understanding of power-relation 
change and developments both within the regional context and under global conditions. As 
regards Korean wireless telecommunications policy, the interactions between the government 
and the private sector have not been so simple that one can rely on a basic dichotomy: neoliberal 
convergence vs. the return of the developmental state. These two arguments share the 
assumption that the developmental state is incompatible with the neoliberal state. The proponents 
of the convergence thesis highlight an excessively big picture, that of economic homogenization !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%!8,#+.)0#0/,+/,4/-#U6&%)+)4(%#/4&,&57P#.(0#(#'3&(2/3#5/(,),:-#;.&0/#:&(%#)0#+&#1,2/30+(,2#0&4)(%#4.(,:/0#(,2#
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and isomorphic institutionalization under global capitalism, while neglecting regional 
particularity or the national context. They seem to equate developmentalism with protectionism 
or authoritarian control over the market. Meanwhile, the advocates of the state’s return 
overemphasize the role of the state or the particularity of relations between actors within national 
borders, while neglecting the forces of larger social change. 
However, the practices of the neoliberal state and the developmental state are not 
mutually contradictory, unlike their popular conceptions. The fundamental principle of 
neoliberalism is that a self-regulating market is superior to other modes of organization such as 
state intervention and, thus, governments should return to a minimal role along the lines of a 
“night-watchman state” (Hayek, 1944). This viewpoint is that the neoliberal state is theoretically 
unable to coexist with the notion of a developmental state, which is characterized by strong state 
intervention in the market. However, the practice of a “neoliberal state” is different than the 
theoretical notion. The neoliberal shift was made possible by the political power of state 
apparatus. Thus, according to Plant (2010), neoliberals sought to limit government but the 
practical result of their policies has often been a huge expansion in the power of the state. As the 
market acquired more freedom, the strong need for “re-regulation” emerged, ironically enough, 
in industries such as finance and telecommunications (Moran, 1991; Vogel, 1996). Schiller 
(2000) points out that continuous political intervention was paradoxically necessary to actualize 
something approaching a free-market regime in telecommunications (p. 2). The neoliberal drive 
required national authorities to establish new rules for industry, such as a competition policy for 
telecommunications, instead of eliminating state intervention from the market (Jordana & Levi-
Faur, 2004). 
The practices of developmental states are not necessarily incompatible with the practices 
of a neoliberal state. Developmental states were originally defined as “states whose politics have 
concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and 
promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a 
varying combination of both” (Leftwich, 1995, p. 401). In other words, the developmental state, 
a distinctive brand of capitalism often found in East Asia, is the embodiment of the kind of 
economic growth that should be prioritized and helps define the appropriate role of the state in 
the pursuit of economic growth (Thurbon, 2011). Thus, the specific features of a developmental 
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state that continuously change depend on the particular political economic environment that a 
country faces. As the free market system came to dominate the globe, old forms of development 
and state intervention were reconfigured. Developmental states facing neoliberal globalization 
become consistent with the new global system to the degree that they facilitated market 
competition, accepted the rules of free trade, and relied upon open export markets, while also 
becoming “actively interventionist in creating the infrastructures for a good business climate” 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 72). 
It is necessary to look beyond this unproductive dichotomy in order to better understand 
both Asian regional development under globalization and the transformation of its 
telecommunications industry. A reconfigured or hybrid type of regime, where aspects of 
neoliberal economic model are integrated into the developmental state and where neoliberal 
features and developmental legacies co-exist or are embedded with each other, can be deemed a 
“neoliberal-developmental state5” (Liow, 2012). This dissertation traces the historical trajectory 
of wireless telecommunications policy by applying the concept of the neoliberal-developmental 
state. The framework of the neoliberal-developmental state has three main features!in this 
dissertation. First, the neoliberal transformation of telecommunications industry is an ongoing 
project. Transnational forces continuously push nation-states to retreat from intervention in 
industry, which nation-states have long conducted for national development purposes. As new 
technological innovations continuously occur in telecommunications, the conflict between 
national and transnational interests reoccurs and revolves around emerging industries driven by 
new technologies. For instance, when the Korean government led the technological development 
of a wireless broadband platform standard (Wireless Internet Platform Interoperability, or WIPI), 
counter-pressure was brought to bear by the US government and US high-tech corporations, 
including Qualcomm and Sun Microsystems, and subsequent interactions between the state, 
transnational forces, and domestic businesses formed a different stage of the policy network 
surrounding the WIPI mandate. 
Second, the role of the neoliberal developmental state as a facilitator varies depending on 
factors such as global economic change, domestic politics, and domestic business interests !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&!T)&;#?BC!BD#10/2#+./#+/35-#,/&%)'/3(%K2/</%&65/,+(%#0+(+/-#),#./3#4(0/#0+127#&9#@),:(6&3/-#(,2#9&410/2#&,#%('&3#
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during different time periods. However, among political and economic variables, domestic 
politics are the most influential factors for deciding the contours of the telecommunications 
policy landscape, because external neoliberal pressures and internal business interests have not 
decreased but exist as a given condition. For instance, during the liberal government6 period 
(1998-2008), the state took a leading role in initiating massive research and development projects 
in wireless telecommunications such as the International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 
(IMT-2000) and the Wireless Broadband (WiBro). It pursued the nation’s economic 
revitalization based on an IT-centric growth model and a Keynesian policy orientation. In 
comparison with other time periods, the liberal governments exhibited more developmental 
aspects, although conservative governments can also be regarded as having administered a 
neoliberal developmental state. 
Third, the nature of a neoliberal developmental state involves support for domestic 
capital accumulation. The basic goal is boosting the national economy’s competitiveness. State-
business linkages with shared interests for development prioritize supply-centric or growth-
oriented policies. In this situation, individual users of telecommunications services are apt to 
become alienated from policy, and are considered to be passive consumers who conform to 
government policies. Closed policy-making mechanisms, which mainly serve government 
developmental goals and business interests, bring about resistance from users. For instance, 
potential users who wanted to purchase the iPhone began to resist the government’s WIPI 
standard mandate. Individual users who wanted to keep their wireless telephone numbers began 
to take a stand against the government’s mobile number unification policy. 
 Individual users have usually been considered to be passive consumers or markets, and 
have generally not been regarded as actors in the telecommunications policy-making process. 
For this reason, the focus of analysis in telecommunications policy has been on political elites 
and business entities, although users have begun to appear at the center of technological 
innovation and social change in recent telecommunications debates (Hippel, 1998; 2005; Tuomi, 
2003; Sandvig, 2011). In Korea, supplier-centric policies such as device subsidies and WIPI have 
promoted favorable conditions for telecommunications conglomerates. The rapid replacement of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'!J.)0#2)00/3+(+)&,#2/9),/0#+;&#:&</3,5/,+0-#+./#X)5#Y(/KZ1,:#:&</3,5/,+#?!OO[KBCC\D#(,2#S&.#V&&KE71,#
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mobile handsets, the high cost of devices and the high price of wireless service have provided 
businesses with both a proving ground for new technological innovations and an easy path for 
accumulating capital. The result was that Korean domestic conglomerates such as Samsung and 
LG rapidly grew into global mobile industry giants. Nonetheless, users have exerted a limited 
degree of influence on policy-making because they have not been organized.  
The culture of new online communities allows scattered, discontented users to have a 
space where they can protest against telecommunications policy. A great deal of research on 
social movements demonstrates that new media environments such as the Internet can provide 
ordinary people who lack political power with new instruments to support their claims in 
cyberspace.7 Citizens began using new media to develop a “bottom-up” democracy by creating 
forums for discussion and deliberation, and sites for mobilization and action (Hacker and Dijk, 
2001; Beetham, 2005, pp. 150-5; Held, 2006, p. 250). In online communities, users produce and 
share their experiences, opinions, and knowledge. They have also organized themselves as 
potential actors who can impact the telecommunications policy-making process. This dissertation 
deems newly emerging online users who are self-informed and self-organized as being 
“networked users.” These networked users call for a more democratic telecommunications 
policy-making procedure that extends beyond the closed decision-making system in which 
developmentalist politicians/bureaucrats and neoliberal business elites have long predominated.   
Telecommunications users have long been framed as mere consumers or as a passive 
market from the economic perspective (Livingstone & Lunt, 2012). However, networked users 
can be understood as a new form of policy actor who actively interacts with other policy actors 
and attempts to influence policy changes. Networked users actively link their arguments in 
online deliberations with their offline activities. Networked users mobilize via various channels. 
They petition the National Assembly and contact the mainstream media to raise their voices 
against the government. The emergence of networked users can reconfigure an existing policy 
network and complicate interactions among the state and business. More important, networked 
users in certain cases evolve into collectives that can mobilize the legal authority to change 
policies by filing administrative lawsuits and a constitutional petition. As a result, the emergence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(!G06/4)(%%7-#3/0/(34.#.(0#'//,#2&,/#('&1+#+./#8,+/3,/+P0#)56(4+0#&,#:%&'(%#0&4)(%#5&</5/,+0#'7#0+127),:#
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of networked users sometimes challenges the power of the state (or, at least, the power of 
regulatory agencies) by raising questions about the legitimacy of existing telecommunications 
policy.  
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Korea’s wireless telecommunications has been transformed from a public monopoly to a 
market-based approach since the 1990s. This change in the Korean telecommunications 
landscape was a part of the trend toward neoliberal globalization that began in the 1980s. The 
neoliberal ideas and policy packages that drove the structural shifts in the telecommunications 
sector originated in the US and were diffused to the rest of the world (Hill, 1986; 2007, Schiller, 
2000). It is clear that a series of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation initiatives 
restructured the contours of Korea’s wireless telecommunications landscape just as occurred in 
other countries. 
However, neoliberalization is not a one-shot project but rather an ongoing process in 
Korea. In addition to neoliberal packages such as the privatization of existing public telecom 
enterprises, new licensing of wireless services, and various deregulatory measures, national 
research and development projects for homegrown wireless technology continue to be designed 
and implemented on a large scale in Korea. In the neoliberal and developmental context, actors 
such as the state, transnational forces, domestic businesses and even users dynamically construct 
and dismantle the policy networks that surround wireless telecommunications policy.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the historical changes in Korea’s wireless 
telecommunications policies from 1993 to 2013 by focusing on the changing interactions and 
power relations between actors in the policy field. This research addresses the following primary 
question: 
. What has been the relationship between neoliberal globalization and the nation-state 
during this period of historic changes for Korea’s wireless telecommunications policies? 
The primary question leads to the following sub-questions: 
. What was the role of the state in the development of wireless telecommunications 
policy, particularly in relationship to privatization, licensing, deregulation, and research 
and development? 
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. What were the nature of interactions between transnational forces, the state, and 
domestic capital? 
. Is there a new role for the culture and voice of networked users in specific wireless 
telecommunications policy-making processes? If so, what is its form? 
So far, there have been a number of studies of Korea’s wireless telecommunications 
policy. These studies have valuable policy implications and offer considerable insights that can 
help researchers understand the issues that involve the Korean wireless telecom policy and 
industry. However, none of these studies provide a complete picture of the changes that occurred 
in wireless telecommunications from a holistic viewpoint. Most of the research provides isolated 
pieces of the puzzle, but not the complete picture that is needed to understand the historical 
changes in Korea’s wireless telecommunications policy.8  
Given that wireless telecommunications policies concerning spectrum allocation, 
competition, standards, and so on are closely interconnected with each other in the Korean 
context, studies that have focused on individual policies may not be helpful for understanding the 
changes in the policy regime as a whole. In addition, some studies have typically employed 
methods such as simple descriptions of technological change, market research, or economic 
simulations of a single policy. A critical and balanced perspective is necessary in order to 
understand the complete and complex picture of Korea’s wireless telecommunications policies in 
the larger social context.  
This dissertation thus mainly relies on a critical perspective in the tradition of the political 
economy of communications, combined with concepts from developmental state theory to grasp 
the shift in power relations and the role that actors played in the historic transformation of 
Korea’s wireless telecommunications policy. For clarity, the scholarly literature will be reviewed 
in more detail in later chapters, as close as possible to the events that the literature seeks to 
explain. However, at this point it is useful to provide an introduction to the methods and sources 
of evidence that will be brought to bear on these research questions. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)!M&3#),0+(,4/-#+./3/#.(0#'//,#(#:3/(+#2/(%#&9#6&%)47#3/0/(34.#&,#;)3/%/00#0+(,2(320#?Z.&-#BCCd_#T//#b#`.-#BCC[_#
R.&1,:-#/+#(%"-#BC!!D-#4&56/+)+)&,#3/:1%(+)&,#?R.&)-#/+#(%-#BCC!-#@&,:#b#X)5-#BCC!D-#06/4+315#%)4/,0),:#?E;(,:#b#
e&&,-#BCCO-#X;&,-#/+#(%"-#BC!CD-#+/4.,&%&:)4(%#),,&<(+)&,#?T//-#/+#(%"-#BCCOD-#5&')%/#.(,20/+#01'0)2)/0#?X)5-#/+#(%"-#
BCC^D-#(,2#5&')%/#<)3+1(%#,/+;&3A#63&<)2/30#?VfF`D#?X)5#b#@/&%-#BCCdD-#(,2#0&#&,"#
!!
15!
!"^"#V/+.&2&%&:7#(,2#Y(+(#
This dissertation is based on qualitative research methodology. Qualitative research 
methods can be used to better understand social phenomena about which little is yet known, and 
can also provide a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of topics about which a great deal 
has already been learned (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In addition, qualitative research allows 
researchers to develop complex pictures of the problems being addressed. A holistic account in 
the qualitative research tradition involves reporting multiple perspectives, identifying multiple 
factors involved in a situation, and sketching the larger picture that emerges (Creswell, 2007, p. 
39). Thus, qualitative research is useful for examining the research topic of this dissertation: 
complex mechanisms and contextual interplays between the state, capital, technology, and users 
in Korean’s wireless telecommunications policy-making and the consequences of policy-making. 
Qualitative research allows the investigator to explore the research theme in a 
comprehensive manner by gathering multiple sources of data such as archival data, interviews, 
and observations instead of relying on a single data source (Creswell, 2007). Qualitative methods 
mainly investigate the why and how of human behavior and social phenomena in an in-depth 
manner, so smaller but focused samples are often needed. This study relies on archival data and 
in-depth informant interviews. 
The archival data in this dissertation comes from various sources: government documents 
in both Korea and the US, international organizations’ documents, archival records, and news 
coverage. Documents play an explicit and important role in the data collection process when 
conducting a case study (Yin, 2009). First, this study mainly collected documentary information 
such as agendas, announcements, government strategy and other written reports of events that 
are closely related to privatization, licensing, spectrum auctions, national research and 
developments projects in Korean wireless telecommunications. These documents were produced 
by regulatory agencies such as the Ministry of Communications (MOC), the Ministry of 
Information and Communications (MIC), and the Korean Communications Commission (KCC) 
from 1988 to 2012. Second, this study also relies on documents from US government agencies 
such as the US Trade Representative (USTR) and international organizations such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in order to understand the global pressures surrounding both 
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the Korean national economy and wireless telecommunications. Third, this study also used 
archival records produced by the Korea Bank, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), the 
Ministry of Finance and Economics (MOFE), the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO), and 
the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) in order to accurately describe the longitudinal trends in 
the Korean economy and the wireless industry, as well as the performance of conglomerates. 
In-depth informant interviews were used to further map the different positions of major 
stakeholders who were, and remain, involved in Korean wireless telecommunications policy. In-
depth interviews for this dissertation were conducted with three groups. First, officials of the 
KCC, a regulatory agency that manages both broadcasting and telecommunications, were 
interviewed in order to identify the goals and processes of policies and to understand the 
interactions with other actors in the policy-making process. The second group consists of 
corporate managers in wireless network operators including Korea Telecom (KT), SK Telecom 
(SKT), and LG Telecom (LGT). Third, lead users in two online communities were interviewed 
to identify the culture of user communities which surround the Korean wireless 
telecommunications. These groups are rare, so a combination of purposive and snowball 
sampling was used to identify them. They were recruited by means of e-mail contact. They were 
not offered compensation for participation. The interviews were conducted in Seoul from July to 
September 2012.  
Interviews with policymakers and business executives are a standard and effective 
method that is often employed in telecommunications policy research. The key constraint when 
employing interviews is obtaining access to relevant informants. It was helpful to consult with 
local people who had connections to the population being studied. This researcher contacted 
former officials in the KCC and business experts in the Korean wireless industry using this 
researcher’s work experience with Korea Telecom.9 This researcher interviewed four 
government officials in the KCC who were, and remain, directly involved in establishing WIPI, 
the spectrum auction, and wireless number allocation policy. This researcher also completed 
interviews with four corporate managers who were, and remain, directly involved in the 
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introduction of the iPhone, WIPI, the termination of 2G, wireless number allocation, and the 
spectrum auction.  
In contrast with interviews of policymakers, user interviews are a novel concept in 
telecommunications and a research method investigating users requires some explanation. In this 
study, this researcher interviewed five lead users from two online communities. Two points of 
contact were chosen to represent the types of users relevant to the wireless policies under 
consideration in this dissertation. The first point of contact for the user was Korea’s largest 
iPhone user community (http://cafe.naver.com/appleiphone, 1.27 million members, as of July 
2012). This community, known as Asamo in Korean, has been a venue for knowledge sharing, 
opinions, and collective purchases related to the iPhone since December 2006, three years before 
the Korean introduction of the iPhone. Users in this community exhibited critical attitudes 
toward the WIPI policy, and called for the abolition of the WIPI mandate by means of an online 
petition. 
A second point of contact with users was an online user community that opposed the 
unification of mobile identification numbers to 010 (http://cafe.naver.com/anti010, 27,000 
members, as of July 2012). In each community, lead users who had actively published their 
opinions concerning wireless telecommunication policies were interviewed in person. Different 
mobile identification numbers (or prefixes) such as 011, 016, 017, 018 and 019 have been used 
in Korea. Users receive these prefixes because regulators assigned these prefixes to each carrier 
before introducing 3G services. The KCC announced the mobile number unification policy in 
April 2011, and users who wanted to maintain their old prefix numbers were ineligible to 
subscribe to 3G services or use smartphones. In addition, these users were also excluded from 
the mobile carrier’s subsidy of new phones unless they changed their prefixes to 010. For this 
reason, users in this community filed administrative litigation against the KCC and a 
constitutional petition against the policy.  
In-depth and open-ended interviews were used for all three groups. In-depth refers to 
exploring a topic in detail in order to deepen the interviewer’s knowledge of the topic, and open-
ended refers to the fact that the interviewer is open to any and all relevant responses (Schensul, 
et. al., 1999; Johnson & Weller, 2002). This researcher employed an open-ended or narrative 
format of conversation in order to offer the participants the freedom to tell their stories while 
reducing intervention on the part of this researcher. This researcher choose this open-ended 
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interview format because it was anticipated be the best tool for sketching the dynamic process of 
conflicts and alliance among actors and for grasping the culture of users, considering the 
“authoritarian” cultural atmosphere of Korean society. All of the interview responses were 
audio-recorded and transcribed in Korean. The quotations that appear in this dissertation were 
translated into English by the author. 
This dissertation employs a form of policy research that is both based on a historical 
approach and which also provides multiple case studies. First, this dissertation is an investigation 
of the recent history of Korea’s wireless telecommunications, and includes a particular focus on 
the ever-changing political and economic environments and major policies such as privatization, 
licensing, and research and development. The historical approach is a useful tool for 
understanding structural continuity and changes in power relations in the telecommunications 
policy field. This dissertation categorizes three major time periods for the purpose of clarifying 
political economic environments and the accompanying changes in related wireless 
telecommunications policy, depending on political regimes and global economic events (See 
Table 1). This research begins by analyzing the Kim Young-Sam government period (1993-
1998), when the full-fledged neoliberalization of both the national economy and wireless 
telecommunications began. The research then moves on to the liberal government period (1998-
2008), which followed the 1997 Asian economic crisis that reshaped the nation’s political 
economic landscape. The research examines how the corporatist state pushed a recovery strategy 
based on Keynesian policies and information-centric development model. Finally, the study 
examines the Lee Myung-Bak government period (2008-2013), when a strongly neoliberal 
political party returned to power at the time when the 2008 global financial crisis began. 
Second, this dissertation provides two specific case studies for promoting the 
understanding of the emergence of networked users in the telecommunications policy landscape. 
One case study involves the case of WIPI policy, a national standard for the mobile Internet 
platform. This research analyzes the role of, and the interactions between, the government, 
global actors, domestic businesses and users, which surround the formation and removal of a de 
jure national standard for mobile broadband. The other is the case of wireless number unification 
policy. This dissertation examines the historical changes in the wireless number allocation 
policy, and includes a particular focus on the resistance from networked users who were 
discontented with a policy that primarily served the interests of business players.  
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As this dissertation is chronologically organized but also includes specific case studies 
that are described in additional detail, this summary will also identify the dates and list the 
specific policy cases included in each chapter. Chapters 2 through 4 employ historical and 
political economic methods and provide holistic context and evidence for the central concepts 
engaged in this dissertation. Chapters 5 and 6 rely more centrally on interviews and focus on 
specific case studies that test and elaborate the patterns developed in the preceding chapters. 
Each chapter will now be discussed briefly in turn: 
Chapter 2 will rely primarily on historical methods and delineate the neoliberal 
transformation of wireless telecommunications under the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-
1998) by examining three policy cases of interest. The chapter first focuses on investigating the 
four significant political economic environments which surrounded the transformation: 
increasing neoliberal pressure from the US government and international institutions, the change 
in domestic politics after democratization, the repression of the labor movement, and the growth 
of domestic capital power after financial liberalization. This chapter highlights three policy cases: 
(a) the process of licensing new cellular service providers, (b) the privatization of Korea Mobile 
Telecom (KMT), and (c) the research and development of Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA) technology. As regards these three policy cases, the chapter identifies how power 
relations between the state and domestic capital shifted and explains how the traditional 
developmental model changed during the process of wireless telecom liberalization. 
Chapter 3 documents the political economy of Korea’s wireless telecommunications 
under the liberal government (1998-2008), again employing historical and political economic 
methods. This chapter focuses on how Korea functioned as a neoliberal developmental state that 
adopted a Keynesian recovery strategy and an information-based growth model after being 
confronted with the 1997 Asian economic crisis. This chapter analyzes how the mixed 
characteristics of the Korean political economy shaped major wireless telecommunications 
policies. It also examines power relations in the policy-making process, and analyzes a selection 
of three policy cases: (a) the privatization of KT, (b) the R&D projects and the process of 
licensing the IMT-2000, and (c) the R&D projects and the process of licensing the Korean 
WiBro, the home-grown wireless broadband technology.  
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Chapter 4 is the last chapter that relies only on historical and political economic methods. 
It investigates the nature of the major changes in wireless telecommunications policy under the 
Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-2013). The chapter first analyzes the political and economic 
environments that surrounded Korea’s wireless telecommunications from four perspectives: the 
return of conservative government with an intensified neoliberal policy orientation; the Korea-
US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Korea’s accelerated integration into the global economy; 
increasing corporate power and the rise of Korean IT-based transnational corporations; and the 
reorganization of regulatory agencies. The chapter then examines how political and economic 
changes affected major telecommunications policies by investigating three policy cases, 
including (a) the approval of M&A, (b) the introduction of spectrum allocation, and (c) the 
promotion of Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) service market. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the interactions among actors in the policy landscape involved in 
mobile Internet platform standard policy. While it does use historical methods, it also includes 
material from interviews and the materials that users wrote in online forums. This chapter 
analyzes the underlying motivation of the Korean government in developing homegrown 
technology and standards. WIPI was a large-scale project that took more than ten years to 
culminate, and this chapter divides WIPI into two phases – the formation and collapse of WIPI – 
and analyzes the role of the state, transnational high-tech corporations such as Qualcomm, 
domestic players such as Samsung, and users. More particularly, this chapter will consider the 
iPhone import controversy that occurred from 2008 to 2009. The chapter analyzes the role of 
networked users, who wanted to use the iPhone and organized themselves into online 
communities during the removal of WIPI, and explains how networked users emerged as a 
political influence in the wireless telecom policy landscape. 
Chapter 6 investigates the interactions among actors who were involved in the policy-
making process for wireless number unification policy. Like the preceding chapter, this chapter 
relies on interview material. As was the case for WIPI, wireless number policy was also a long-
term project, not a one-shot policy. This chapter documents the trajectory of wireless number 
policy, and highlights its inconsistent changes that were caused by both the policy goals of 
government and the interests of wireless carriers such as KT, SKT and LGT. More particularly, 
this chapter will consider the wireless telephone numbering controversy that occurred from 2008 
to 2012. This chapter analyzes how and why networked users, who sought to keep their wireless 
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numbers, resisted the government and corporations. In addition, this chapter analyzes the impact 
of networked users’ resistance against policy, and focuses on their interactions with the 
regulatory agency and business players. 
Chapter 7 provides the conclusion, analyzes implications of this dissertation and suggests 
areas for further research.
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    Entered WTO (1995)   ! !  
     Joined OCED (1996)   Final Completion of FTA (2010) 
 The 1987 Democratization    
 The 1997  
IMF Crisis   
The 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis   
Major 
Events 
     
 
        
Government Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-88) 
Roh Tae-Woo 
(1988-1993) 
Kim Young-Sam 
(1993-1998) 
Kim Dae-Jung 
(1998-2003) 
Roh Moo-Hyun 
(2003-2008) 
Lee Myung-Bak 
(2008-2013) 
Regime Military regimes Civilian regimes 
Political  
Characteristic Conservative Liberal Conservative 
Phase The developmental state 
Neoliberal 
developmental state 
(N>D) 
Neoliberal developmental state 
(N<D) 
Neoliberal 
Developmental state 
(N>D) 
Government 
Intervention Strong (Strong Authoritarian) Medium (Mixed) Strong (Corporatist) 
Medium (Weak 
Authoritarian) 
Capital power Medium (Growing) Strong (Emerged) Strong (Unabated) Strong (Re-emerged) 
Major polices 
in 
Wireless 
Telecom 
Corporatization of 
KT & KMT 
 
R&D of TDX 
 
Preparation for 
telecom liberalization 
Privatization of KMT 
 
Licensing of cellular 
 
Licensing of PCS 
 
R&D of CDMA 
Government-led 
R&D of synchronous 
IMT-2000 
 
Licensing of IMT-
2000 
 
Private sector-led W-
CDMA 
IT839 developmental 
strategy 
 
Government-led 
R&D of WiBro 
 
Government-led 
R&D of WIPI 
Consolidation of 
industry 
 
Spectrum auctions 
 
Deregulatory 
measures: MVNO, 
Pricing, the “fourth” 
wireless provider 
Regulatory 
agency 
MOC: Industrial promotion particularly in 
telecommunications sector 
MIC: Focus more on 
telecom liberalization 
MIC: Strong control tower for entire “IT” 
industrial promotion 
KCC: neoliberal 
regulatory agency 
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This chapter will primarily rely on historical methods and investigate the neoliberal 
transformation of Korea’s wireless telecommunications under the Kim Young-Sam government 
(1993-1998) by examining three policy cases of interest. It focuses on the changes in the political 
economic environments, the role of the state, and shift in power between the state and domestic 
capital. Unlike the previous industrial structure and policy regime, which were based on a 
traditional model of the developmental state, Korea’s wireless telecommunications experienced 
fundamental changes during this time period. This chapter examines the major political 
economic changes in Korea and studies the crucial policy cases, including the licensing of new 
wireless providers, the privatization of KMT, the research and development of CDMA 
technology. This chapter argues that Korea’s wireless telecommunications was not an exception 
to neoliberal globalization, and also argues that the power in the industry began to shift from the 
state to domestic corporations. However, at the same time, the role of the state was not any less 
important than the interests of business players during the process. 
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Since the 1970s, the world has witnessed a ferocious wave of systematic transformation 
in politics and economics. Ideologically, this global change was encouraged by neoliberalism, 
the notion that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). Political theorists and economists such as Hayek and Friedman 
introduced the justification for “competitive capitalism,” which features a free market and small 
government that acts in the capacity of a “night-watchman state.”10 Their scholarly writings were 
welcomed by conservative politicians such as Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, and their idea 
became part of a neoliberal package of policies, political practices, and went on to become a 
global movement. 
Communications and transport have always had crucial roles in facilitating the flow of 
capital (Harvey, 2010). The current state of global capitalism developed as a result of speeding !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!96-&:*.,;0$5))<$!"#$%"&$'()"*+),-..+/($=!>>!?$(),/&,:0$/2./$/2&$0()@&$)4$7)A&6,*&,/$*+0/$5&$'-*-/&:$.,:$
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up the circulation of commodities and resources, and by reducing “the friction of distance” 
(Harvey, 1990). More specifically, the worldwide transition to market-driven 
telecommunications aims to provide “the production base and the control structure of an 
emerging digital capitalism” (Schiller, 2000, p. 37). The full scale and scope of development in 
global telecommunications networks and technologies occurred mainly to support the expansion 
of transnational capitalism (McChesney & Schiller, 2003). Given the significance of 
telecommunications to global capitalism, it is natural that telecommunications and the financial 
sector were core targets for liberalization.11  The resulting privatization and deregulation rapidly 
opened the telecommunications market to competition. 
Telecommunications liberalization first originated in the United States in the 1980s and 
was adopted by the rest of the world during the 1990s (Hills, 1986; Horwitz, 1989; Schiller, 
2000; 2007). The driving forces behind telecommunications liberalization were mainly United 
States-based transnational corporations and the US government. These forces sought easy access 
to the global telecommunications market, a reduction of the influence of national sovereignty, 
and the development of a global telecommunications system to serve their interest (Schiller, 
2007). International institutions such as the World Bank, ITU, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), and WTO mobilized to implement the liberalization of the telecommunications 
sector (Hills, 2007). In many countries, the result was the dismantling of the state monopoly 
based on the Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications (PTT) model12 and the introduction of 
market competition. In the process, power in the telecom industry shifted from the state to capital 
and the emphasis switched from serving the public interest to serving business interests (Hills, 
1986).  
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Reaction to the tide of telecommunications liberalization emerged in diverse and dynamic 
ways. Each country followed a different path depending on its domestic political and economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""!I(()6:-,7$/)$J)7&'$=#FFK?B$/&'&()**+,-(./-),0$'-5&6.'-8./-),$1.0$.(()*@.,-&:$5D$4-,.,(-.'$:&6&7+'./-),$-,$
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conditions. For instance, the British pluralist political system, unlike Germany’s corporatist 
political system, actively responded to the growing demand for deregulation from corporate 
users (Duch, 1991). In contrast, in developing South American countries, the more centralized 
the power of government was to begin with, the more easily and forcefully that government 
reorganized its own telecommunications regime in a neoliberal fashion (Petrazzini, 1995). 
Unlike other regions, telecommunications liberalization in East Asian developmental 
states exhibited a more restrained scope and a more protracted process due to their unique state-
business alliances for the support of national development. Many developmental state theorists 
argue that the state functions as a catalyst or as a leading partner13 with industry, which responds 
to the sorts of incentives and disincentives that states establish (Evans, 1995; Gold, 1986; Wade, 
1990a; Weiss & Hobson, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999). This mechanism resulted in developing 
Asian countries not directly welcoming neoliberal pressure on their industries, including the 
telecommunications sector. They instead adjusted neoliberal policies to fit their national 
contexts.  
 As noted above, there have been a number of excellent scholarly political economy 
studies that have offered both a big picture and clues for understanding the neoliberal 
transformation of the telecommunications industry and policy. Nonetheless, little has said about 
the Korean case, particularly the wireless telecommunications sector. This chapter thus identifies 
major political and economic events which affected the transformation of the traditional 
telecommunications regime in Korea, the role of the state during the regime change, and the 
changing power relationship between the state and capital. 
This chapter first illuminates several aspects of the environment surrounding during the 
transformation period: foreign pressures, domestic politics, domestic capital’s strategy, and the 
labor movement. This chapter will then examine the most influential policy-making processes in 
the wireless telecommunications industry during the transformation period: the privatization of 
Korean Mobile Telecom (KMT), the licensing of new mobile service providers, and the 
development of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology. This chapter seeks to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"%!%2&$0/./&;0$6&'./-),02-@$/)$0)(-&/D$-,$U)6/2&.0/$I0-.$2.0$5&&,$A.6-)+0'D$:&0(6-5&:$.0V$W&*5&::&:$.+/),)*DX$
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provide a historical account of the power shift in the early-stage Korean wireless 
telecommunications policy landscape, and is mainly drawn from archival sources such as 
government documents, newspapers14, and secondary literatures on the Korean wireless 
telecommunications policy.  
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In order to understand the structural power shift in Korea’s wireless telecommunications 
industry, we should first examine the period between 1979 and 1987. During this period, Korea’s 
goal was to both modernize its telecommunications infrastructure, which then lagged behind 
other industrialized countries, and to promote related industries by upgrading the infrastructure. 
Korea was then pursuing a form of rapid export-oriented industrialization with an emphasis on 
heavy and chemical industries. Korea’s telecommunications infrastructure was insufficient to 
keep pace with the nation’s economic growth during the 1970s. According to the ITU (2003), 
Korea had a market penetration rate of 0.36 fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in the 
1970s, barely one tenth of the world average at that time. Korea reached the world average 
market penetration rate in the early 1980s (pp. 1-3).  
During the 1980s, Korea experienced a ‘miraculous’ achievement in its 
telecommunications sector. The slogan “one family, one telephone line” was used to describe the 
millions of new fixed telephony lines that were installed to solve the country’s chronic shortage 
of telecommunications service. Government-led heavy investment facilitated the rapid expansion 
of telephone service. One exemplary case was the successful development and 
commercialization of Korea’s first indigenous digital circuit-switch exchanger. This national 
R&D project, known as the Time Division Exchanges (TDX) project, allowed Korea to 
substitute its own product for the imported electronic switching systems from developed 
countries and accelerate its network upgrade for fixed line service (MOC, 1988b, pp. 25-33). 
According to government-led telecommunication development policy, Korea expected to evolve 
from a net importer of telecommunications equipment to a net exporter within a short period of 
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time. By 1987, Korea experienced a $500 million trade surplus in the telecommunications sector 
because it was exporting telephone equipment to other countries (MOC, 1989).  
The key to the successful development of fixed line telecommunications in a short period 
of time was the strong government-led policy regime of that time period. In order to accomplish 
modernization and industrialization in telecommunications, a group of technocrats15 in the 
military government established an interventionist telecommunications regime based on the 
“developmental state” model (Kim, 2000). The most noteworthy policy decision was the 
corporatization of telecommunications services in 1980. Corporatization is usually understood to 
mean the process of transforming government organizations into state-owned corporations in 
order to introduce corporate and business management techniques into their administrations. 
During the 1980s, telecommunications strategies in most countries were situated somewhere 
between the US, British, and Japanese market ideologies and French statist policies, meaning a 
rapid deconstruction of PTT by means of full privatization, or an increase in the role of 
government by means of vertical nationalization (Noam & Kramer, 1994, pp. 2-3).  Interestingly, 
Korea instituted a hybrid strategy for the purpose of restructuring its PTT system. The traditional 
PTT system was split into postal and telecommunications bodies in 1981. Only the 
telecommunications was then managed as a public enterprise. Detaching Korea Telecom (KT) 
from the government allowed the state to both finance its network modernization program in a 
more efficient manner and also reduce Korea’s financial dependence on foreign investments. 
Accomplishing this required KT to issue telecommunications bonds. The result was that 
increased telephony rates several times!in the early 1980s. 
These changes were highly effective means of accomplishing government policy goals. 
The ratio of domestic funds as a percentage of total investment in the telecommunications 
infrastructure expanded from 48.4% in 1980 to 66.1% in 1984, and the ratio of foreign loans 
decreased from 21.9% to 7.9% of total investments (MOC, 1988b, p.105). In addition, unlike a 
direct privatization scenario, the government could easily control KT, which was a public 
enterprise, because of its stock ownership. The government forced KT to fund a state-run 
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scale research project intended to develop new telecommunications services and equipment 
technologies.  
In 1984, Korea applied the government-led development model to its burgeoning wireless 
telecommunications industry, expecting to reproduce the early success of the fixed-line 
telephone. The government established Korea Mobile Telecom (KMT), a monopolistic wireless 
service provider under the wing of KT. The company’s cellular service was expected to drive a 
lucrative market, the so-called “the goose that lays the golden eggs.” The company met these 
expectations. Before it was privatized in 1994, KMT had 70% annual growth for ten consecutive 
years. The Ministry of Communication (MOC), the telecommunications regulatory agency, 
established a long-term plan for boosting the mobile service and device industries and 
coordinated the entire process.16 Public enterprises such as KMT built the wireless infrastructure 
and operated the wireless telephone service. ETRI developed related technologies and provided 
them to private device-makers!using funds from KMT. Samsung, LG and Hyundai were the main 
wireless device manufacturers that chose to utilize these technologies. This alliance for 
development and “virtuous circles”17 within the telecommunications industry resulted from the 
government taking crucial actions while private corporations appeared to be acting as passive 
beneficiaries. 
In conclusion, Korea succeeded in developing its own style of telecommunications policy 
regime during the 1980s and began applying it to wireless telecommunications. Korea’s success 
in developing its fixed line telecommunications industry was mainly the result of the Korean 
government maintaining its autonomy or power in the policy-making process. Chang (2002) 
illuminates that developed capitalist countries often attempt to “kick away the ladder” in order to 
prevent developing countries from adopting protectionist policies and institutions that they 
themselves had used to promote their own earlier economic growth, which the United States did 
during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Had telecommunication liberalization been fully 
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services and equipment industry and also failed to accumulate indigenous telecommunications 
technology.  
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However, the political economy surrounding Korea’s telecommunications industry has 
rapidly changed since the late 1980s. Neoliberal pressure from the US and international 
institutions triggered the change. Domestic capital increased its power and began to liberate itself 
from state control. More crucially, the “democratic” government which had taken power away 
from the military regime, actively accepted neoliberal globalization and created favorable 
conditions for businesses by means such as repressing the labor movement. 
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The challenge to the interventionist Korean telecommunications regime initially emerged 
from outside the system. In the late 1980s, the Korean government faced increasing US and 
international pressure to open its markets.18  After the US market was liberalized in 1984, the US 
trade deficit with Korea in the US telecommunications equipment market increased rapidly19 
(ART, 1991, p. 58).  The consequence was that initial pressure was focused on the 
telecommunications equipment markets. However, these efforts expanded to include the entire 
Korean telecommunications service market in February 1989, when the United States 
government passed the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988. This act designated Korea as a “Priority 
Foreign Country (PFC)” and established legal grounds for retaliation by the U.S government 
against countries that exhibited a lukewarm attitude toward opening their markets (Bayard & 
Elliot, 1994).  
The Act’s telecommunications provisions provided a basis for US requests for Korea to 
liberalize its telecommunications markets through a series of bilateral negotiations (Larson, 
1995, p. 14). Korea’s one-legged dependence on exports made it particularly vulnerable to 
pressure from the United States, its largest trade partner at that time. In addition, the end of an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"*!=".$&)>?6*;@.B$!\$P.,+.6D$#F\\"$P.*&0$d-''&DB$/2&$LM$.*5.00.:)6B$.67+&:$-,$2-0$.::6&00$/)$/2&$9&:&6./-),$)4$
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economic boom driven by cheap oil imports, a low won-to-dollar exchange rate, and low interest 
rates had intensified concerns about an imminent economic crisis by late 1988. The United States 
and Korea finally reached an agreement on most of the controversial issues after five rounds of 
negotiations in 1989 and 1990.20  
Two of the agreed-upon measures, such as procurement and standardization, dealt fatal 
blows to the traditional telecommunications regime. One result of the agreement was that the 
Korean government was required to treat US companies in a non-discriminatory manner during 
the process of procuring telecommunications equipment. It was also required to refrain from 
mandating specific technology protocols and to provide foreign governments and companies 
with opportunities to express their opinions during the process of domestic standardization 
(MOC, 1990a).  The result affected one of the core elements of the traditional regime. This 
meant that the strong tie between the MOC, KT, and domestic equipment makers could be 
broken. 
The GATT and the WTO!stipulated that a neoliberal international regime was expected to 
establish rules ensuring free competition based on opening up monopolistic telecom services to 
the market (KIET, 1996). Given the United States’ aggressive pressure toward a free trade 
regime, telecommunications policymakers in Korea could not help but rethink their existing 
telecommunications regime and invite market competition into the telecommunications service 
sector. The technocrats of telecommunications policy realized the need to understand the 
changes in international circumstances and reflect those changes in their policy. It is noteworthy 
that the MOC dispatched a secretary to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for the 
first time in 1989, and that Korea was also appointed to the governing board of the 
Plenipotentiary Conference at Nice, France in 1989 (MOC, 1988a, pp. 259–266). 
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During 1987–1997, the domestic political environment changed dramatically, and 
transitioned from a military dictatorship to a civilian democracy.21 The June 1987 movement was 
led by dissident students, supported by the citizenry, and triggered the collapse of the 30-year 
military dictatorship. In 1987, Tae-Woo Roh was elected as the new president of Korea. After 
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more participation in the political sphere. However, as Bruce Cumings (2005) points out, the 
political system under Roh was by no means a civilian regime; the military coexisted with the 
ruling bloc and exercised veto power over opposition groups. The “partial democratization” that 
occurred in Korea proceeded without the dismantling of the repressive state structure (p. 349). 
The Roh government did as the former military regime had done, and attempted to maintain an 
emphasis on universal service with regard to telecom services while focusing on promoting 
economic growth through protectionism (Hwang, 1993, p. 8). The technocrats were proud of 
their accomplishments in promoting the landline telephone industry, and continued to express a 
willingness to reinforce the use of traditional policy principles and tools (MOC, 1988b).  
More drastic political change occurred in 1993. After winning the presidential election in 
1993,!Young-Sam Kim, the first civilian President, removed the power elite in the army from the 
government, finally retiring the military to the barracks. Many respected scholars and former 
dissidents joined the Kim government’s new cabinet (Cumings, 2005, p. 395). Most of the 
members of the new higher echelons of government had been educated in the United States and 
expressed strong neoliberal tendencies regarding public policy. Government elites shared the 
belief that continued active integration into the global economy was essential for sustaining 
Korea’s economic growth. Young-Sam Kim’s inaugural speech emphasized the free market and 
competition as one of the three core national agendas for the future. The President’s speech 
illustrated the priority given to a particular political agenda under the new government:!
 “The next thing we should do is to strengthen our economic vitality. To achieve this, the 
government should guarantee the autonomy of the market and encourage our companies to 
enhance their international competitiveness, instead of regulating and protecting them. The 
government will respect the creativity of the private sector. The government will reduce its 
budget and save money… This is the new economy that I now propose.”22 
Given this background, the Kim government adopted the “segyehwa” strategy as its top-
priority political agenda. Segyehwa is the Korean word for globalization. The Korean state 
attempted a top-down reform of the Korean political economy in order to cope with the rapidly 
changing conditions of global capitalism. The government set up the Globalization Promotion 
Committee, actively accepted neoliberal ideas and policy packages as “global standards” and 
began implementing reforms in the government’s administrative structure as well as education, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$$!M&&$=".$&)>?6*;@.B$WQ6&0-:&,/$^-*$h)+,7$M.*;0$E,.+7+6.'$0@&&(2BX$!Y$9&56+.6D$#FF]"!
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economic, science and technology sectors. The globalization drive of the Kim government was 
often deprecated as no more than a “political slogan” (Kang, 2000) and was criticized as a failure 
(Kim, 2000). It is true that Korea’s globalization drive was initiated by the state. The 
government’s globalization drive shaped powerful conditions on the nation’s economic and 
industrial policies including wireless telecommunications policy. In the post-Cold War era, 
neoliberal globalization was considered by Korean politicians to be a major type of external 
pressure. The active acceptance of globalization, or segyewha, reflects an “instrumentalist 
treatment of globalization.” In other words, the strategic approach sees globalization as an 
opportunity to boost the nation’s economic development and a means of obtaining a competitive 
edge against other developing countries (Shin, 2003, p.11). 
Most noteworthy is the fact that the Kim government finally decided to join the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1993. W. Michael 
Blumenthal, US treasury secretary in the Carter administration, first mentioned the need for 
Korea to join the OECD in 1978 (Kim, 1991).  The Korean government delayed joining the 
organization for a number of years because participation meant that Korea would have to 
restructure its economic institutions, norms and rules so that they would be in accord with free 
market ideology. Deregulation and liberalization in capital markets and major service markets 
were anticipated to be accompanied by participation in the OECD, which was a condition for 
membership (Shin & Chang, 2003, p. 70). Korea finally agreed to join the OECD during the 
Uruguay Round in December 1993, and this decision increased Korea’s need to liberalize 
wireless telecommunications market. 
Globalization is a detrimental challenge to developing countries in the sense that it 
pushes them to abandon  “catch-up strategies” founded on strong government autonomy or 
leadership. Korea as a developmental state succeeded in growing related industries and 
accumulating core technologies by pursuing huge national R&D projects in the 
telecommunications sector.  Maintaining this successful developmental model meant that Korea 
needed a “control tower”23 to manage conflicting domestic and foreign pressures. The result was 
that the Kim government established the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) as a 
telecommunication regulatory agency in December 1994. The MIC began with extended !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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authority over the regulation and promotion of information industries by absorbing the roles of 
the Ministry of Communication (MOC) and other departments such as the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI). 
From this point in time onward, the regulatory agency had dual explicit policy objectives: 
neoliberal and developmental. As will be seen later, the MIC the new control tower of IT 
industry and policy, had a hybrid mission: to push neoliberal policy packages in the 
telecommunications industry, including privatization and deregulation, and to actively manage 
developmental projects intended to create homegrown wireless technologies such as CDMA. It is 
interesting that Korea linked the legacy from the developmental state model – legacies such as 
huge government-led research and development projects – with Korea’s active efforts to 
integrate its economic system into global capitalism. Korea actively accepted neoliberal tenets 
under political agenda umbrellas such as segewha but, at the same time, did not abandon its 
developmental tradition.  
This hybrid type of strategic reaction to neoliberal globalization is best explained by the 
concept of the neoliberal developmental state. Scholarly studies of political economy posit that 
East Asian developmental states have converged into “neoliberal regulatory states” as a result of 
globalization since the late 1980s (Amyx, 2004; Jayasuria, 2005; Pirie, 2005a; 2005b). On the 
other hand, some have proposed that there has been more continuity than substantial change with 
respect to past practices despite global neoliberalization (Hundt, 2005; Lee and Han, 2006; 
Thurbon and Weiss, 2006; Vogel, 2006; Walter, 2006). However, the neoliberal state and the 
developmental state are not necessarily contradictory in practice, although the two notions may 
be in conflict regarding the role of the state. Strong state intervention is always necessary to 
make conditions favorable for business, as will be seen later. The role of the state has been 
creating and preserving an institutional framework that meets the needs of business.  
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Despite external pressure from the United States and domestic political changes, one of 
the most influential factors in telecommunications liberalization during this period was the rising 
pressure from domestic capital. There are three reasons why change in the power relationship 
between the state and capital in Korea was inevitable. First, the stake of private capital in the 
national economy skyrocketed, and the private sector emerged as the main driver of the Korean 
economy. When the government’s fiscal budget increased 3.76-fold from 1980 to 1990, the total 
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assets of the major domestic conglomerates jumped about 10-fold24 (Hong, 1996, p. 221). The 
rapid growth of these private conglomerates raised the question of whether or not the 
government’s role as a powerful driving force of the national economy, the developmental state, 
was still effective.  
Second, a series of financial market liberalizations in the 1980s, supported by both the 
chaebol and the United States, weakened traditional tools designed to control the chaebol, such 
as bank lending regulations (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, pp. 231–235). After the financial 
liberalization, the chaebol were allowed to both possess financial institutions and also finance 
their businesses using local banks without government intervention (Pirie, 2008, p. 82).  This 
change had a crucial influence on the chaebol’s entry into the telecommunication market, where 
infrastructure investments required massive infusions of capital. 
Third, given the close connection between the legitimacy of the government and the 
growth of the national economy, the increase in domestic capital led to a gradual shift away from 
authoritarian control over the market to a state-business linkage that was more flexible than had 
been the case under the previous regime. Kim (2000) states that the government sought to 
prevent policy failure, and began engage in close consultations with the chaebol before making 
important economic decisions, particularly decisions regarding telecommunications policy (p. 
455). For instance, the government did not impose its decision regarding the privatization of 
KMT and the licensing of a new cellular service provider in the 1990s. The government instead 
approached these policy issues in a cautious and consultative manner, and even authorized the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) to select the new owner of KMT as well as a new licensee 
at a later date.25  
 This change in the power relationship between the state and capital in Korea was 
apparent in the telecommunications industry. Three key factors decreased private capital’s 
dependency on the traditional telecommunications regime during the 1980s. First, the success of 
the regime allowed the telecom equipment industry to grow explosively. The expansion of fixed-
line telephone networks and its subscribers during this period brought about colossal market 
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growth of telecom devices such as key phones, cordless phones, and electronic circuit-switch 
exchangers. There were strict barriers to entry for foreign companies, and domestic telecom 
device makers were the exclusive beneficiaries of the rapid increase in demand. The domestic 
telecom device market recorded an annual growth rate of more than 20% from 1983 to 1987 
(MOC, 1988a, p. 86). 
Second, this rapid expansion of business meant that large domestic companies emerged 
as the primary users of telecommunications services. Business telephone users required a high 
degree of security and quality, and the number of private telephone lines skyrocketed during the 
1980s in Korea. Corporate data use increased so briskly that the ratio of voice to data equalized 
in the late 1980s. Business users often complained about the quality and price of the private 
networks provided by the monopolistic telecom system.26  Schiller (1982) pointed out that 
disagreements with AT&T about pricing and services led business users to become significant 
participants in US telecommunications policy changes, such as the Above 890 Decision (p. 89). 
Just as US business users did, Korean business users, most of whom were the Korean 
conglomerates, began protesting such policies during the 1980s.  
Third, capital’s dependence on the state decreased as their business strategies changed. 
Until the late 1980s, Korean telecom equipment manufacturers pursued risk-adverse strategies. 
Device makers usually copied advanced technology from developed nations such as the United 
States or were the recipients of patented technology from government research institutes such as 
ETRI. However, these companies could not avoid being forced to increase their investments in 
technology because price competitiveness decreased and the technology protectionism practices 
of multinational corporations increased in the late 1980s. Samsung’s successes in the 
semiconductor industry were achieved through risk-taking strategies, which encouraged active 
investments by chaebols to promote the development of new technologies. The competition for 
new R&D projects among private companies also increased in the late 1980s. The combined 
budgets of the top 32 private research institutes amounted to over $10 million in 1990, while the 
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Samsung Research Institute’s budget was over $100 million, which surpassed the budget of the 
governmental institute, ETRI (Hwang, 1993, pp. 183-187).  
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Despite the growth of the labor movement during this time period, and in a sprit contrary 
to that of the rise of capital, the labor movement found itself unable to exercise substantive 
influence over the sort of policy-making that had transformed the telecommunications regime. 
After the 1987 June Democratization Movement, the elimination of the most severe forms of 
oppression of labor organizations led to the rapid growth in union membership. Most labor 
activities during this period, however, involved wage rates, not political issues (Cumings, 2005, 
p. 392).  Only after the foundation of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in 
1995 did the government allow the development of a politically progressive labor movement. 
Meanwhile, the Korea Telecom Labor Union’s (KTLU) activities were becoming 
noteworthy. During the 1990s, the KTLU, had 49,000 members, the largest membership of any 
single union in Korea, and played a leading role in establishing the KCTU. During the 1995 
strike, 30,000 striking union members gathered at rallies in Seoul. The KTLU protested the 
telecom policy. In addition to a wage dispute, the union began criticizing three of the 
government’s policies:  
“First of all, we are concerned that the introduction of competition into public telecom service 
will result in mass layoffs.27 Second, we think that the privatization of KMT was an irresponsible 
policy because the government sold a public asset to the chaebol at an unreasonably low price 
and because there has been a concern that the chaebol have been skimming off the top after 
privatization. Third, we also oppose the full-fledged opening of the markets to foreign capital 
after the WTO’s Uruguay Round talk in 1994.”28 
The union’s arguments and concerns, however, did not affect the telecom policies 
because the conservative media supported the government’s repressive measures. Soon after the 
strike, the minster of the MOC charged the 60 heads of the KTLU with prosecution on charges of 
engaging in an illegal strike. Within three months, most KTLU executives had been arrested for 
obstructing the MOC. This process involved the major players in the conservative press, 
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labor union had crippled the nation’s ‘nervous system’ and inconvenienced the public. The 
KTLU filed lawsuits against seven newspaper companies for a correction notice but lost the 
suit.29 The most powerful opposition to the strike came from the “civilian” president. President 
Kim Young-Sam declared the union’s activities to be subversive plots against the government. 
“I view the recent illegal activities of KTLU as a huge threat to national security, not as an 
ordinary strike. It is immediately necessary for our government to impose strict punishment on 
the union leaders. Given the union’s continuous political opposition to the government’s 
information and communication policy, I cannot avoid believing that the union intends to 
overthrow the democratic government.”30 
This turmoil led to the labor movement in the telecom industry becoming stalled on the 
issue of wage demands. The opposition voices in the labor movement questioned the direction of 
telecommunications policy, and little has been heard from them since then.31 This reflects a 
paradoxical result of democratization in Korea. The establishment of the Kim government was 
made possible a result of the Korean democratization movement led by dissident students, 
workers and citizens. The problem was that the new government repressed the voices at the 
bottom. Internal pressures had grown in Korean society seeking economic democratization 
including labor-management relationships, but these pressures failed to bring about change and 
reform. Eventually, calls for removing the legacy of the “developmental alliance” between the 
state and the chaebol came from outside Korea around the time of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, as will be seen in Chapter 3.  
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The political and economic environments, which were linked to each other both in the 
global and the local contexts, brought about fundamental changes in the policy-making process 
and triggered a market-oriented shift in the wireless telecommunications policy landscape. The 
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services allowed Korean conglomerates, which were mainly chaebol, to enter the wireless 
telecommunications industry. The industry was expected to grow rapidly and become the most 
profitable market in the future. Chaebols’ entrance to the industry influenced the configuration of 
national research and development project. The project was a product of state-interventionism in 
the sense that the state initiated and attempted to manage the projects as a developmental 
objective. But, research and development projects such as CDMA reflected how the power 
relations between the state and domestic capital had begun to change. It shows that the interests 
of the Korean conglomerates were in conflict with the traditional R&D system, and had begun to 
veer away from government control during the Kim Young-Sam government period (1993-
1998). 
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The process of selecting a second cellular service provider took place from 1991 to 1994. 
It illuminates the manner in which pressure to change undermined the traditional 
telecommunications regime. In 1990, the MOC’s first restructuring plan for the 
telecommunications industry prescribed that the government should select a new cellular service 
provider by October 1992, and that the new provider would launch its mobile service by 1994.  
In reaction to the plan, other government ministers, such as the Minister of the Economic 
Planning Board (MEPB), and the Minister of Commerce and Industry (MCI) asked the MOC to 
postpone the plan. They feared that the low localization rates of mobile communication 
technology and devices, and the early introduction of competition to the mobile service industry 
would have a detrimental impact on the trade balance.32 Both academic economists and 
economists in state-run telecommunications research institutes such as the Korea Information 
Society Development Institute (KISDI) supported this concern.33 
Some political insiders and members of the press suspected that the Roh government 
would favor SunKyung (SK) chaebol in choosing a second cellular service company, indicating 
a matrimonial/nepotistic relationship between the government and SK.34 The truth was that the 
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bright growth prospects. The rapid growth of KMT, which had recorded triple-digit annual 
growth in terms of subscribers, revenues, and net profits since 1988, proved that this was likely 
to be a huge industry.35 Furthermore, the wireless telecommunications business was expected to 
be a breakthrough for the chaebol, who had suffered from profit erosion in their heavy-chemical 
industries since late 1988.  
The MOC pushed ahead with its plan on the grounds that President Roh wished to finish 
the selection during his tenure and that US pressure for liberalization had increased (Song, 1999, 
pp. 91–93). After a four-month evaluation, SK was selected as a final winner. However, 
controversy remained because the result of the selection confirmed widespread suspicions about 
the relationship between President Roh and SK. Other chaebols that had failed to pass the 
screening for licensing demanded an immediate cancellation of the selection. The opposition 
party criticized the government for policy failure and corruption, and also called for cancellation 
of the license. Even the ruling party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), pressured the 
government, aware that the Presidential election was coming up. Finally, the disruptions brought 
about by various political and economic interests forced the Roh government to cancel the 
license and turn over decision-making authority to the newly elected government. The initial 
process of selecting a second cellular service provider stirred up controversy and failed to 
produce any real outcome. 
The newly elected Kim Young-Sam government (1993–1998) approached the licensing 
issue in a cautious manner, while dealing with continual calls from both domestic chaebols and 
the US government to reopen the licensing process. Foreign investors such as AT&T, Motorola, 
and Ericsson used the facade of the US government to aggressively demand that the licensing 
process be restarted. These entities sought to sell their products to a newly licensed company 
whose procurement was estimated to exceed $0.5 billion during their first year in business.36   
As mentioned above, the procurement market in Korea was already open to foreign 
companies as the result of telecommunications negotiations between the United States and Korea 
during the 1990s. In addition, transnational investment capital had a serious interest in this 
profitable market. Nearly 300 foreign companies participated in six consortiums which had been 
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December 1993 was the watershed moment for foreign investment, which had added up to a total 
of $9 million in 1993, and this skyrocketed to $126 million in 1994. This rate of increase 
represented a growth rate of almost 1,300% (KISDI, 2001a, p. 171).  
After losing the initiative and facing pressure from both domestic chaebol and foreign 
capital investors, the Kim Young-Sam government adopted an old nostrum, the strategy of delay. 
The government added a new condition to the reopening to the effect that a new service provider 
should adopt CDMA technology instead of analog mobile technology (cellular). This provision 
postponed the service’s launch until late 1995 and was linked with the CDMA project, which 
ETRI and Qualcomm had propelled in association with Samsung, LG, and Hyundai. The 
intentions of the Kim government can be described as follows: First, the government needed 
time to search for optimal options in order to avoid repeating the policy failures of the previous 
government. Second, the government intended to avoid controversy regarding business favors by 
adopting CDMA, which had never been scrutinized commercially or technologically. 
In December of 1993, the deadline for finalizing the methods for licensing the award 
came to a close. The Kim government suggested a new guideline that linked the licensing of a 
new service provider with the privatization of KMT37 (Joo, 1995, p. 61).  The government then 
owned 64% of KMT’s shares!through KT. Thirty-six percent of the shares had already been sold 
through public offerings beginning in the late 1980s. The 1987 guidelines for privatization 
specified that the government could use a limited public share offering. In order to enhance the 
redistributive effect and enhance the legitimacy of the military regime, only low-income families 
and individuals were allowed to buy stocks. In other words, domestic chaebol and rich people 
were prohibited from purchasing public enterprise stocks and the government continued to 
control the public enterprises by owning over 51% of their shares.  
The Kim Young-Sam government changed the privatization policy to be so capital-
friendly that the chaebol could obtain managerial control over a public enterprise by buying its 
stock. In December 1993, the government announced a privatization plan that included 68 state-
invested or funded organizations and enterprises. There were three major principles: First, every 
public enterprise whose efficiency could be improved should be privatized. Second, public 
enterprises whose initial goals disappeared or weakened should be reorganized or annexed. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%)!P))$0/./&0$/2./$/2&$7)A&6,*&,/$+0&:$/2&$@6-A./-8./-),$)4$H.()*$/)$2-,/$/2./$/2&$H),7h.,7$76)+@$()+':$5+D$/2&$
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Third, incentive systems should be introduced to the other public enterprises in order to enhance 
their efficiency (Kim, 1996, pp. 32-33).  These guidelines allowed the government to permit the 
chaebol to own 45% of KMT’s shares.   
The most interesting point was that the government authorized the Federation of Korean 
Industries (FKI) to choose both a second mobile service provider and the new owner of KMT.38 
This was an unprecedented policy-making move. The state abandoned its rights and 
responsibilities to issue a license for public goods, and it gave the authority to the FKI, a 
representative interest group consisting of chaebol. In January 1994, the SK group became the 
major shareholders of KMT, and withdrew from the competition for new licensing. In addition, 
Shinsegi Mobile Telecom (SMT), whose dominant shareholder was POSCO, received the license 
for a new mobile service in June 1994. The government finally managed to put an end to the 
most controversial policies of the two previous administrations through the unprecedented 
“private sector’s autonomous coordination and consensus.” However, this lasted for only five 
years.  
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The license award process for a new wireless service demonstrates how the changing 
environment impacted the implementation of policies such as entry regulation. The CDMA case 
shows how the growth of domestic telecommunications device makers influenced the traditional 
R&D project system.  
There was concern about the saturation of incumbent analogue mobile networks due to 
the sharp increase of subscribers. The Korean government decided to rush into the development 
of digital wireless telecommunications technology in 1990 (MOC, 1990b, p. 83).  ETRI realized 
that the lack of fundamental technologies would prevent this development. Thus, in order to 
speed technological research on a solution, ETRI requested a technology transfer from Motorola 
and other companies that already possessed Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), the 
dominant technology standard in the global wireless telecommunications market.  
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However, the companies refused to transfer the technology for fear of helping a potential 
competitor (Song, 1999, p. 83). The MOC and ETRI failed to obtain the TDMA technology, and 
invited Qualcomm, which owned the patent for the original CDMA technology, to join the joint 
R&D project. Qualcomm’s CDMA was not accepted at that time as a technological standard 
even in its home country, and Qualcomm was a small startup company. Despite widespread 
domestic concerns about adopting an unproven technology (Han, 2007, p. 291), the MOC pushed 
ahead with its scheme, regarding it an opportunity for two reasons. First, the MOC thought there 
was little chance for TDMA to promote national competitiveness in the international market 
because the technology was already dominated by multinational equipment manufacturing 
corporations. Secondly, CDMA was more accessible than was TDMA in the particular aspects of 
technology transfer and “technology independence.”39 
In May 1991, the national-scale CDMA commercialization project was launched with a 
joint-development contract between ETRI and Qualcomm. The initial project was modeled on 
the development of TDX. The development of this electronic exchanger was considered to be a 
huge success by the traditional telecommunications regime. Under the government’s initial plan, 
the public enterprise KMT, and the mother company KT, were prospective purchasers who 
provided funds for the project. ETRI, the government’s R&D institute, obtained a related 
wireless transfer technology from Qualcomm and developed the entire wireless system to the 
commercial level. After successful testing, domestic equipment makers were supposed to 
participate in the project and produce wireless equipment that applied the results of the 
development process. This model was exactly the same as in TDX case except for the addition of 
KMT to the project. 
However, conflicts of interest among domestic chaebol led to a crack in the traditional 
technology development process. During the second of the four different stages of the project, 
the government selected Samsung, LG, and Hyundai as qualified equipment providers. Samsung 
and LG were unhappy with this, and questioned why Hyundai had been selected despite its lack 
of experience in making electronic exchangers. Both companies were seriously concerned about !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%+!%&(2,)(6./0$.,:$@)'-(D*.<&60$-,$^)6&.,$1-6&'&00$/&'&()**+,-(./-),0$2.A&$'),7$&*@2.0-8&:$W/&(2,)')7-(.'$
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the release of their core technology for telecom equipment such as electronic exchangers and 
personal wireless handsets.40  Samsung and LG called for a reduction of their participation fee, 
and declared that they would withdraw from the R&D project unless the government satisfied 
their demands. Their protest ended in about a month. The chaebol’s boycott of the state-led R&D 
project was unprecedented and inconceivable within the context of the traditional 
telecommunications regime. This was a harbinger of the regime’s dissolution during the CDMA 
development process. Under the subsequent Kim government, the chaebol’s attitude became 
more autonomous. 
In June 1993, when the Kim government announced that it would restart the licensing 
process and link the process with the development of CDMA, two noteworthy changes occurred. 
The first change was that the role of coordinating the entire project process moved from ETRI to 
the Institute of Wireless Technology Development (IWTD). In September 1993, IWTD was 
established as an affiliated organization of KMT, which was sold to the SK chaebol three months 
later.41 Despite the announcement connecting the licensing process to the development of 
CDMA, the MOC was unable to say with any degree of certainty whether or not the 
development of CDMA technology would be completely finished by the deadline. If the 
development plan were not finished on schedule, the MOC would become the target of various 
sorts of criticism from chaebol, foreign capital, and even the President (Song, 1999, p. 112). 
Furthermore, device manufacturers such as Samsung and LG continued to express their 
discontent with ETRI, saying that ETRI paid attention only to technological aspects of the 
project and neglected the commercial viability or feasibility of technology. For these reasons, the 
government handed over control of national-scale R&D projects to the chaebol.  
The second change was that KT had retreated from the project, and KMT had assumed 
leadership after being privatized. Once the SK chaebol obtained managerial control over KMT, 
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the KMT Technology Institute aggressively intervened in the CDMA development project.  KT 
was the mother company of KMT and was still owned by the government. It was asked to back 
off despite financing the project. These two events were tied to the licensing of a new wireless 
company and the privatization of KMT, and demonstrated that domestic capital had begun to 
escape from state control of the development of new technology.42  
The privatization of KMT had an immediate influence on the wireless equipment market. 
After being privatized in 1994, KMT changed its procurement method.  KT was a public 
enterprise that bought fixed-line equipment from every manufacturer that participated in the 
TDX R&D project43. KMT decided to procure wireless equipment from only one contractor 
using a competitive bidding process. This decision intensified the competition between device-
making companies participating in the CDMA project. In April 1994, LG declared that it would 
break away from the joint R&D project and would develop commercialized technology 
independently. In August 1994, Samsung followed LG’s example. Only Hyundai decided to 
remain engaged until the end of the project.  
When the joint R&D system collapsed, Samsung and LG spurred their independent 
development in order to move to a more advantageous position in procurement bidding. In 
February 1995, LG officially announced that it had succeeded in developing the CDMA digital 
wireless telecommunications system.44  ETRI reacted by protesting that LG had violated the 
agreement signed by the project participants and raised suspicions regarding collusion between 
IWTD and LG.   
Despite the vicissitudes of the process, Korea became the first country in the world to 
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During this process, the traditional telecommunications regime had been weakened. Domestic 
capital appears to have won a victory over the state. Chaebol such as Samsung, LG, SK, and 
Hyundai had emerged as the protagonists in the mobile telecommunications industry in Korea. 
CDODKD)01.)-.'%-6B%6-$*;)+6-$*;)FSSETFSSO)"*+)%1.)&$B.*'$*;)/4)U!3)$*)FSSV)
The second restructuring of the telecommunications industry occurred in 1994. The third 
restructuring occurred in 1995, and indicated that the liberalization of the wireless industry, and 
the collapse of the national R&D system, which had been based on the traditional developmental 
state model, was the watershed for market-oriented transformation. These events encouraged the 
chaebol confidence in dealing with politicians and other external factors. During the June 1994 
restructuring, lobbying of politicians by chaebol manufacturers led the government to fully 
eliminate the ownership limit on telecom service companies. The initial announcement stated 
that the MOC had set a maximum 10% of the shares as the ownership ceiling for a service 
company!by equipment-makers.46 However, the chaebol manufacturers lobbied in every possible 
way, including at the Blue House, and pressured the MOC to change this policy (Joo, 1995, pp. 
107-108).  The MOC eventually permitted the top four chaebol, including Samsung and LG, to 
become major shareholders of telecom service companies. 
The power struggle between the government and the chaebol revived in the July 1995 
restructuring and ended with the victory of the chaebol. The restructuring came about during the 
time of the high-speed IT infrastructure project.47 Funding this enormous project meant that the 
Korean government needed financial participation from domestic capital. The chaebol seized this 
opportunity, and objected that the government would require them to invest in uncertain markets 
such as high-speed data applications and software while maintaining unnecessary regulations on 
the lucrative telecommunications service market. The government eventually decided to attract 
chaebol participation in the construction of high-speed IT infrastructure by introducing full 
competition into the telecom service industry. The MOC announced that full-fledged competition 
would be invited into every type of telecommunications business (KISDI, 2001b, p. 13). This 
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decision meant that investments in the national backbone network were dependent on domestic 
capital from the chaebol.  
The July 1995 restructuring brought about severe competition between the chaebol. The 
event began when the government released a plan for providing the market with 27 new 
licenses.48  Given that the total number of telecom service providers was then only 15, the 
restructuring plan was an extreme version of liberalization policy, and was more than enough to 
promote immediate market competition. The most extreme case of competition occurred in the 
selection process for the Personal Communications Service (PCS) provider service,49 the mobile 
communication market which was expected to exceed over $10 billion in the near future.50  
During the licensing award process, the quasi-bidding system was controversial. The MIC, the 
successor to the MOC, issued a new rule that winners would be determined according to the 
amount of their contribution to the IT R&D funds.51  Had this rule had been applied, the license 
award process might have been used to the advantage of large conglomerates such as the 
chaebol. By that time, the chaebol had accumulated a large amount of capital and technology 
which they used to expand into the global market. For example, Samsung invested $150 million 
and acquired a 20% share in ENTEL in Chile (Lee, 1997, p. 113).  
The controversy intensified despite two previous public hearings. The MIC announced 
that it would postpone the license award process until the following year.52  This happened 
because the policy environment was worse than the MIC had expected in three ways. First, there 
was serious conflict between domestic capital companies. The top four chaebol, Samsung, LG, 
Hyundai, and Daewoo, argued that the MIC should stick to the original plan for domestic 
bidding. In contrast, small-and medium-size enterprises such as Hansol and Kumho insisted that 
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the MIC should take remedial measures to prevent “a feast of chaebol.” First, the Korean 
Federation of Small and Medium Businesses (KFSMB), the lobbying group for small and 
medium-size enterprises, pressured the MIC to give licenses to their member-led consortiums.  
Second, there was also a debate about technology standards for PCS. Unlike the license 
for new cellular service two years before, the government did not restrict the wireless technology 
that was set as a standard for PCS service. Instead, the national standard for PCS was supposed 
to be determined by consensus among the interested parties and technology experts. The 
beneficiaries of liberalization, SKT and Shinsegi, supported CDMA in light of their 
technological advantage and experience. KT preferred TDMA, because its rivals had expertise in 
CDMA.  
Third, there was pressure from political circles. The DLP, the ruling party, requested that 
the MIC give priority to the small-and medium-size enterprise-led consortium in the licensing 
competition. This was the result of KFSMB’s lobbying and the DLP’s concerns regarding 
election schedules.53 A general election was scheduled for April 1996. In order to attract votes, 
the ruling party distanced itself from the chaebol because anti-chaebol emotion was widely 
prevalent among the citizenry due to the increasing concentration of economic power in the 
chaebol. The MIC decided to postpone the selection process, just as the MOC had used a 
delaying strategy as a risk-avoidance method in 1993. However, the conflict and controversy 
surrounding the licensing of PCS and the criticism of the government’s decision failed to settle 
down. 
In December 1995, the MIC announced that it would change the method of selection 
screening from quasi-bidding to a lottery system. The MIC wanted to avoid the resistance of the 
chaebol, who had dropped out of the licensing screening process (Jung, 2006, p. 45).  This 
depoliticized policy indicated that the government had relinquished their authority and 
responsibility for selecting public goods for fear of resistance. After criticism from the chaebol, 
the MIC again changed the method of evaluating business proposals. In June 1996, the license 
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was divided into two parts, and finally enacted with each of the groups: one of the top 4 chaebol-
led consortiums, LG, and one of the small and medium enterprise-led consortiums, Hansol.54  
 
!"K"$a),('+0-),V$,&)'-5&6.'-8./-),B$@)1&6c02-4/B$.,:$/2&$6)'&$)4$/2&$0/./&$
In conclusion, this chapter notes that the Korean telecommunications industry was not an 
exception to the worldwide dissemination of the US communication system model that came into 
being in the 1980s. The US government and international institutions such as the WTO pushed 
the trend towards neoliberal transformation, which focused on deregulation and privatization of 
the mobile telecommunications market.  McChesney (2001) notes that “the centerpiece of 
neoliberal policies is invariably a call for [the] commercial communication market to be 
deregulated” (p. 2). Global forces triggered the change away from the traditional wireless 
telecommunications policy regime based on a developmental state model to a neoliberal 
economic model. 
This chapter also found that Korean conglomerates, which had accumulated capital and 
strengthened their economic power throughout the state-business alliance period during the 
developmental dictatorship, liberated themselves from state control by means of financial 
liberalization and rushed to the wireless telecommunications sector during the 1990s. All three 
policy-cases examined in this chapter, including the privatization of public wireless service 
providers, the licensing process of cellular and PCS services, and the research and development 
of CDMA, shows that the locus of power in the wireless telecommunications policy-making 
process began to shift away from the government and migrate to domestic conglomerates. 
The neoliberal transformation of industry and the power shift to market is not a new or 
unique phenomenon that is particular to Korea. However, this chapter also found that the Korean 
state played an important role during the transformation of wireless telecommunications policy. 
First, the Korean state during the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1998) actively accepted 
neoliberal globalization as part of the political agenda of segewha. The state played a crucial role 
in creating favorable conditions for business by implementing neoliberal policy packages that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'&!C.,0)'$1.0$,)/$.$0*.''c$)6$*&:-+*c0-8&$&,/&6@6-0&"$%2&$)1,&6$)4$C.,0)'$-0$*.66-&:$/)$/2&$)1,&6$)4$M.*0+,7"$E,$
^)6&.B$/2&$!>>F$6&A&,+&0$)4$M.*0+,7;0$4.*-'Dc6+,$5+0-,&00&0$.*)+,/&:$/)$g]>>$5-''-),B$.,:$&3(&&:&:$/2&$.,,+.'$
5+:7&/$)4$/2&$^)6&.,$7)A&6,*&,/"$M&&$d&&$H))$N+'$[$^.,7$P+,7$IB$W%2&$2-0/)6D$)4$M.*0+,7$4.*-'DBX$3./6&)
31$*(6*9$\$9&56+.6D$!>#>"!
!!
49!
included privatization and deregulation. Harvey (2007) pointed out that the major role of the 
state is “to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to the neoliberal practice” 
(p. 2). The state thus played a significant role in the neoliberal transformation of the Korean 
mobile telecommunications industry no less than was the case for transnational forces - including 
the US government, international organization, and transnational corporations - and domestic 
capital. 
 In addition, the Korean state, unlike other countries, did not abandon the tradition of the 
developmental state. Korea reorganized and empowered the telecommunications organization, 
whose mission was to both implement neoliberal policies and manage the national research and 
development of telecom technology. The state attempted to use the opportunity offered by 
neoliberal globalization strategically. This chapter depicts the research and development projects 
and the development of CDMA as an example of a power-shift in the wireless 
telecommunication policy. It also shows that the Korean state did not abandon the developmental 
model, although power-relations in the developmental projects were reconfigured to some degree 
in order to line up with the interests of domestic capital.$$
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This chapter investigates the political economy of Korean wireless telecommunications 
during the liberal government period (1998-2008). This chapter will rely primarily on historical 
methods and first delineate crucial events that surrounded the industry, including the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. And then, this chapter examines three wireless telecommunications policy cases, 
including the privatization of Korea Telecom, the R&D projects and licensing process of the 
IMT-2000, and those of WiBro.  
As regards the investigation of political economic environments and major policy cases, 
this chapter argues that the tradition of the developmental state was not reduced but instead 
coexisted side-by-side with neoliberal reforms, while the state responded strategically to the 
1997 Asian economic crisis. This chapter focuses on the Keynesian policy packages - such as 
expansionary fiscal policy, social welfare policy, and the promotion of consumption - as the true 
cause of the nation’s rapid recovery from the crisis. This chapter points that the emphasis on the 
information-based economic growth model intensified the developmental features found in 
wireless telecommunications policy. This chapter also claims that the state took a crucial role in 
initiating the large-scale research and developments projects, although the policies were often 
reshaped later on in order to promote the interests of transnational forces and domestic 
corporations.  
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The developmental state model has been widely adopted for the purpose of explaining the 
rapid economic development of East Asia. Johnson (1982) first conceptualized this in his 
analysis of the Japanese post-war economic miracle. The notion of the developmental state was 
created by conceptually contrasting it with the regulatory state55. Developmental states intervene 
directly in the national economy to promote economic growth by means of strong industrial 
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policies, while regulatory states govern the economy by setting the standards of behavior or by 
making formal and informal rules for the purpose of preventing market failures.  
The practical outcome of this conceptualization was that early developmental state 
theorists overemphasized an “autonomous” state featuring a large government bureaucracy, 
authoritarian domination over society, interventionist industrial policies, and economic 
protectionism (Amsden, 1989; Haggard, 1990; Wade, 1990a; Wade, 1990b; White & Wade, 
1988). Other scholars paid more attention to the shifting balance of power between the state and 
business, or the blurring of the line between the state and business, rather than the “autonomy” of 
the state by suggesting various conceptual metaphors.56 Nonetheless, the reification of a coercive 
and centralized state remains in the field of international political economy studies and often 
leads to misreadings of recent political economic changes in the East Asian region.  
For example, more than a few scholars of political economy have predicted the decline of 
the region’s developmental states (Haggard, 2000; Pang, 2000; Jayasuriya, 2005; Pirie, 2008), 
since the financial crisis occurred and deepened the neoliberal transformation of national 
economies in the East Asian region in the late 1990s. The “end of the developmental state” thesis 
posits that developmental states in East Asia have ceased their interventions in national markets 
and have passively converged upon the neoliberal model of capitalism under the pressure of 
globalization.  
Korea has emerged as an important case study that supports the thesis, and its post-crisis 
reforms are frequently cited as indisputable evidence of Korea’s neoliberal restructuring. For 
instance, Kim (1999) suggests that the Korean developmental model - state domination and 
subordination of big business - has rapidly eroded due to economic liberalization. Minns (2001) 
analyses that the demands made by various class forces and their intrusions into politics 
undermined the autonomy of the state and brought an end to the developmental policy. Pirie 
(2008) declared that Korea should be understood as “an unambiguously neoliberal state” because 
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it has relinquished heavy-handed market interventions in favor of liberalization since the 1990s 
(pp. 7-10).  
 However, the declinist thesis should be closely examined, at least, with regard to the 
Korean wireless telecommunications policies, which were developed during the liberal 
government period (1998-2008). The proponents of the declinist thesis have often simply 
associated the developmental state with protectionist policies and authoritarian control over the 
market. They appear to define the Korean developmental state as a coercive state extrapolated 
from the image of the state during the military regime of 1961-1987. However, they neglected to 
examine the changing nature of the developmental state. The developmental state can be 
understood as a distinctive brand of capitalism in East Asia in which national economic growth 
has been given a top priority in politics (Thurbon, 2011). The appropriate role of the state has 
been repeatedly redefined for the sake of national economic growth. In other words, the specific 
features of a developmental state have been reconfigured depending on the political economic 
environments that a country faced at different points in time.  
For instance, after the 1997 financial crisis, both the Korean national economy and its 
wireless telecommunications industry became more liberalized than during previous periods. The 
privatization of state-owned corporations and the deregulation of foreign ownership were 
accomplished to secure easy access for global capital to Korea’s telecommunications network 
and industry, in accordance with neoliberal tenets. However, the government simultaneously 
initiated interventionist industrial policies such as the research and developments of IMT-2000 
and WiBro technology. This paradoxical coexistence of neoliberal reforms and developmental 
traditions can be better understood if we focus on the flexibility of the state role. Relying on a 
static understanding of the developmental state model is not helpful for grasping the complicated 
hybrid political economy of both the Korean national economy and wireless telecommunications.  
Given this context, this chapter first analyzes the political economic environments, which 
impacted and shaped the major wireless telecommunications policies during this period. There 
were a variety of changes in the structural environment that surround the wireless telecom 
industry and policy landscape. This chapter focuses on four interconnected events: the impact of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Korean government’s strategic reactions to the crisis, the 
intensification of the information-based growth model, and the reforms and their consequence in 
the corporate sector. This chapter also examines three wireless telecommunications policy cases, 
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including the privatization of Korea Telecom, the R&D projects and licensing process of the 
IMT-2000, and those of WiBro, and focuses on the role of, and interactions between, the Korean 
governments, transnational forces, and domestic corporations.  
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During this period, the political and economic environments that surrounded the policy 
landscape interacted to produce Korean wireless telecommunications policies that were both 
neoliberal and developmental in nature. Korea faced economic challenges and experienced a 
“transition failure” when it was integrating the Korean economy into the global capitalist 
economy. The active acceptance of globalization under the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-
1998) led to the neoliberalization of the national economy, the unstable labor market57, and 
chaebols’ dependence on foreign loans. These factors increased the vulnerability of the national 
economy and worsened Korea’s susceptibility to the economic crisis. The 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, often referred to inside Korea as the IMF crisis, brought on a serious economic slowdown 
and numerous corporate bankruptcies in Korea. The IMF-sponsored neoliberal reform program 
was imposed on Korea after the crisis. Overcoming the crisis required Korea to accept foreign 
institutional pressures to open its financial and service markets in a more active manner. The 
Korean national economy was consequently restructured into a more neoliberalized system under 
the IMF regime. However, the Korean government simultaneously adopted the Keynesian 
approach and strengthened the information-based economic growth structure as a core crisis 
recovery strategy. This strategy led to large-scale research and development projects in the 
wireless telecommunications under the MIC, the control tower. 
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The economic, currency and financial crises of 1997-1998 brought about structural 
changes in the Korean economic system. At that time, the Asian region, including Korea, was 
confronted with a series of financial crises. The Asian crisis began in Thailand in mid-1997 with 
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its fixed exchange rate. Afterwards, the crisis spread rapidly to other countries in the region. 
Although most of Southeast Asia, including Japan, experienced currency devaluations, stock 
market crashes and asset price changes and a steep rise in private debt, Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Korea were most directly affected by the crisis. 
One of the unusual features of the crisis is that the affected economy had experienced 
strong economic growth, relatively moderate inflation, and disciplined fiscal policy (Hawkins, 
2003, p. 19). How could these supposedly ‘robust’ economies fall into crisis? Popular accounts 
of the causes of the crisis involve “moral hazard” arguments that often attributed the crisis to the 
Asia-specific problems. These arguments state that crony capitalism,58 developmental industrial 
policy, and implicit government guarantees encouraged banks and firms to take excessive risks. 
These three types of government actions induced moral hazards in private sector decision-
making and brought about the financial crisis (Brittan, 1997; Burton, 1998; Kang, 2002; 
Krugman, 1998; McKinnon & Pill, 1998; Yoo, 1997). The Asian crisis was tied to neoliberal 
globalization. Although the “moral hazard” argument continues to predominate, the crisis was 
primarily caused by the “manias, panics, and crashes” mechanism that is inherent in the sort of 
unregulated financial markets that the East Asian economy developed as a result of rapid 
financial liberalization after the late 1980s (Chang, 2000, p. 776). This researcher understands 
that the Asian economic crisis was a transition failure that occurred because the nations that were 
impacted were in the process of integrating their economies into neoliberal global capitalism.  
The Korean economic crisis of 1997 was an outcome of transitioning its economic 
system and structure. Korea had an export-oriented growth model, and was eager to pursue 
structural change involving moving away from labor-intensive industries to capital/technology-
intensive industries. In the early 1990s, Korea’s global competitiveness in labor-intensive 
industries dropped rapidly due to rising labor costs within Korea and increased competition from 
China and other developing countries in Asia (Jin, 2011, pp. 33-34). Semiconductors (17.7%) 
became the most important export item in 1995, whereas textiles (23.1%) had been the top 
export products of Korea in 1985.59 Given these circumstances, trade balances rapidly 
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deteriorated to $23.7 billion, which was equivalent to more than 5 percent of GDP in 1996.60 The 
trade deficit was largely due to declining export earnings, whose main cause was the “cyclical 
downturn” in semiconductor prices (Shin & Chang, 2003, p. 36). Semiconductors were the 
leading Korean export items, and the decline of their exports impacted the nation’s trade balance. 
However, the most important factor in the crisis was the financial vulnerability of an 
economy driven by financial liberalization. The main problem was the rapid buildup of short-
term (less than 1-year) foreign debts. This was a direct result of an extensive financial 
liberalization that began in the late 1980s and which accelerated under the Kim Young-Sam 
government (1993-1998). The mixture of (a) deregulation of entry restrictions for the financial 
industry sector, (b) lax regulation of bank risk exposure and asset-liability match, and 
particularly (c) liberalization of foreign borrowing, brought about a rapid accumulation of 
foreign debt. Korea’s foreign debt skyrocketed from $79 billion in 1995 to $105 billion in 1996 
to $120 billion in 1997.61 Korea’s foreign debt was so large that it added up to nearly one-fifth of 
all of the foreign debt borrowed by all Asian countries (Fukagawa, 1998, p. 361). The share of 
short-term debt reached 50.2% of Korea’s total amount of foreign debt in 1996 (Corsetti, Pesenti, 
& Roubini, 1999, p. 336).!!
Interestingly, the primary users of short-term loans were the Korean large conglomerates 
known as chaebol. After financial liberalization, it became easier for the chaebol to finance their 
businesses because they experienced less government intervention than had been the case before. 
Chaebol borrowed heavily to finance their investment projects to the extent that the average 
debt-equity ratio for the 30 chaebols in 1996 was 333% in 199662 (Corsetti, Pesenti, & Roubini, 
1999, pp. 317-318). The large Korean conglomerates attempted to expand into a variety of new 
fields that had little or no relationship to their core industries!using excessive amounts of 
borrowed money. For example, Samsung, a representative Korean electronics firm, invested in 
the auto business, while a Korean global car manufacturer, Hyundai poured its money into 
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semiconductors and telecommunications equipment industry. Six of the top 30 chaebols filed for 
bankruptcy protection in 1997.63 
Faced with this unexpected currency crisis, the Korean government requested assistance 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November 1997. This was urgent business, given 
that Korea’s usable foreign exchange reserves had declined from $22.5 billion at the end of 
October 1997 to $6 billion in early December 1997 (IMF, 1999, p. 6).  On December 3, the 
Korean government and the IMF agreed on a bailout amounting to $58 billion64, the largest aid 
package in IMF history. However, the IMF attached a variety of conditions to its loan to Korea, 
just as it had done with Thailand and Indonesia. 
The IMF-sponsored structural reform program which was imposed on Korea following 
the crisis induced the nation to transform its economy to a more neoliberal model. The IMF 
program instituted in Korea after the crisis had three major elements: (a) macroeconomic 
retrenchment, (b) market opening, and (c) structural reforms of the financial sector, corporate 
sector, labor market, and public sector.65 Macroeconomic retrenchment included monetary policy 
that maintained high interest rates and tight budgetary policies intended to maintain a small 
budget surplus. More significant was the implementation of fuller liberalization of product and 
capital markets. According to a series of memorandums of understandings (MOU) between the 
IMF and the Korean authorities, all of the trade-related subsidies and imports barriers such as the 
Import Diversification Program66 were abolished. The upper limit to foreigners’ domestic 
shareholdings was eliminated, the bond market was fully opened to foreign investors, and 
commercial lending was further liberalized (Shin & Chang, 2003, p. 54). As far as market 
openness is concerned, Korea looks as if it became a full ‘First World country’ after accepting 
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The four major system reforms directly reflected the popular view of western economists 
regarding the causes of the Asian financial crisis. In the financial sector, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established to comprehensively supervise financial 
institutions. The government introduced a “global standard” such as the BIS capital adequacy 
ratio, shut down “ailing” commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions, and forced some 
of them to agree to mergers and acquisitions. Similar reforms occurred in the corporate sector, 
especially chaebol, because they were accused of being a major cause of the crisis. The 
government pushed the Korean conglomerates to reduce their debt-equity ratios, prohibited them 
from engaging in loan guarantees with their affiliates, forced them to reform corporate 
governance, and urged them to concentrate on their core business by selling, closing, and 
swapping their over-expanded peripheral businesses.  
Among the four sectors, the reform of the labor market and public sector were also in 
agreement with neoliberal ideas. Although neoliberal labor policy under the Kim Young-Sam 
government had already made the Korean labor market “flexible,” the Labor Standard Act was 
revised in February 1998 to make layoffs of surplus employees easier than before, as had been 
agreed upon with the IMF (Park & Yoon, 1998). In addition, the practice of the recruitment of 
temporary workers by specialized contingent labor agencies devoid of responsibilities to workers 
they employ was fully legalized in the 1998 National Labor Dispatch Law (Jun, 2011, p. 70). In 
the public sector, the privatization of government-owned companies was implemented across a 
wide range of industries. The first and second Public Enterprise Privatization Plan announced in 
1998 included the plan for the full privatization of five companies and a phased or partial 
privatization of six companies in telecommunications, steel-manufacturing, heavy and chemical 
industry.67 During the liberal government period, seven companies, including Korea Telecom, 
POSCO, and Korean Integrated Chemical, were fully privatized according to the plan.68 !
To sum up, the crisis should be understood as a transition failure which occurred when 
Korea integrated its economy into neoliberal global capitalism in the 1980s. The 1997 economic 
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Korea. Most importantly, there was huge direct pressure from global forces, which the IMF 
represents, that reshaped Korea’s financial sector, corporate sector, labor market, and public 
sector. After the crisis, Korea could not avoid accepting the neoliberal tenets that were embedded 
in a wide range of government policies, business activities, and workers’ lives, although Korea 
exhibited a different path during the recovery from the crisis. 
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The economic crisis occurred a month before the Korean presidential election of 1997. It 
enabled the Kim Dae-Jung government to take power.69 Just as one major cause of Bill Clinton’s 
victory was the economic problems ascribed to the policy failures of the previous administration, 
an economic crisis often triggers political change. What is notable is that this regime change was 
exceptional in the sense that the opposition parties won the presidential election, and a 
democratic transition of power took place for the first time in Korean history. Before this 
changeover, conservative parties founded upon military political force had ruled Korea for nearly 
four decades.70 
The Kim Dae-Jung government gave top priority to overcoming the crisis and revitalizing 
the nation’s economy. President Kim Dae-Jung’s inaugural speech defined the economic turmoil 
as “the most serious national crisis since the Korean War” 71 and promised that he would 
continue with the reform measures the Korean government had agreed upon with the IMF. As 
noted above, the Korean government implemented reform measures in the financial, corporate, 
labor, and public sectors. The characteristics of the implemented measures were neoliberal in the 
sense that they sought to reduce the control exerted by the government over the economy and 
increasing the degree of economic freedom in the private sector by means of privatization, trade 
liberalization, market opening, and deregulation. 
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It is thus ironic that the Korean government simultaneously adopted a Keynesian 
approach to hasten the recovery from the crisis. The Korean economy experienced a noticeable 
recovery starting in late 1998, contrary to earlier predictions that economic growth would remain 
sluggish for a minimum of three or four years after the crisis. Korea’s GDP started to increase at 
an unexpected rate: -6.9% (1998), 9.5% (1999), and 8.5% (2000).72  Korea’s recovery was so 
rapid that on December 30, 1999, the IMF acknowledged that Korea had actually ‘graduated’ 
from the IMF assistance program. The three-year stand-by arrangement expired in late 2000 
(Ahn, 1999). The IMF and its supporters attributed this unprecedented rapid recovery to the 
Korean government having faithfully executed the IMF reform program.  
The true cause of the rapid recovery from the crisis can be found in Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies such as monetary and budgetary policy. As regards monetary policy, the 
monetary authorities such as the BOK and the MOFE trimmed interest rates, a move that had no 
precedent. The inter-bank call market rate, which the BOK influences, dropped from nearly 30% 
in the early 1998 to 5% in early 1999.73 At the same time, the corporate bond rate also 
significantly dropped. The initial recommendation of the IMF was to maintain high market 
interest rates, but this was poison to the recovery. After changing monetary policy, banks could 
extend loans to the corporate sectors and firms could obtain money to operate their businesses.  
The other key factor in the rapid recovery was the recapitalization of banks using public 
money. The Korean government increased its budget deficit to support financial institutions, 
which was contrary to the IMF’s initial recommendation. A series of firm bankruptcies increased 
bad loans74 made by domestic banks to 68 trillion won (about $52 billion) as of March 1998 
(Yoo, 2013). In August 1998, a non-performing resolution fund was created within the Korea 
Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) to clean up the large amount of bad loans made by 
financial institutions (Lim & Hahm, 2004, p. 16). The fund purchased the distressed bonds of 
banks and other financial institutions from November 1997 through the end of 2002, which were 
worth approximately 110 trillion won (IMF, 2004, p. 8). Without the recapitalization of Korean 
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financial institutions with public money, the recovery would have been as stagnant as the IMF 
had initially predicted.  
Together with macroeconomic policy, the Keynesian crucial measures the liberal Korean 
government implemented sought to expand the social security system with public funds and 
increase domestic consumption. First, the lack of a ‘social security network’ made the impact of 
the economic crisis much worse when tens of thousands workers lost their jobs75. The liberal 
government implemented several reforms in the nation’s social security system. The government 
consolidated occupational/region-based health insurance societies into a national single payer 
system with one fund managed by a public agency in 1998. This expanded the coverage offered 
by the National Pension Scheme to all Koreans in 1999. The National Basic Livelihood Security 
System was introduced as a modernized public assistance system in 2000. The result was that 
social expenditures76 by institutionalized programs almost doubled under the liberal government 
(Kim, 2006e, p. 16). These reforms took place at the time when Korea was integrating its 
economy into the neoliberal global economy. This may appear paradoxical from the perspective 
of neoliberal globalization enthusiasts who often vilify ‘big’ government and argues in favor of 
retrenchment of the social security system in an era of neoliberal globalization. 
At that time, government sought to increase domestic consumption to aid the nation’s 
economic recovery. Korea had accomplished an unprecedented sort of rapid economic growth, 
often known as ‘the miracle on the Han River,’ by means of its export-oriented strategy, but this 
dependence on exports was considered to be the weak point of the Korean economy during the 
crisis. In addition, although high saving rates had contributed to nation’s economic growth, it 
could induce “the paradox of thrift”77 during the recession. The government decided to boost 
consumption using credit cards. Offering a wide range of incentives, such as tax refunds and 
allowing chaebol and financial companies to enter the credit card business, the government 
succeeded in increasing domestic consumption by promoting the use of credit cards. Credit card 
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use skyrocketed from 63.5 trillion won in 1998 to 623 trillion won in 2002.78 The ratio of credit 
card use to private final consumption was 73.9% in 2002, compared with 12.7% in 1998. 
Consumption-driven economic strategy was a very effective way to foster economic recovery 
and growth. The ratio of private final consumption to GDP increased from 50.3% in 1998 to 
56.7% in 2002.79  
Despite their success, the Keynesian approaches to recovery had some limitations. First, 
the expansion of the social security system was insufficient to secure stable welfare for Korean 
citizens. The concept of “productive welfare” suggested by the Korean liberal government may 
be the third way “based on an integrated balance of economic growth and welfare” (Kim, 2003c, 
p. 67). However, given that productive welfare emphasizes the individual’s work as its primary 
condition, it was in line with neoliberal ideology, which emphasizes the individual’s 
responsibility to be self-sufficient instead of understanding welfare as a social right. The Korean 
unemployment rate does not accurately reflect reality, and the concept of productive welfare was 
unsatisfactory. Second, consumption-based growth brought about another potential risk to 
Korean economy, the increase in household debt. The 2003 credit card crisis reflects the 
weakness of the consumer-based economy. Policy measures helped Korea’s credit card market 
grow substantially, but unregulated credit card market competition produced 4 million credit 
card loan defaulters80 and led to distress in the credit card business, financial markets, and the 
national economy.  
To sum up, Korea developed a more neoliberal economic system after the 1997 financial 
crisis, and the Keynesian approach played a crucial role in the national economic recovery. It is 
often understood that neoliberalism is the antithesis of Keynesian economic and social policy. 
The developmental state is said to be in line with the Keynesian approach in the sense that strong 
government intervention is considered a crucial component of the nation’s economic and social 
development. The coexistence of these two heterogeneous approaches may appear paradoxical at 
first glance. However, neoliberalism does not necessarily require a “powerless state” or the 
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persistence of power relations and interests embedded within the developmental state often 
prevented a full-fledged neoliberal regulatory state. Korea under the liberal government (1998-
2008) can be defined as a hybrid type of neoliberal developmental state. The unabated emphasis 
on the role of state in promoting its economy enabled the emergence of the knowledge or 
information-based economy as the new economic model in Korea. The information-based 
economic growth model led to the intensification of the role of the Korean telecommunications 
regulation agency, the MIC, as the control tower of IT policy. 
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The liberal government drove the development of the information and communications 
technology industry (ICT) in order to revitalize the nation’s economy and foster competition in 
the global market after the crisis. Korea had already recognized the importance of ICT and the 
fact that relevant products such as semiconductors played a crucial role in Korean exports 
immediately before the crisis, so the government focused on ICT as the nation’s growth engine. 
Two liberal government presidents gave top priority to ICT-driven economic growth. President 
Kim Dae-Jung’s inaugural speech on February 25, 1998 emphasized that “intangible knowledge 
and information will be the driving power for economic development.”81 President Roh Moo-
Hyun, the successor, also emphasized the importance of information-based economic growth. He 
said, “I will promote the continued expansion of the infrastructure for a knowledge and 
information-oriented society and cultivate new industries.”82!!
Under the liberal government, the main strategy of economic growth involved shift 
Korea’s economic model to an increasingly information-based economic model. The result in the 
trade sector was that semiconductors became the largest or second largest export item during the 
2000s, and total semiconductor exports increased from $8.4 billion in 2000 to $39.0 billion in 
2007.83 More particularly, wireless telecommunications equipment contributed to the increase in 
Korean export during the 2000s. According to the Korea International Trade Association 
(KITA), the total exports of mobile handsets and parts increased from $6.6 billion in 2000 to 
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$28.2 billion in 2007.84 In 2004, ICT goods accounted for 34% of Korean’s total merchandise 
exports, and Korea was the second largest among OECD countries, as measured by the ICT 
research and development percentage share of GDP (OECD, 2006). Exports of semiconductors, 
wireless equipment and other ICT goods from Korea grew at an annual average of 10% from the 
late 1990s. It grew to USD $88 billion in 2006, and nearly 60% of all venture capital investment 
in Korea was in the ICT sector (OECD, 2008). The ICT industry’s share of GDP increased from 
4.7% in 1997 to 16.2% in 2006 (Hong, Ko & Volynets, 2007, p. 96).!
Building an information-based economy required that Korea implement ICT-related 
policies in three areas: building an information infrastructure using projects such as the nation-
wide broadband network, promoting technological capacity by means of R&D projects, and 
ensuring fair competition. The primary goal of the Korean government was to create a “virtuous 
circle” in the ICT industry founded on facility-based competition. The development of affordable 
information infrastructure85 induced the growth of the service sector, which, in turn promoted 
additional demand for high-end equipment and terminals, and also helped develop the 
manufacturing sector. Enhanced competitiveness in the manufacturing sector enabled Korean-
based multinational corporations such as Samsung and LG to grow and become global ICT 
giants. The increase of exports driven by the Korean ICT giants contributed to the growth of 
Korea’s economy. In this model, the center of ICT policies was not regulations but rather the 
industrial promotion policy. 
The Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), the Korean telecommunications 
regulator, functioned as the control tower of ICT development under the liberal government. It 
was first established in December 1994 as an outcome of neoliberal regulatory reform. The MIC 
went on to take a leading role in the promotion of information-based growth as the liberal 
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government pursued information-based economic growth. Most of all, laws86 such as the 
Telecommunications Business Act gave the MIC a broad range of discretionary powers to use in 
regulating and promoting telecommunications and broadcastings industries: licensing for service 
providers; setting technical standards; promoting research and development; securing fair 
competition; regulating interconnection; building the Korean Information Infrastructure; 
operating the Informatization Promotion Fund (IPF); implementing e-government initiative; 
spectrum planning and allocation, numbering and so on (See Table 2).  
In addition to its discretionary powers, the MIC under the liberal government exhibits 
several interesting characteristics. First, the IPF managed by the MIC was an efficient way to 
implement the informatization initiatives, which often require large-scale investments and long-
term cooperation on the part of various stakeholders, which is often problematic to implement 
within the general budget. IPF87 was a flexible financing mechanism for avoiding the budgetary 
restrictions. $5.33 billion was invested through 2003 to support research and development 
(38%), to promote e-government (20%), to enhance human resource development in the ICT 
sector (18%), to promote broadband infrastructure (15.1%), to build infrastructure in ICT 
industries (7%), and to implement standardization (3%). Second, the ministers were appointed 
from outside the government. Five88 out of the eight ministers who were appointed under the 
liberal government (1998-2007) came from technological institutes or related industries such as 
electronics, software, and telecommunications services. This was unusual because ministers in 
the Korean government were traditionally high-ranking bureaucrats who had passed the civil 
service examinations. The liberal government thought that ministers who had a strong technical 
and business background could successfully lead the MIC as the control tower for promoting the 
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During this period, the MIC control tower planned and implemented the nation’s ICT-
based developmental strategies such as ‘cyber-Korea 21,’ ‘U-Korea,’ and ‘IT 839.’ Wireless 
telecommunications was a crucial component!of these national projects. During this time period, 
the Korean government chose broadband Internet and wireless telecommunications as two 
wheels of Information-based growth in both the service and equipment markets. Among these 
alternatives, the wireless telecommunications sector was more suitable for creating the virtuous 
circle in the ICT industry. It was relatively easy to facilitate wireless equipment exports and to 
accumulate technological competitiveness by means of intensive national R&D project. Korea 
had already experienced the successful development of CDMA in the late 1990s. For this reason, 
five out of the eight services were selected on the basis of their potential to create demand and 
synergistic effects as part of the IT839 strategy. They included wireless telecommunications such 
as Wireless Broadband (WiBro), Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (DMB), Telematics, RFID, 
and W-CDMA. The detailed policies of the wireless telecommunications industry during this 
period will be examined later in this chapter. 
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The reform of Korean conglomerates, chaebol, was the main thrust of the post-1997 
reform program in the corporate sector. The IMF called for a series of corporate reform programs 
to solve the ‘immoral’ overinvestment problems of chaebol, accusing them of being a major 
cause of the crisis. Given these circumstances, the objective of chaebol reform was to reduce the 
economic risks for the entire economy by lowering financial risks in the corporate sector. Three 
major measures for reforming chaebol were implemented: (a) radical reductions in corporate 
debt-equity ratios, and (b) the ‘big deals’ and workout program, and (c) changes in corporate 
governance structures. The first two were intended to deal with the symptoms of problematic 
chaebol structures and the last was an attempt to change the structure supposed to have created 
the symptoms. 
The corporate reform measures were seemingly successful. First, the government 
mandated that the chaebol must lower their debt-equity ratios to below 200%. Top five chaebol, 
including Samsung, LG, and SK, reduced their debt-equity ratios from 472.9% in 1997 to 162.0% 
in 2000. The debt-equity ratios of the 30 largest chaebols were also reduced from 512.8% in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1997 to 171.2% in 2000 (Shin & Chang, 2003, p. 85). Second, the government ‘encouraged’ 
business swaps between the five largest chaebols in order to push them to focus more 
exclusively on their core businesses. The ‘big deals’ targeted sixteen affiliates of the five first-
tier chaebol in eight major business sectors such as automobiles, electronics, semiconductors, 
and petrochemicals. The ‘workout’ program, a bank-sponsored restructuring process, was 
devised for the sixth through the thirtieth largest chaebol. The big deals and workout program 
rapidly reduced the number of affiliates of the top thirty chaebol, as ranked by sales revenues, 
from 821 in 1997 to 544 in 2000 (Seri, 2000, p. 127). Third, after the crisis, the government 
strengthened punishment on unfair internal transactions between chaebol and their affiliates, 
mandated that one-quarter of the members of the boards of directors must be outside directors, 
and revised the external audit law to mandate that chaebol report their consolidated financial 
statements.90    
However, the corporate sector reforms did not result in substantial change. More 
particularly, the big deal was a total failure. None of the proposed big deals were conducted by 
means of business swaps. Instead, most were one-sided takeovers or simple mergers. For 
instance, a proposed deal in automobile/electronics was business swap between Samsung Motors 
and Daewoo Electronics. The deal failed. Samsung Motors was sold to Renault in 2000. Daewoo 
went bankrupt in 1999, Daewoo Electronics was broken up and Daewoo Motors was sold to 
General Motors in 2001. In semiconductors, Hyundai Electronics took over LG Semiconductors 
in June 1999, and the new merged entity, Hynix, became the third largest semiconductor 
manufacturer worldwide. The problem was that Hynix soon faced serious liquidity problems and 
fell under creditor management in 2001. The failure of reform measures reflected that the power 
of Korean conglomerates had not decreased under the liberal government. It did decrease shortly 
after the crisis, but the ratio of the total revenue of the top ten chaebol to GDP continued to 
increase from 49.7% in 2002 to 55.7% in 2007.91  
The promotion of the information-based economy meant that major conglomerates such 
as Samsung, LG, and SK, which engaged in wireless service and wireless equipment-
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manufacturing, achieved profitable growth. For instance, the consolidated revenues of Samsung 
Electronics and its affiliates in 2007 was 172.5 trillion won, while the conglomerate garnered 
86.4 trillion won in 1998.92 LG group achieved revenue growth that increased from 60.9 trillion 
won in 1998 to 110.9 trillion won in 2007.93 SK group increased its revenue from 47.6 trillion 
won in 2001 to 70.4 trillion won in 2007.94 These three chaebol were the main beneficiaries of 
information-based economic growth. The unabated economic power of these IT conglomerates 
exerted considerable influence on wireless telecommunications policy, which will be explored 
later in this chapter. 
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The political economy which surrounded Korean wireless telecommunications during the 
liberal government period (1998-2007) had two primary orientations: neoliberal and 
developmental, which intermingled. The neoliberal agenda, which began to find acceptance 
during the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1997), and was amplified during the economic 
crisis, was a major influence on wireless telecommunications policy. The Keynesian recovery 
strategy used by the liberal government restored the developmental tradition that government-led 
projects should initiate or create the virtuous circle of industry. This section explores how the 
mixed characteristics of the Korean political economy shaped the major wireless 
telecommunications policies and examines the nature of the power relations in the context of the 
policy-making process. This section examines three cases of Korean wireless telecommunication 
policy during the liberal government period: the privatization of Korea Telecom, R&D projects 
and the licensing process of IMT-2000, WiBro.  
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Korea Telecom (KT), the Korean government-owned telecommunications conglomerate, 
became fully privatized in May 2002, when the government sold off its remaining 28.36% stake 
in KT. KT once took a crucial role in building the Korean telecommunications infrastructure and 
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was the dominant player in several service markets95. The full privatization of KT was indicative 
of a remarkable changeover in the Korean telecommunications industry and its policies. 
Moreover, it was a notable event in the sense that Korea finally adjusted to the neoliberal 
pressures exerted by the US government and international organizations such as IMF after long 
delays intended to put off full privatization. 
The major pressure in favor of the full privatization of KT came from foreign players. 
Although the privatization of KT had been gradually implemented since 198796 due to pressure 
from the US government, and international organizations such as the WTO and transnational 
companies97, the IMF bailout program triggered the full privatization of KT. The IMF set 
neoliberal conditions for the bailout and the privatization of government-owned companies was a 
major public sector reform. The goal of the requirement was to eliminate investment restrictions 
in the telecommunications sector. The result was that the government announced the first and 
second Public Enterprise Privatization Plans in 1998, which included the full privatization of KT. 
Foreign ownership limitations on KT were deregulated from 20% to 33% in September 1999. 
The Telecommunications Business Act was revised to increase the foreign ownership ceiling 
from 33% to 49% of KT in September 2000. After a series of measures such as the issuance of 
American depositary receipts (ADR) and a strategic alliance with Microsoft, the government 
sold 43.64% of its shares in foreign markets and its share fell to 28.36% immediately before the 
completion of privatization (See Table 4.) 
After selling nearly half of its shares to foreigners, the government wanted to sell the 
remaining shares to domestic players by distributing the shares in a balanced manner. This was 
the case because the government wanted to maintain some degree of managerial control over KT 
by separating ownership and management. For this reason, the government decided to separate 
the buyers of the remaining 28.36% into three groups: strategic buyers (15%), individual and 
institutional buyers (7.66%), and KT employees (5.7%). The government expected Korean !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!+'!I0$)4$`.D$!>>!B$^%$76)+@$2.:$.$FK"Fi$)4$/2&$4-3&:c'-,&$')(.'$@2),&$0&6A-(&$*.6<&/B$\Yi$)4$/2&$'),7$:-0/.,(&$
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conglomerates such as Samsung, LG, and SKT to each take a 5% of the 15% stake available to 
strategic buyers. The government prohibited any single chaebol from owning more than 5% of 
the shares of KT. However, the government removed the 5% barrier immediately before the 
public offering because only a few of the chaebol had the financial ability to raise the $2.3 
billion in cash necessary to purchase the shares.  
 The result of the public offerings in May 2002 was entirely unanticipated by the 
government and industry. Contrary to the government’s plan and other business players’ 
expectations, SKT bought 11.34%98 of the shares and became the largest shareholder of KT. 
Before the bidding, SKT repeatedly denied its participation in the privatization of KT, saying 
“there have been rumors spreading about our participation, but we have no interest in the 
privatization of KT” (Lee, 2002). The government expected that SKT would buy small numbers 
of shares even if the company did join the bidding. The government pushed SKT to sell its shares 
of KT to other conglomerates, being concerned that SKT, already the dominant player in the 
wireless service market before the privatization of KMT, would become a telecom giant that was 
the dominant market power in almost every telecommunications service market including fixed 
telephone lines and broadband. The government strongly criticized the company and requested 
that SKT sell its KT stock until it became the second largest stakeholder.99  
However, SKT delayed the sale of KT shares, arguing that the company had followed the 
sales rules and that there had been no illegal activity. KT then suggested a swap deal, in May 
2002, for the purpose of exchanging the shares of KT that SKT had bought with the shares of 
SKT that KT already owned. SKT initially refused this suggestion, and expected to expand its 
business to fixed-line and broadband, which were outside the wireless industry. Sang Cheol Lee, 
the former CEO of KT, was appointed to become the Minster of Information and 
Communications in July 2002. SKT was unable to resist the government’s pressure and accepted 
the swap deal. SKT exchanged its 9.64% stake of KT for KT’s 9.27% stake in SKT in January 
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intention of preventing any single private corporation from owning KT and maintaining the 
government’s control of KT. 
The privatization of KT was a representative policy that accepted neoliberal pressure 
from foreign and domestic players. Up to 49% of the stock shares in Korea’s largest 
telecommunications company was sold to foreign investors. Facilitating privatization involved 
an intensive restructuring program. 13,394 employees were laid off in 1999. After privatization, 
there was a limit on investing in building enhanced infrastructure due to the hefty dividends 
offered to foreign investors. Nonetheless, the developmental orientation of the Korean 
government caused the government to attempt to develop ‘ownerless’ corporate governance 
during privatization. The government could maintain some control over KT by distributing the 
shares of KT to foreign investors, domestic conglomerates, individuals and domestic institutional 
investors. Within the context of the Korean political atmosphere, KT and POSCO were often 
called ‘privatized public enterprises.’ In terms of ownership, KT was fully privatized and was no 
longer a public enterprise, but the mechanism of CEO appointment, in which political pressure is 
a crucial factor, left room for government intervention in KT’s management. 
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The IMT-2000 R&D project shows the developmental orientation of the government’s 
wireless telecommunications policy. IMT-2000100 is the abbreviation for International Mobile 
Telecommunication-2000, which indicates multimedia mobile services, often known as 3G. 
IMT-2000 pursued global roaming, but was different than 2G. The adoption of the 2G technical 
standard was determined by national circumstances and technological capability, the global 
standard became important in the adoption and development of 3G. The liberal government was 
eager to develop 3G technology and promote related industries, and continued to give top 
priority to IT-based economic growth. 
The IMT-2000 project sought to create a ‘virtuous circle’ in the mobile broadband 
industry. The goals were: (a) to develop a home-grown technology and standard, (b) to induce 
competition and growth in the service industry, (c) to promote increased demand for high-end 
equipment and handsets, and (d) to increase exports based on enhanced competitiveness in the 
manufacturing sector. The government initially intended to promote the IMT-2000 technology !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"##!O&4)6&$/2&$E%L$(.''&:$]N$*)5-'&$56).:5.,:$/&(2,)')7-&0$.0$/2&$E`%c!>>>B$-/$1.0$)4/&,$(.''&:$/2&$9+/+6&$Q+5'-($
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based on the traditional model, which led to the successful development of TDX and CDMA. 
The MIC established the long-term plan known as ‘the Research and Development Plan for Next 
Generation Mobile Telecommunications,’ and organized ‘the Committee on the Development of 
Next Generation Mobile Telecommunications Technology’ in 1997 (KIICA, 2004, p. 36). The 
project was co-funded by 99 members of the committee, including the government, the research 
institute (ETRI), device manufacturers (Samsung and LG) and service providers (KT, SKT, and 
LGT).101 The committee was expected to coordinate the entire project.!
Unlike previous national projects such as TDX and CDMA, the changing political 
economic environments in wireless telecommunications in Korea made a difference in the 
implementation of the IMT-2000 project. First, Korea joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in January 1995, at which time direct government intervention in the telecommunication 
sector became restricted under the WTO agreements. For instance, if the government unilaterally 
determined a technical standard and mandated that business players adopt it, doing so might lead 
to trade friction with other countries according to the WTO agreements102. Moreover, the 
government could not easily provide funding for R&D projects, because the WTO rules 
intensified constraints on government subsidies. In previous projects such as TDX and CDMA, 
the Korean government provided subsidies to industry both during the process of 
commercialization and the process of initial research and development. Second, 
telecommunications liberalization and the private sector’s accumulated research capabilities at 
developing technology decreased the need for government-led projects.103 
Given these circumstances, the government divided the development process into two 
parts: R&D and commercialization. The target technology was cdma2000, which is a 
synchronous mode of IMT-2000 based on 2G CDMA. The government hoped to maintain the 
experience and momentum accumulated as a result of the success of CDMA. During the R&D 
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possibility of trade friction as defined by the WTO agreement. After $60 million was invested 
and 470 engineers participated in the project, ETRI succeeded in developing the synchronized 
cdma2000 STP104 system in December 1999. The commercialization process was conducted in 
the form of competition between business players in the mobile industry. In March 2000, ETRI 
transferred the developed technology to consortia, which mainly consisted of carriers and 
handset manufacturers. An investment of $100 million by private firms such as Samsung, LG, 
and Hyundai, led to the successful initial commercialization of cdma2000 1x in October 2000 
and cdma2000 1x EV-DO in May 2002.  
The MIC was soon confronted with a dilemma due to conflicting interests of private 
actors during the licensing process of IMT-2000. There are two competing technical standards in 
IMT-2000: cdma2000 and W-CDMA. The former is the synchronous mode used in the US and 
Korea. The latter is an asynchronous mode used mainly in Europe and Japan. Cdma2000 was an 
upgraded version of CDMA that Korea first successfully commercialized and accumulated core 
technologies as a result of this. On the contrary, W-CDMA was expected to use the same core 
network as the 2G Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) that had been deployed 
worldwide and which had a larger subscriber base than CDMA.105 Service providers such as 
SKT, KT, and LGT wanted the MIC to adopt W-CDMA as a national 3G standard. Their 
rationale was that the greater the revenue derived from global roaming, the broader the business 
opportunities, and easier the alliance with global carriers they could anticipate when adopting W-
CDMA, as compared with cdma2000, due to the dominant market share of GSM in wireless 
service worldwide. Meanwhile, the MIC and handset manufacturers such as Samsung and 
Hyundai, except for LG Electronics,106 argued that dual standards for IMT-2000 should be 
selected. The rationale for their arguments was that (a) ITU had approved five different standards 
for IMT-2000 service, (b) cdma2000 would enable faster commercialization than W-CDMA, (c) 
and the adoption of cdma2000 would make it possible to sustain competitive advantages and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#&!M%Q$-0$/2&$.556&A-./-),$)4$0-7,.'$/6.,04&6$@)-,/"$M%Q$.(/0$'-<&$.$6)+/&6$/2./$6&'.D0$*&00.7&0$5&/1&&,$0-7,.'-,7$
&,:c@)-,/0$.,:$)/2&6$0-7,.'-,7$/6.,04&6$@)-,/0"$E,$56-&4B$/2&$(:*.!>>>$M%Q$0D0/&*$-0$.$()6&$0)'+/-),$/2./$&,.5'&0$
()**+,-(./-),0$-,$.$(:*.!>>>$,&/1)6<"!"#'!I(()6:-,7$/)$/2&$a.2,&60$E,cM/./$N6)+@B$/2&$,+*5&6$)4$NM`$0+50(6-5&60$6&.(2&:$K\"]i$)4$1-6&'&00$0+50(6-5&60$
1)6':1-:&B$12&6&.0$aH`I$0+50(6-5&60$.//.-,&:$),'D$#G"!i$-,$!>>!$=M&&$^EMHE.B$!>>]B$@"$]K?"!"#(!dN$R'&(/6),-(0$@6&4&66&:$ZcaH`I$5&(.+0&$/2&$()*@.,D$2.:$.$*)6&$.:A.,(&:$(.@.5-'-/D$-,$:&A&')@-,7$
.0D,(26),)+0$]N$/2.,$)/2&6$*.,+4.(/+6&60$./$/2./$/-*&$=M&&$`)),B$!>>>?"$
!!
73!
know-how acquired from the CDMA development project and facilitate technological exports to 
South East Asian countries (See Table 5).  
After a harsh debate, the MIC announced a technology-neutral policy known as ‘Polices 
for Licensing IMT-2000 Service Providers’ on July 12, 2000. It would allow the industry to 
decide on its own which technical standards to adopt. In fact, the MIC was reluctant to abandon 
its initial plan to adopt cdma2000 as a single standard for IMT-2000, because it sought to 
maintain an edge in the synchronous platform developed by means of huge investments. There 
were two types of motivation that led to the dual-standard 3G policy of the MIC. As noted 
earlier, the MIC was concerned that it might bring about trade friction according to the 
definitions set up by international rules such as the WTO agreement, should it push a particular 
technology as a single standard (Song, 2009, p. 168). The MIC took an optimistic view that three 
consortia, respectively led by KT, SKT, and LGT, would choose different standards. By allowing 
dual-standards, the MIC expected W-CDMA carriers to enter the large asynchronous 
international user market and also expected that cdma2000 carriers would be able to provide both 
a ‘test-bed’ and a domestic market where handset manufacturers could develop their 
competitiveness in a cdma2000 market (Shin, 2008, p. 1410).  
However, the MIC began to intervene again in the licensing process after all three 
consortia expressed a preference for asynchronous IMT-2000 licenses. The MIC reaffirmed its 
previous stance - the adoption of standards would depend on the industry’s decision. MIC 
organized a September 2000 conference, ‘the Conference on IMT-2000 Technical Standard’ in 
which the MIC, wireless carriers, handset manufacturers, ETRI, and KISDI participated. The 
conference involved four closed meetings and one public hearing, and aimed to persuade carriers 
to adopt cdma2000 technology. The MIC used the conference to announce that (a) it would offer 
incentives to a consortium that would adopt the cdma2000 standard and (b) only two consortia 
would get licenses for one standard. Despite the announcement, all three of the consortia applied 
for W-CDMA license. LGT dropped out of the bidding for a W-CDMA license, whereas KT and 
SKT passed the government administrative screenings for the license. One interesting point is 
that a non-wireless carrier consortium led by Hanaro Telecom107 applied for a cdma2000 license, 
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broadband Internet service at that time. It created the Korea IMT-2000 Consortium together with 
several wireless paging service providers. Given the weak financial capability of the consortium 
led by Hanaro Telecom, the MIC intended to secure the tripartite competition, which it expected 
to be accomplished by KT, SKT, and LGT in the wireless industry. 
After the first licensing process resulted in a failure, the MIC became involved in more 
active intervention in the market. The MIC announced ‘the Measure for Balanced Development 
in IMT-2000 Service Industry’ on January 22, 2001. According to the measure, cdma2000 
licensees would acquire priority in choosing spectrum bands and identification numbers and 
would also receive subsidies from the government for building an IMT-2000 network in rural 
areas (MIC, 2001, p. 3). This sought to encourage LGT to participate in the cdma2000 licensing 
process. Despite this measure, LGT did not join the licensing process for synchronous IMT-
2000, and demanded that the government reduce frequency fees. The MIC suggested installment 
payments instead of reduced fees. LGT did not want to abandon 3G business, and accepted the 
suggestion. The result was that the LGT became the only licensee in the world to operate a 
synchronous IMT-2000 network in 2GHz band.  
LGT delayed launching the cdma2000 service for five years and expressed its hope of 
returning the license to the government in July 2006. The main reason was that W-CDMA 
became the dominant standard in the global 3G market, and no equipment manufacturers in the 
global wireless industry had developed technologies and equipment for synchronous IMT-2000 
(Park, 2006). Even Qualcomm, which emphasized the necessity of creating a cdma2000-based 
network operator for the Korean government and wireless industry, gave up developing a 
synchronous IMT-2000 chipset. Samsung completed the development of the CDMA EV-DV 
chipset and related systems in 2003, and attempted to sell it to Sprint and Nextel. Samsung’s 
effort failed, and synchronous IMT-2000 became a ‘nonviable’ technology (Rhew, 2006). The 
MIC did not allow LGT to return the license but did cancel the license in July 2006. In cases of 
license cancellation, the carrier paid a partial license fee, but did not actually use the spectrum. In 
addition, the CEO had to resign from his post according to the terms of the Telecommunications 
Business Act108. The MIC wanted to stop the license from being returned, stating it would treat 
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the case “in accordance with law.” However, the MIC eventually failed to stop LGT from 
withdrawing from its synchronous IMT-2000 line of business. 
The development of the IMT-2000 in Korea was initially driven by the government’s 
developmental policy orientation. The government did not abandon its developmental model, 
which sought to create a homegrown technology and promote the Korean wireless 
telecommunications industry. As noted above, the government took on a leading role in 
developing 3G mobile broadband technology. However, unlike previous national projects such 
as TDX and CDMA, the licensing process of IMT-2000 shows that neoliberal globalization and 
the growing power of private actors restricted the government’s role in the policy-making 
process. The government pushed the IMT-2000 policy based on Korean-style developmental 
logic, but partly failed to coordinate the conflicts of interests among wireless carriers and device 
manufacturers. Contrary to the government’s initial plan, asynchronous IMT-2000 technologies 
and systems, which were developed by private actors, was adopted as a national standard for 3G 
in accordance with the interests of wireless carriers. 
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In addition to the IMT-2000, the WiBro was an exemplary developmental project in the 
wireless telecommunications sector under the liberal government. Wireless Broadband (WiBro) 
is a portable Internet service, often known as 3.5G communications service, which Korea 
developed, and led the standardization of, in the world market. Using the 2.3GHz frequency 
band, WiBro provides users with seamless Internet service with various terminals, including 
laptops and handsets, while moving at 120 km/h (Lee, et al., 2009). This section focuses on the 
role of government and interests of business players, and examines the two main policy 
processes that were in play during technology development and international standardization. 
The government took a leading role in developing WiBro technology. It was motivated to 
develop a fundamental technology for next generation wireless broadband service. WiBro was 
designed as a breakthrough that would help Korea create a new business sector and exceed the 
boundaries of its previous success in the IT industry. First, the saturation of the broadband and 
2G-based mobile voice market in Korea required a new type of momentum for the wireless 
broadband market. Second, despite the successful commercialization of 2G CDMA, Korea did !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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not possess “technological independence” and had to pay considerable royalties to Qualcomm 
because the company possessed the fundamental patents for CDMA. Third, as noted above, the 
government finally failed to vitalize the 3G market by means of cdma2000, a homegrown 
technical standard, due to the resistance from private actors, particularly wireless carriers, in the 
wireless telecommunications industry.  
WiBro was a major component of the IT839 strategy. The government declared the 
IT839 Strategy to be a new long-term plan to consolidate the world leadership position of the 
domestic IT industry in 2004. The plan sought to “open the era of $20,000 GDP per capita” by 
promoting the Korea’s IT competitiveness in the global market. This consisted of three types of 
targets in terms of services, infrastructure networks and fundamental technologies (MIC, 2004a). 
The plan was based on a developmental model that promoted the virtuous circle of the IT 
industry “by organically linking those three areas and creating a corresponding future growth 
engine” (Chin & Rim, 2007, p. 33). WiBro in particular was expected to become a next 
generation growth engine that would generate manufacturing value of $12.3 billion and an added 
value of $9.3 billion that would also induce various application services (KISDI, 2005) 
Given these backgrounds, the MIC initiated the national WiBro developmental project in 
2002109. During the first stage, the MIC sponsored ETRI, a government-funded research institute 
with major achievements in electronics and telecommunications, in order to develop fundamental 
technologies related to WiBro. During the WiBro R&D project, the MIC paid a lot of attention to 
the concerns of other countries’ - such as the US- claims that the project was a violation of WTO 
rules regarding government subsidies.  
During the first stage, ETRI alone took charge of developing a standard for high-speed 
portable Internet (HPi) service by means of a research contract in order to “reduce the risk of 
WTO litigation” (MIC, 2006). ETRI successfully completed the design of the WiBro system 
architecture and the structure of terminals that included high-speed packet modem by investing 
$10 million in 2002. The MIC continued the technological development of standardization and 
commercialization in the form of a private sector-led project. It encouraged business players, 
including Samsung, KT, SKT, and Hanaro Telecom, to join the project by providing them with 
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HPi technology developed by ETRI. During this stage, the private actors who participated in the 
HPi project invested $39 million110 in the project from 2003 to 2005 (MIC, 2006). 
One interesting point is that both the government and the private sector interacted 
actively and horizontally while working on the WiBro project, instead of engaging in 
hierarchical cooperation as had been the case in the previous developmental projects. For 
instance, ETRI and Samsung closely worked with each other at various stages of development, 
from concept development to final commercialization. Samsung initially dispatched 30 engineers 
to ETRI to collaborate on creating technical specifications and a design system architecture in 
2003. In 2004, ETRI needed additional funds for the research. Samsung quickly provided ETRI 
with additional funding of $3 million to support ETRI’s research. This sort of close cooperation 
was possible because the government acknowledged that the increasing financial and research 
capability of private firms such as Samsung and intended to use it. Samsung wanted to rapidly 
obtain core technology related to WiBro and become a ‘Qualcomm’ in the global wireless 
broadband market.  
After successfully completing the development of the WiBro prototype, the government 
and private actors made a concerted effort to set Korea’s homegrown technology as the 
international standard. The first step occurred when MIC announced in 2002 that it would adopt 
WiBro specifications, as defined by the Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), as 
a single national standard for portable Internet service. In June 2004, TTA Project Group 302 
selected the technical specifications, which had been proposed by ETRI/Samsung, as the Phase 1 
Standard for WiBro.  
 However, the US Trade Representative (USTR) expressed the concern that proposed 
single-technology product standard in Korea for wireless broadband communications would 
create unnecessary barriers to trade, which WTO/TBT prohibits, and listed Korea as a key 
country of concern in April 2004 (USTR, 2004). At that time, the US telecommunications 
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(LAN) technology, IEEE 802.16. The USTR judged that WiBro to be a similar technology that 
competed with WiMax and was concerned that the national standardization of WiBro would 
exclude US suppliers from the Korean market. 
In reacting to this pressure, the Korean government modified the initial plan that intended 
to propel the international standardization of WiBro using independent technical specifications. 
During the two regularly scheduled trade meetings with the US government in June 2004, the 
MIC explained to the partner that it was making an effort to establish a WiBro standard that 
would comply with the WTO rules and eliminate the USTR’s concern (MIC, 2004b, p. 5). The 
modification sought to enhance the compatibility of the WiBro standard with IEEE 802.16, 
which WiMax adopted as its base standard. WiMax was initially designed to enable “the delivery 
of last mile of wireless broadband access as an alternative to cable and DSL” (WiMax Forum, 
2008). The difference is that WiBro was designed to boost its mobility as a 3.5G mobile 
communications, not as a form of fixed communications. In collaborating with ETRI and 
Samsung, TTA tried to match the previously-established Phase 1 Standard for WiBro with IEEE 
802.16 in 2004 and 2005. 
After reducing the risk of trade friction with the US, the MIC and Korean wireless 
telecommunications industry actively propelled the international standardization process for 
WiBro. They recognized that increasing interactions with global players and intensified 
neoliberal norms such as WTO/TBT made the passively protectionist policy no longer effective. 
The alternative strategy was to actively participate in international standardization, make a 
homegrown technology into one of the global standards, and expand the market so that Korean 
equipment manufacturers and carriers could easily obtain access.  
 Under this strategy, ETRI and Samsung actively participated in IEEE 802.16 Task 
Group e (TGe) that developed an amendment to IEEE 802.16 in order to enhance its mobility. 
Samsung took a leading role in the Task Group. Samsung successfully promoted a strategic 
alliance with Intel and their collaboration led to the participation of other major companies, 
including LG, Motorola, Nortel, Huawei, and ZTE, in IEEE 802.16 standardization, which 
strengthened the cooperative relationship between the participants (Ju & Son, 2006). In 
December 2005, the amendment of the WiBro standard was approved as an international 
standard for mobile WiMax (IEEE 802.16e).  
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After WiBro was selected as an IEEE standard, the government strategically supported 
the international standardization of WiBro through ITU. After the ITU radio communication 
sector (ITU-R) began discussions for standardizing global wireless broadband access in 2005, 
the MIC dispatched experts from industry, research institutes, and academia to standardization 
meetings, which were organized by an ITU-R study group (SG) and a working party (WP). 
Given these efforts, the WiBro standard (TTAS.KO-06.0082/R1) was approved as one 
international standard for mobile-broadband wireless access (Mobile-BWA) during ITU-R SG8 
and ITU-R WP8A in 2007. 
Despite the success of technological development and global standardization, the 
government later failed to bring about sizable growth of the WiBro market in Korea. This meant 
that only the first step - developing a homegrown technology and setting standards - out of the 
four steps necessary for creating a ‘virtuous circle’ in the industry had been accomplished. For 
instance, the MIC forecast when it gave licenses to carriers that the Korean WiBro market would 
rapidly increase from an estimated 0.79 million subscribers in 2006 to an estimated 9.29 million 
in 2011 (HANAIF, 2007, p. 16). In contrast to these rosy expectations, the number of actual 
WiBro subscribers in Korea reached only 0.17 million as of the end of 2008 (KISDI, 2011, p. 
16). The reasons for this can be found in the nature of the global technological competition 
between mobile WiMax and Long-Term Evolution (LTE), the lack of a robust business model 
for WiBro, and, more importantly, the conflicting business interests of wireless carriers and 
manufacturers. 
WiBro found it difficult to attract market attention because its business model had 
limitations as a wireless broadband service. First, although it had been designed specifically for 
cell phone use, WiBro was mainly used to access the Internet on laptop computers, and it had 
lacked an attractive wireless handset line-up and applications since its initial release. As regards 
Internet access on laptops or personal computing devices, Wi-Fi112 infrastructure, an efficient 
and inexpensive substitute for WiBro, and had already been built nationwide in Korea. In 
January 2010, there were 12,815 Wi-Fi hotspots, 1.65 million access points built by carriers, and 
3.15 million access points installed by individuals (Park, 2010, p. 62). Furthermore, the W-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""$!I'/2)+72$Z-O6)$@6)A-:&0$1-6&'&00$56).:5.,:$(),,&(/-A-/D$),$/2&$7)B$Z-c9-$1.0$)4/&,$6&7.6:&:$.0$.$0+50/-/+/&$
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CDMA network had already been built and was widely used for 3G data service in Korea. The 
LTE had widely been adopted for 4G service to the extent that 424 operators in 126 countries 
were investing LTE as of May 2013.113 
However, the most influential factor in the slow growth of the WiBro market in Korea 
was that private actors in the Korean wireless industry failed to actively invest in WiBro service. 
In April 2005, Hanaro Telecom114 gave up its license for WiBro due to concerns that the 
considerable investments required would fail to produce an appropriate financial return.  
Newbridge and AIG consortium,!the largest shareholders, turned a cold shoulder toward WiBro 
investments and requested that Hanaro Telecom concentrate on the broadband Internet market 
(Kwon, 2005). SKT made the business model of WiBro unattractive. The company strongly 
opposed the use of WiBro for mobile VoIP concerning market cannibalization. SKT did not 
execute an active marketing program and facility investments for WiBro.115 This was the case 
because SKT decided to concentrate on High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA), an 
enhanced 3G data technology that had evolved from W-CDMA, rather than invest in WiBro. KT 
was more active in WiBro investments and marketing because it intended to overturn SKT’s 
dominance in the mobile service market. However, there were limitations in KT’s position. KT 
was concerned that the revenues of its mobile subsidiary, KTF, would rapidly deteriorate if KT 
would aggressively invest on WiBro network and marketing. In addition, the lack of a robust 
business model for an independent wireless service caused KT to position WiBro as a 
complementary service for broadband Internet, Wi-Fi, and W-CDMA. The stagnant growth of 
WiBro in domestic market, and the emergence of LTE in the global market, led Samsung to 
reduce its investments in WiBro development. Criticism increased in the manufacturing industry. 
For instance, a vice president of Samsung said, “we have focused on developing WiBro 
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according to the government policy, but we began to fall behind global rivals in developing 
LTE.”116    
To sum up, the development and standardization of WiBro technology in Korea were 
driven by the government’s developmental policy orientation. Coping with the pressure from the 
US government allowed Korea to manage to make the homegrown technology one of the 
international standards for enhanced 3G communications. The fact that business interests were in 
line with the government’s policy goal facilitated the success of the WiBro project. However, the 
promotion of the WiBro market was less successful than the initial expectations due to business 
interests.  
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In conclusion, the drastic changes in the political economy during the period of the liberal 
government (1998-2007) shaped the ‘paradoxical’ policy regime in the nation’s economy as well 
as wireless telecommunications. The economic crisis, which can be understood as a transition 
failure of the Korean economy during the neoliberal globalization period, pushed the nation to 
accept the neoliberal tenets - more market and less government - in many areas of the public and 
private sectors. The result was that Korea developed a more neoliberalized economic system.  
 Nevertheless, the liberal government took a Keynesian approach in its macroeconomic, 
social, and industrial policies in order to recover from the crisis. During the liberal government 
period, two heterogeneous approaches toward economy and society, neoliberal and Keynesian, 
coexisted in the Korean policy regime. Korea during this period can be defined as a “neoliberal 
developmental state.” The role of the state in promoting its national economy did not decrease 
but instead intensified. More particularly, the Korean government took a leading role in 
establishing ‘information-based economic growth model’ and intensified the power of the 
telecommunications regulator, the MIC, as the control tower for designing and implementing 
industrial policies in the information, communications, and telecommunications (ICT) sector.  
Three major policy cases, the privatization of Korea Telecom, the development and 
licensing process of IMT-2000, and the development and standardization of WiBro technology, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""(!I$A-(&$@6&0-:&,/$)4$M.*0+,7B$P-cM&),7$a2)-B$*.:&$/2-0$.(6-*),-)+0$()**&,/$),$7)A&6,*&,/$@)'-(D$6&7.6:-,7$
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reflect that the Korean government actively intervened in industry with developmental goals in 
mind. During the privatization process of KT, the MIC sought to develop ‘ownerless’ corporate 
governance in the company, and aimed to maintain its power over the industry. In the IMT-2000 
case and the WiBro case, the MIC exhibited a strong developmental policy orientation in 
creating a virtuous circle in the mobile broadband industry. The Korean state had successful 
experiences in building virtuous circles in the telecommunications industry in order to promote 
national economic growth through the development of TDX and CDMA. The MIC intended to 
initiate another iteration of a self-reinforcing feedback circle for economic growth. This 
consisted of (a) technological innovation and the development of the information infrastructure, 
(b) the growth of the service sector, (c) the growth of the equipments manufacturing sector, (d) 
increased exports, and (e) additional development of technology and infrastructure. The MIC 
successfully led the development of technology and standardization in the IMT-2000 case. 
Furthermore, the MIC became more ambitious in the WiBro case in seeking to establish 
homegrown technology as an international standard for promoting Korea’s mobile broadband 
industry. 
In all three cases, major private actors such as Samsung, SK and LG acted in the pursuit 
of their interests. During the developmental stage of new technology and its standardization, 
wireless carriers and device manufacturers, mainly Korean conglomerates - chaebol, often 
cooperated with the government by actively participating in the projects. However, they often 
challenged government policy decisions. The conglomerates in the wireless industry were able to 
increase their power in the Korean market and the global telecommunications market as a result 
of the ‘information-based economic growth model’ that the government espoused. Ironically, as 
the power of private actors increased, it became difficult for the MIC to coordinate their 
corporate interests in a manner consistent with its policy-making process. During the 
privatization of KT, the MIC got into unexpected trouble that it came close to abandoning its 
‘tripartite competition policy,’ when SKT purchased KT stocks in contradiction to the MIC’s 
plan. During the licensing process of IMT-2000, conflicting business interests eventually led to 
the abandonment of the homegrown technology, synchronous cdma2000. Although WiBro is an 
ongoing business in the Korean market, the government failed to produce any sizable growth in 
the WiBro market. 
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To recapitulate this chapter so far, the wireless telecommunications policies in effect 
during the liberal government period (1998-2008) supports my argument that the end of the 
developmental state thesis is either a bad conceptualization or a misreading of the hybrid 
character of the Korean policy regime. We need more flexible concepts such as “neoliberal-
developmental state” in order to characterize and understand the complicated and ever-changing 
role of actors and interactions among actors that influence the Korean telecommunications policy 
landscape. This chapter notes that the role of the state was not reduced, but rather intensified, in 
initiating industrial policies for the purpose of promoting economic development. At the same 
time, the increasing power of domestic capital and the pressure from foreign actors meant that 
the state was no longer a dominant player over business interests. In a manner contrary to both 
declinists’ and statists’ misreadings of the Korean case, the interactions between the state, 
transnational forces, and domestic corporations were not static. The interactions among the 
assorted actors change continuously. Depending on the political economic environments, the 
constantly changing interactions between actors shaped and dismantled the policy networks that 
surrounded the Korean wireless telecommunications policy in more dynamic manner.
!!
84!
!"#$%&'(C*(?"&(D7%&7=5854#%5-7(-8(%"&(7&-/50&'#/('&.5A&(B7:&'(%"&(4-7=&'6#%56&(.-6&'7A&7%(
This chapter primarily relies on historical methods and delineates the changes in the 
political economy of Korea and Korean wireless telecommunications policy under the Lee 
Myung-Bak government (2003-2008). It examines four policy cases: the approval of mergers 
and acquisitions, the shift from administrative control to the spectrum auction, the introduction 
of MVNO, and the licensing of a fourth wireless carrier. 
The political and economic environments that a nation faces are dynamic, not static. The 
Korean economic policy regime, including telecommunications, was transformed into a hybrid 
type of both neoliberal and developmental state, as Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 revealed. There have 
also been changes in the role of state and the interactions between the state and the private sector. 
Under the conservative government (2008-2012), Korea’s economic policy regime appears to 
have become more neoliberal. In Korean wireless telecommunications, the developmental 
features and government intervention decreased compared with previous administrations, while 
the private sector acquired more power in the policy-making process. The role of the state 
appears to have been reconfigured into the role of a ‘neoliberal regulatory state,’ as some 
scholars have conceptualized. 
Neoliberal ideas spread globally in the 1980s, and governance through regulation became 
the “ideal” model for the state-society relationship, particularly in politics and economics. This 
model has been conceptualized as the neoliberal regulatory state. This concept includes the idea 
that discretionary economic governance is replaced by depoliticized’ governance. Rule-bound 
governance by means of independent regulatory agencies governs the economy instead of the 
old-fashioned mode of command and control directly exercised by the state (Majone, 1997). The 
formerly autonomous state retreated from the hands-on approach and gave way to a self-
regulating market. 
Some revisionist works on neoliberal globalization suggest that the role of state did not 
decline when facing a neoliberal hegemonic order. Welfare state expenditures in rich countries 
from 1980 to 1998 reflect that the role of the state did not decrease despite neoliberal changes 
(Castles, 2004). The state has a persistent neo-mercantilist approach to foreign economic 
relations, and acted as the catalyst for the internationalization strategies of corporate actors 
(Weiss, 1998). Empirical works from the revisionist viewpoint indicated that “globalization per 
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se neither undermines the nation-state nor erodes the viability of the welfare state” (Guillén, 
2001, p. 254). 
This chapter!draws on the revisionist perspective and investigates the role of the state as a 
facilitator of neoliberal transformation of both the national economy and the wireless 
telecommunications industry. A great deal of academic research has focused on the 1997 Asian 
economic crisis and its impact on the role of the Korean state and policy landscape. However, 
there has been little research on the nature of the Korean economic and industrial policy during 
the period on which this chapter focuses. Few scholars have attempted to analyze the changing 
Korean state’s role in response to extraneous economic conditions such as the global financial 
crisis. For instance, Pirie (2012) argues that the large fiscal stimulus package which the Korean 
state implemented in response to the 2008 global economic crisis represents a “selective limited 
retreat from neoliberalism.”117 Furthermore, as regards Korean wireless telecommunication, it is 
difficult to find scholarly research that closely examined the role of the state and the interactions 
between the government and the private sector under the Korean conservative government 
(2008-2013).  
This chapter examines the political economy of the Korean wireless telecommunications 
under the Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-2013). This chapter finds that the wireless 
telecommunications policy regime during this period became more market-oriented than under 
the previous government. This chapter finds that the transformation was driven by the 
government’s neoliberal policy orientation, the Free Trade Agreement, the chaebol-based 
economic growth model, and the dismantling of the IT control tower. This chapter claims that 
the state took a crucial role in facilitating the market-oriented transformation, which supports 
business interests in the wireless telecommunications industry. This chapter simultaneously 
reveals that the developmental tradition remains, despite deep neoliberal changes. 
$
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During this period, the changing political and economic environments made the Korean 
wireless telecommunications policies become more market-oriented. Government intervention in 
the industry waned on a relative basis, while the autonomy of the private sector waxed. Chapter 3 
of this dissertation noted that extraneous demand, which was accompanied by the Asian 
economic crisis, initially triggered neoliberal reforms in the economic system during the period 
of liberal rule (1998-2008). Unlike the previous period, domestic politics, meaning the return of 
conservative rule, was the main driving force that precipitated market-oriented changes in the 
political economic environments, although the Global Financial Crisis occurred soon after the 
conservative government came to power. The “business-friendly” conservative government 
pushed a prototypical neoliberal policy package, including tax reductions, deregulation, and 
privatization. The free trade agreement with the US further integrated the Korean economy into 
the neoliberal global economy and accelerated full-fledged liberalization in the 
telecommunications sector. The increasing economic power of Korean industrial conglomerates, 
chaebol, and the reorganization of regulatory agencies created an environment that brought about 
market-based policy changes in wireless telecommunications.   
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After the ten-year rule of the liberal government, the conservative government returned to 
power and implemented a prototypical neoliberal policy package that included tax reductions, 
deregulation and privatization. In December 2007, Lee Myung-Bak, the presidential candidate of 
the conservative Grand National Party, became the new South Korean president. He was under 
suspicion of involvement in a stock price manipulation. Nevertheless, he won the presidential 
election due to his public image of being the so-called “economy president.”118!Public opinion at 
that time was unfavorable towards the second liberal government, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
government due to a real estate bubble, high levels of youth unemployment, increasing social 
inequality, and ‘stagnant’ economic growth119. It is often noted that the economic problems the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""*!d&&$`D+,7cO.<$1.0$.$4)6*&6$aR_$)4$CD+,:.-$a),0/6+(/-),$=#Fbbc#FF!?$5&4)6&$2&$&,/&6&:$@)'-/-(0$-,$#FF!"$C-0$
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nation faced were the results of market-oriented economic policies brought about during the 
‘left-neoliberal’ government era.120 During the liberal government era, market-oriented reforms 
both revived economic growth and increased social inequality. Deepening social inequality made 
many Korean people susceptible to the conservative party’s populist promises of new economic 
miracles. 
After taking power, the conservative government initiated market-oriented economic 
policies under the slogans “MBnomics,121” “business-friendly,” and “advancement” (seonjinhwa 
in Korean). The government declared that it would make the nation’s economy grow 7% per 
year, increase per capita GDP to $40,000, and create the 7th largest economy in the world (GNP, 
2007. p. 19). In order to attain these goals, the government implemented a package of neoliberal 
economic policies. The Lee government engaged in three major types of economic action: tax 
reductions, deregulation, and privatization, using the rationale of promoting national economic 
growth.  
First, the government reformed tax policies to benefit businesses and the wealthy. It 
lowered major tax rates and broadened corporation tax exemptions, income taxes, and 
comprehensive property taxes.122 The tax cuts were based on the neoliberal idea regarding 
“trickle-down” economics. The trickle-down economics means that the free market economy 
increases income for the owners of capital and suggested that the resulting profits would 
eventually trickle down like water and benefit the poor. Chang (2012) pointed out that the 
distribution effect is very limited through market mechanisms in comparison with a welfare state. 
The neoliberal tax reforms under the Lee Myung-Bak government did not produce a measureable 
trickle-down effect, just as the “supply-side” economic policies of the Reagan Administration 
deepened the economic inequality in the US and failed to produce measureable trickle-down !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"$#!d&4/c,&)'-5&6.'-0*$-0$,)/$.,$.(.:&*-(.''D$&0/.5'-02&:$(),(&@/"$E,$^)6&.B$/2&$1)6:B$l'&4/c,&)'-5&6.'B;$-0$.$/&6*$
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effects. Rather, during the period of the Lee government, the poor paid more taxes than they did 
in the previous government. The total taxes paid by the lowest 20% of income earners increased 
7.2% from 2003 to 2007, while it increased 43.5% from 2007 to 2011. On the contrary, the rate 
of increase in the tax burden of the top 20% of income earners was 63.7% from 2003 to 2007, 
but it was 13.2% from 2007 to 2011 (Seon, 2012). The conservative government reduced direct 
taxes for businesses and the rich, and increased indirect taxes on the poor to counterbalance the 
loss of government tax revenue from corporations and the rich. Furthermore, the Korean 
conglomerates were the biggest beneficiaries of the neoliberal tax policy. According to the 
National Tax Service (NTS), although chaebol affiliates with total assets exceeding $5 billion 
constituted only 0.33% of all Korean corporations, they received tax relief amounting to $5.4 
billion, 58.55% of entire corporate tax exemptions in 2011 (Roh, 2013).!
Second, the government propelled deregulation to create more favorable conditions for 
the nation’s industrial conglomerates - chaebol. The crucial deregulatory measures were (a) to 
ease “separation between industrial capital and financial capital” and (b) to abolish equity-
investment limits. Korea had long maintained the principle of “separation between industrial 
capital and financial capital” since the 1960s, although the chaebol always sought to have 
financial subsidiaries in order to make their investments, business expansions, and capital 
accumulation easier. The principle was that the chaebol were restricted from possessing 
controlling ownership of financial institutions, particularly banks123. This was the case because 
chaebol ownership of banks has been regarded as being risky due to their aggressive business 
strategies (IMF, 2006, p. 37). However, the conservative government eased the separation rule so 
that industrial capital could own up to 9% of a bank’s shares by revising the Financial Holding 
Company Act in July 2009.124 In addition, the government abolished the chaebols’ equity-
investment limits among intra-group companies in March 2009. The chaebol, including 
Samsung, Hyundai, SK, and LG, developed a complex “circular” system of cross-shareholding !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"$%!%2&$6&7+'./-),$*.-,'D$4)(+0&:$),$@6)2-5-/-,7$B1".8/&$46)*$)1,-,7$.,D$'.67&$()**&6(-.'$5.,<0"$%2+0B$B1".8/&$
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among their affiliates to bypass the ban on mutual investments between subsidiaries.125 Given 
these circumstances, the shareholding limit on chaebol was introduced right after the 1997 
financial crisis in order to prevent economic concentration and the risk of chain reaction 
bankruptcies. The conservative government eased or removed these crucial regulations, and the 
chaebol enjoyed more freedom to expand their businesses and increase market dominance. 
Third, the conservative government attempted to privatize state-owned huge enterprises 
in the name of “advancement.” President Lee Myung-Bak,- inaugural speech, emphasized 
privatization in saying, “the jobs that are not meant for the government shall be privatized.”126 A 
series of “public enterprise advancement policies” led the government to decide to privatize 24 
state-owned companies in the financial, construction and transportation sectors. The privatization 
of the Korea Development Bank (KDB) in particular was a core part of the advancement policy. 
KDB had about $140 billion in assets in a variety of industries because it bought the shares of 
bankrupt companies during the corporate sector reform period after the IMF crisis.127 Thus, 
privatizing KDB means that a huge part of the public sector would be transferred to the private 
sector. The first step was that the government restructured the governance of KDB by 
establishing KDB holding companies in November 2009. According to the government plan, the 
privatization of KDB was anticipated to be completed by the end of 2013. Although the 
implementation of privatization plan was slow due to the global financial crisis that began in 
2008 (Cho, 2011), it was clear that privatization was a core component of the neoliberal policy 
package under the conservative government. 
To sum up, the conservative government’s political orientation was prototypically 
neoliberal. In defining the liberal government period as “the lost decade,” the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration attempted to differentiate itself from them by implementing neoliberal policy 
packages. The administration gave a high priority to creating favorable conditions for businesses, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"$'!9)6$-,0/.,(&B$M.*0+,7$RA&6'.,:$2)':0$#F"]Gi$)4$/2&$02.6&0$)4$M.*0+,7$d-4&B$12-(2$2)':0$G"\i$)4$M.*0+,7$
a)6@)6./-),B$12-(2$2)':0$#"G\i$)4$M.*0+,7$RA&6'.,:"$%2&$(-6('&$(),/-,+&0$.0$M.*0+,7$a)6@)6./-),$2)':0$G">!i$)4$
M.*0+,7$R'&(/6),-(0B$12-(2$)1,0$!>"]\i$)4$M.*0+,7$MHEB$12-(2$)1,0$Gi$)4$M.*0+,7$RA&6'.,:$=d&&B$!>>\(B$@"$
GGY?"$!!"$(!M)+6(&V$/6.,0'./-),$)4$@6&0-:&,/-.'$-,.+7+6.'$0@&&(2$),$9&56+.6D$!Y$!>>\$=M&&$2//@Vnn111"*)4./"7)"<6n?!"$)!I0$)4$!>>FB$^HO$)1,0$.$'.67&$,+*5&6$)4$02.6&0$)4$*.e)6$()*@.,-&0V$H.&1))$M2-@5+-':-,7$[$`.6-,&$
R,7-,&&6-,7$=]#"]i?B$H.&1))$M&(+6-/D$=]F"#i?B$^)6&.$R'&(/6-($Q)1&6$a)6@)6./-),$=]>">i?B$^)6&.$I&6)0@.(&$
E,:+0/6-&0$=]>"#i?B$N`$H.&1))$`)/)60$=!\">i?B$CD+,:.-$a),0/6+(/-),$=#G"bi?B$CD,-3$M&*-(),:+(/)6$=K"!i?B$.,:$
CD+,:.-$a)6@)6./-),$=!!"Y]i?"$
!!
90!
particularly chaebol, through tax reductions, deregulation, and privatization. The economic 
policy packages under the conservative government were based on free-market ideology: less 
government intervention and more freedom for businesses was thought to lead to the growth of 
national wealth and prosperity.  
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During this period, the Korean economy was further integrated into global economy more 
rapidly than before. The global economy is based on “financially oriented capitalism” and the 
international division of production (Volrokx, 1999). Thus, the flow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and trade dependency reflects the degree of a nation’s economic integration into the global 
market. First, the neoliberal market opening, which intensified after the 1997 economic crisis, 
enticed FDI to Korea to the extent that annual FDI skyrocketed from $2.8 billion in 1997 to 
$9.28 billion in 2000.128 Interestingly, Korea’s FDI inflows stagnated in the early and mid 2000s, 
but increased again under the conservative government: from $11.7 billion in 2008 to $16.3 
billion in 2012 (See Table 6). The increase of FDI inflows was driven by the government’s 
neoliberal economic policies, including the reduction of corporate income taxes, the expansion of 
free trade agreements, wage controls129, and the overhaul of legal and institutional devices 
related to FDI.!Second, the Korean economy’s foreign trade dependence deepened during the 
conservative government period. The trade-to-GDP ratio, meaning the sum of exports and 
imports divided by gross domestic product, increased from 49.9% in 1990 to 92.7% in 2012.130 
Meanwhile, domestic demand contributions to the nation’s economic growth decreased.131 The 
country’s high degree of dependence on international trade without robust domestic demand 
made the national economy vulnerable to a global economic crisis.  
 It is noteworthy that the conservative government completed the Korea-US Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS FTA) in December 2010. The negotiations for the KORUS FTA first began 
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economic growth could be encouraged through bilateral regionalism became widespread among 
Korean policymakers. The idea that depending exclusively upon the global multilateral 
framework - such as IMF, GATT, WTO, and IBRD - led by the U.S became less popular. Korea 
began negotiations for a free trade agreement with Chile in September 1999 and went on to 
complete negotiations with Chile (2003), Singapore (2005), EFTA (2005) and ASEAN (2007).132  
In June 2006, Korea began negotiations with the US. Korea hoped to become a hub for 
the East Asian region through the KORUS FTA as means of surviving its “sandwiched” 
economic position between China and Japan. Unlike the Korea-Japan FTA, negotiations with the 
US proceeded rapidly and proactively due to the Korean government’s will to become the first 
country to sign a free trade agreement in East Asia. At the same time, the US government had a 
strategy for re-empowering political economic hegemony in the region and there was relatively 
little political opposition to the KORUS FTA in the US (Rhyu, 2011). The US was interested in 
pursuing the KORUS FTA, and expected that the agreement would serve as a bridgehead for 
“curbing the rising tide of China’s economic and political influence in East Asia” and reviving 
US hegemony by generating a domino effect in that region (Manyin & Cooper, 2006, p. 6). The 
US also sought to make the agreement a gold standard that covered all aspects of trade without 
exception and become a model for other countries. The US expected the FTA to “trigger a 
tectonic shift in regional trade relations and in future potential institutional frameworks” for US-
based transnational corporations’ interests (Barfield, 2007) 
In Korea, a number of organizations that represented farmers, workers, and other civic 
groups stood against the government and staged massive anti-FTA demonstrations during the 
negotiations. Nationalist sentiment among the general public increased, with a particular focus 
on the opening of the food market, including the agriculture (rice) and the livestock (beef) 
industries.133 Meanwhile, the Korean conglomerates, chaebol, supported the KORUS FTA, and 
expected more opportunities and benefits to result from free access to the US market. For 
instance, major chaebol such as Samsung and Hyundai had factories in the US and had already 
become competitive in the global and domestic markets.  They became active supporters of the 
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FTA and sought to make public opinion favorable to the market opening by means of their 
cooperative relationships with conservative media. !
It is important to note that the liberal government initiated the FTA but the Lee Myung-
Bak government completed it (See Table 7). Korea signed the FTA in June 2007, but ratification 
by the National Assembly remained and public opposition to the agreement continued from 2008 
to 2010. The Obama administration exhibited a skeptical attitude toward the FTA, and it became 
necessary to modify the original agreement through additional negotiations.134 During these 
additional negotiations, the conservative government made concessions to the US government’s 
demand regarding core issues such as beef, automobiles, labor and environment. The Korean 
government thought that a failed agreement would be “a setback to the political and security 
relationship” and the US took advantage of this concern135 (Brooks, Ikenberry, & Wohlforth, 
2013). The conservative government was confronted with massive civic protests such as 
candlelight vigils in 2008!regarding this concession. However, despite the resistance from the 
public and the opposition party, the ruling GNP railroaded ratification of the KORUS FTA in a 
surprise plenary session of the National Assembly in November 2011 (Hwang, 2011).  
The completion of the FTA with the US integrated the Korean economy more closely 
into the neoliberal global economy. First, with the FTA in place, Korean conglomerates had a 
significant opportunity to “expand their economic territories”136 (Cheong, 2013). It is clear that 
the FTA facilitated exports of automobile, electronics, and wireless devices, which had been 
Korea’s major export items produced by chaebol. In addition to benefiting domestic-based 
transnational corporations, the FTA institutionalized favorable conditions for transnational 
capital by restricting national sovereignty in public policy. For example, investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISD), which grants foreign investors the right to initiate legal proceedings against a 
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vehement protests by opposition parties and civic groups. The indirect expropriation doctrine137 
in particular blurs the line between a legitimate regulation of the host state and an illegal indirect 
infringement on investors’ rights. It means the doctrine may accelerate actual deregulation 
effects in a host state’s public policy when a state attempts to avoid legal conflicts with global 
investors.138 !
The liberalization of telecommunications was a core issue in the negotiations for the 
KORUS FTA. During the negotiations, the US focused on the deregulation of the foreign 
ownership restriction in basic telecommunications service and the removal of government 
intervention regarding standardization (Choi, 2007). After several refusals and concessions, 
Korea and the US reached an agreement in telecommunications. It has three major components: 
service market opening, market-based standardization, and non-interventionist regulatory 
framework.  
First, the FTA was expected to enhance market openness in telecommunications by 
allowing full-fledged indirect investments. The FTA specifies that Korea shall allow US 
investors to own up to 100% of facility-based telecommunications service providers by 
establishing a legal entity in Korea,139 although Korea was allowed to maintain the current 49% 
ceiling for two major operators, KT and SKT. Second, the FTA restricts the government’s power 
over technical standards. The US requested that service providers be given “flexibility” in their 
choice of technology. Given that government-led technical standardization has been a core tool 
of industrial development in Korea, it means that Korea should abandon governmental 
intervention concerning technical standards intended to develop a certain target technology. The 
FTA acknowledges the government’s right to limit the market’s choice of technologies or 
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standards, but only when this is done to achieve specific public policy objectives140 and it does 
not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. In addition, the government must ensure a “transparent 
and rational” standardization process by offering various opportunities to foreign companies to 
convey their opinions on the matter. Third, the FTA reaffirmed market-based and non-
interventionist policies: (a) to ensure non-discriminatory interconnection by means of the public 
communications network, (b) to prohibit anti-competitive subsidies, (c) to encourage the 
efficient use of the spectrum and competition among service suppliers, and (d) to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of regulatory bodies. 
The FTA is one of the major policy environments that precipitated full-fledged 
liberalization in telecommunications and the nation’s economy. The binding legal force of the 
KORUS FTA surpasses that of existing Korean domestic laws.141 There was an increased need to 
transform the domestic laws and institutions of Korea, which were based on an interventionist 
policy model, into increasingly market-based laws and institutions. There were 1163 domestic 
laws that were being enforced as of 2008, and 169 of these laws were inconsistent with the FTA 
provisions and had to be revised or abolished (Choi, 2009, p. 122). Various domestic policies in 
telecommunications sector had to be revised in order to be in accordance with the FTA. For 
instance, in Korea, there were no legal grounds for spectrum auctions before the FTA. However, 
given that the FTA expressed that auctions were an efficient means of spectrum allocation, the 
Korean government established a legal ground for auction by revising the Radio Waves Act in 
2010. 
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The Korean conglomerates’ power was relatively restrained under the liberal 
government’s corporatist142 reforms, and they regained their power as a result of the conservative 
government’s focus on economic growth. Interestingly, the conservative government regarded 
the chaebol as being too small to compete on the global scale, instead of viewing them as big and 
powerful in the Korean context. This version of “economic nationalism”143 shifted the economic 
policy priority from curbing the power of chaebol to secure competition in the domestic market 
to nurturing the power of chaebol to enhance national competitiveness in the global market 
(Kalinowski, 2009, p. 297). The global recession began with the US subprime mortgage crisis 
and reinforced the strategy of chaebol-based growth for economic recovery. Some scholars argue 
that the Korean state’s response to the global financial crisis, such as a large fiscal stimulus, 
represents a “selective limited retreat from neoliberalism” (Pirie, 2012). However, the 
conservative government’s recovery strategy was not developmental but rather completely 
neoliberal in the sense that it attempted to overcome difficulties by expanding market power with 
tax reductions, deregulation, privatization, and the completion of a free trade agreement. The 
export prowess of chaebol was responsible for creating faster economic growth than in other 
OECD countries after the global financial crisis began (Economist, 2010).  
 The Korean conglomerates expanded in size and economic power!due to neoliberal 
economic policies and the business-friendly atmosphere among conservative political elites. For 
instance, the number of conglomerates with assets exceeding 5 trillion Korean won (about $5 
billion), and their affiliates rapidly increased: there were 32 conglomerates with 683 affiliates in 
2007 compared with 63 conglomerates with 1,831 affiliates in 2012.144 Furthermore, the 
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period. The ratio of the top ten chaebol’s total revenues to GDP under the “business friendly” 
government skyrocketed compared to the “Participatory Government.”145!The ratio averaged 
69.1% from 2008 to 2011, whereas it was 52.6% from 2003 to 2007 (Lee, 2012a). In 2011, the 
ten largest chaebol’s total sales were 946.1 trillion won, which accounted for 76.5% of Korea’s 
GDP of nearly 1.24 quadrillion won (Kwon, 2012a). In 2012, Korea’s ten biggest conglomerates 
constituted more than half the total value of the 1,779 companies on the Korean Stock Exchange 
(Yoon, 2012). Four major chaebol, meaning Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK, increased their 
economic power over the nation’s economy.146 The ratio of their total sales to GDP was 39.7% in 
2007, 46.2% in 2008, 47.4% in 2009, and 51.4% in 2010.147 In 2012, the net profits of the four 
major chaebol reached 80% of the total net profits that the top thirty chaebol garnered (Park, 
2013).!
Among the four major chaebol, Samsung, LG, and SK were engaged in the wireless 
service and wireless equipment-manufacturing industry and achieved continuous growth due to 
the government’s promotion of the information-based economy. The total revenues of Samsung 
and its 81 affiliates was 256.2 trillion won in 2012, while the conglomerate garnered 150.4 
trillion won in 2007.148 The LG group’s sales grew from 66.5 trillion won in 2007 to 115.9 
trillion won in 2012.149 The SK group also increased its revenues from 70.4 trillion won to 157.9 
trillion won in 2012.  
Samsung and LG become successful transnational corporations in the global wireless 
telecommunications industry150. Samsung Electronics become the number one supplier of mobile !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"&'!E,$^)6&.B$/2&$^-*$H.&cP+,7$.:*-,-0/6./-),$1.0$)4/&,$<,)1,$.0$/2&$WN)A&6,*&,/$)4$/2&$Q&)@'&X$.,:$/2&$f)2$
`))cCD+,$.:*-,-0/6./-),$1.0$<,)1,$.0$/2&$WQ.6/-(-@./)6D$N)A&6,*&,/"X!"&(!%2&$76)1/2$)4$M.*0+,7;0$&(),)*-($@)1&6$2.0$5&&,$0.'-&,/$.*),7$/2&$4)+6$(2.&5)'"$9)6$&3.*@'&B$/2&$.,,+.'$
6&A&,+&$)4$M.*0+,7;0$4.*-'Dc6+,$5+0-,&00&0$&3(&&:&:$/2&$.,,+.'$5+:7&/$)4$/2&$^)6&.,$7)A&6,*&,/$-,$!>>F"$%2&$
.,,+.'$6&A&,+&$)4$/2&$M.*0+,7$76)+@B$-,('+:-,7$M.*0+,7$R'&(/6),-(0$.,:$-/0$0+50-:-.6-&0B$2.0$5&&,$)A&6$!>i$)4$
^)6&.;0$.,,+.'$NHQ$0-,(&$!>#>"$%2&$(),0)'-:./-),$)4$&(),)*-($@)1&6$-,/)$M.*0+,7$'&:$/)$^)6&.$5&-,7$6&4&66&:$/)$
.0$W/2&$f&@+5'-($)4$M.*0+,7X$-,$6&(&,/$D&.60$=M&&$2//@Vnn&()0"5)<")6"<6$.,:$2//@Vnn:.6/"400")6"<6?" "&)!M)+6(&V$9.-6$%6.:&$a)**-00-),$=M&&$2//@Vnn111"4/("7)"<6?$.,:$/2&$O.,<$)4$^)6&.;0$&(),)*-($0/./-0/-(0$0D0/&*$
:./.5.0&$=M&&$2//@0Vnn&()0"5)<")6"<6?"!"&*!M)+6(&V$9.-6$%6.:&$a)**-00-),$=M&&$2//@Vnn111"4/("7)"<6?"$!"&+!M)+6(&V$9.-6$%6.:&$a)**-00-),$=M&&$2//@Vnn111"4/("7)"<6?"!"'#!L,'-<&$/2&$0+((&00$)4$/2&$1-6&'&00$&T+-@*&,/$*.,+4.(/+6-,7$-,:+0/6DB$/2&$1-6&'&00$/&'&()**+,-(./-),0$0&6A-(&$
-,:+0/6D$4.-'&:$/)$.(2-&A&$0-8.5'&$76)1/2$.,:$4.-'&:$/)$@6):+(&$@6)4-/0$46)*$7')5.'$-,A&0/*&,/0"$9)6$-,0/.,(&B$M^%$
@+60+&:$-/0$7')5.'$5+0-,&00$0/6./&7D$-,$)6:&6$5&()*&$.$'&.:-,7$@'.D&6$-,$/2&$7')5.'$*.6<&/B$.,:$/2-0$0/6./&7D$1.0$
*):&'&:$),$U%%$H)()*)"$M-,(&$/2&$&.6'D$!>>>0B$M^%$-,A&0/&:$-,$:&A&')@-,7$*.6<&/0$0+(2$.0$J-&/,.*B$`),7)'-.B$
.,:$a2-,."$E/$.'0)$'.+,(2&:$.$`JU_B$C&'-)B$-,$/2&$LM"$C)1&A&6B$/2&0&$&44)6/0$1&6&$4.-'+6&0"$M^%$1-/2:6&1$-/0$
!!
97!
handsets worldwide. Samsung sold 406 million wireless handsets, and its market share was 
23.4% in 2012. Samsung’s smartphone sales were 215.8 million, or 30.3% of all smartphone 
sales in the global market in 2012 (IDC, 2013). This surpassed Apple, whose sales reached 135.9 
million and which had a 19.1% market share. Samsung took a leading role in promoting the 
growth of the Android platform. Samsung’s growth meant that Android continued to increase its 
market dominance and accounted for nearly 75% of smartphone sales worldwide in Q1 2013 
(Gartner, 2013). Samsung’s Android smartphone sales generated $5.1 billion of operating profits 
worldwide in Q1 2013, which amounted to a 95% share of all Android smartphone industry 
profits (Oh, 2013).  LG Electronics lagged behind Samsung, and became a major player in the 
global mobile industry. LG is the fifth largest mobile phone vendor worldwide, and its annual 
sales were 55.9 million in 2012, when its market share was 3.2% (ICD, 2013).  LG sold 102.5 
million mobile phones and its market share was 8.4% in 2008 (Gartner, 2009). LG’s 
performance in the global mobile handset market deteriorated. This occurred because LG 
focused on manufacturing feature phones rather than getting on the “smartphone boat” when 
computer-like enhanced multifunctional phones emerged in the mid-2000s. LG greatly increased 
its mobile phone and smartphone sales and became the third largest smartphone vendor in Q1 
2013, when it had a 4.8% market share of all smartphone sales worldwide (Gartner, 2013).  
The remarkable growth of chaebol, who were engaged in the wireless industry, impacted 
the policy-making process in wireless telecommunications. The conservative government gave 
top priority to boosting the global competitiveness of!big businesses by establishing policy 
priorities to a greater extent than previous governments. There is a widespread shared belief that 
under the conservative government, it was better for industrial promotion purposes to respect the 
autonomy of chaebol, the champions in global competition, rather than maintain government 
intervention in industry. Furthermore, influential was the idea that government-led development 
in wireless telecommunications under the liberal government eventually resulted in failure due to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the misjudgments made by government agencies and its incapability to grasp global 
market/technology shifts. These beliefs and ideas are closely connected to the increasing power 
of chaebol who made the Korean wireless telecommunications policy regime become more 
market-oriented. 
EDFDED)2./-;"*$I"%$/*)/4)-.;6&"%/-?)";.*B?M)%1.)+$'("*%&$*;)/4)X70)B/*%-/&)%/L.-Y)
One major change under the conservative government was the restructuring of regulatory 
organizations. The reorganization of regulatory agencies brought about a market-oriented shift in 
the wireless telecommunications policy regime and resulted in the retreat of government 
leadership of industry by dismantling the former IT control tower. In February 2008, the Lee 
Myung-Bak government established a single regulatory institution that integrated the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC) and the Korea Broadcasting Commission (KBC) into the 
Korea Communications Commission (KCC), which regulates both telecommunications and 
broadcasting. What triggered this integration between regulators who had different regulatory 
philosophies, frameworks, and orientations151?  
There was an increasing need for rethinking the traditionally segmented regulatory 
framework, since the development of technology and business model had blurred the line 
between telecommunications and the broadcasting sector. The convergence between the two 
sectors often called for close cooperation between two regulatory organizations. For instance, it 
was essential for them to back up each other in order to implement terrestrial digital TV (DTV) 
services, digital multimedia broadcasting (DMB) services, and home network services, which 
were chosen to be core services in the IT839 developmental strategy. However, the regulators 
and associated industries often came into conflict with each other due to their different 
organizational raison d'êtres and “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible, 
2007). For example, as regards the transitions to DTV, the KBC supported the European-style 
standard, DVB-T, which involved the MIC buttressing the American standard, ATSC152. After 
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serious debates regarding the two competing standards had gone on for almost 4 years (2003-
2006), ATSC was selected as the national standard for DTV service.153 
 Internet Protocol Television154 (IPTV) was an important issue that showed the need to 
reform the fragmented and conflicting regulatory framework. Enhanced bandwidth and video 
compression technology allowed telecommunications operators to provide broadcasting service 
over their IP networks. The conflict between two different advocacy coalitions went on for 5 
years before the introduction of IPTV in 2008 (Park & Park, 2009). Internet service providers, 
including KT and Hanaro Telecom, had finished the technological and business preparations for 
the IPTV service by early 2005, but the providers had to wait for three more years in order to 
obtain the license for the converged broadcasting service. Newspaper articles about IPTV in 
Korea reflect the ferocity of the debate and how much public attention this issue attracted. From 
2004 to 2008, major Korean newspapers carried stories about “IPTV” about five hundred times, 
while major US and French newspapers published articles on this topic only four times (Park, 
2009b). Given these circumstances, the liberal government established a “Committee for the 
Convergence of Broadcasting and Telecommunications” under the control of the prime minister 
in July 2006. The committee proposed a single independent regulatory organization where the 
KBC and the MIC would be consolidated. The original plan was for the role and discretion of the 
new regulator, KCC, to be more powerful than the institutions of other countries. The liberal 
government initially hoped to establish a powerful regulator that covered regulations and 
industrial promotion policy in telecommunications, broadcasting, and the IT industry (Kim, 
2006a). Political matters compelled the liberal government to postpone the establishment of an 
integrated regulator.155 The Lee Myung-Bak government implemented the establishment of this 
regulator and reshuffled the government structure in February 2008. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"'%!%2&$^Oa$6&@6&0&,/&:$56).:(.0/&6$-,/&6&0/0$:+6-,7$/2&$:&5./&"$O6).:(.0/&60$0+(2$.0$`+,21.$O6).:(.0/-,7$
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 The launching of a commission-type single regulatory agency, the KCC, brought a 
market-oriented shift to the policy regime. First, integration into single-regulator system could 
make conditions more favorable for businesses by reducing the number of regulators, their areas 
of overlap and the potential for uncertainty and inconsistency (OECD, 2004). OECD (2008) 
assessed that “the creation of the KCC is a major step towards an independent body that deals 
with regulatory issues.” (p. 109). In following the logic of neoliberalism, an independent 
regulatory agency is essential for limiting the room available for policy discretion, which can 
distort the rationality of the market system (Chang, 2001, p. 11). Second, business logic, which 
prevails in telecommunications, has been applied to the Korean broadcasting sector. According 
to Harvey (2006), after Ofcom, the U.K.’s single regulatory body, was established in 2003, 
broadcasting policy came under the influence of the “neoliberal ethos” that emphasizes markets 
and competition in the telecommunications policy regime. In 2009, the conservative government 
eased media ownership regulations in order to allow big corporations, foreigners, and newspaper 
conglomerates to acquire stakes in almost every aspect of broadcasting, including terrestrial 
broadcasting (See Table 8.).  
Most important of all, the control tower for strong IT industry promotion was 
deconstructed as a byproduct of the launch of the KCC. The new framework, unlike the initial 
plan, integrated authority in information and telecommunications policy-making which had 
previously been separately assigned to four different agencies: (a) regulation in 
telecommunications and broadcasting to the KCC, (b) industry-promotion to the Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy (MKE), (c) regulation and promotion in content industry to the Ministry of 
Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST), and (d) overall control of government-informatization 
projects to the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MPAS). The roles of related 
government agencies became more decentralized, which resulted in weakening state intervention 
in the information and communications industry. For example, the MKE was responsible of 
almost every type of industrial policy, including policies for energy, steel manufacturing, 
shipbuilding, chemicals, and automobiles. The strong government leadership, which the MIC 
showed in various developmental projects in the IT industry, became less possible because the IT 
industry was one of the many industries that the MKE wanted to focus attention on. Furthermore, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the commission-type governance of KCC also weakened government intervention in the market, 
while allowing the private sector to exercise more discretion.  
 
G"!"$Z-6&'&00$/&'&()**+,-(./-),0$@)'-(-&0$+,:&6$/2&$(),0&6A./-A&$7)A&6,*&,/$
As noted above, the political economy that surrounded the Korean wireless 
telecommunications during the Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-2012) brought about reduced 
government intervention and more corporate autonomy, meaning neoliberal policy changes. This 
section examines how the neoliberal orientation of the Korean political economy shaped major 
wireless telecommunications polices and examines power relations in the policy-making process 
by analyzing major wireless telecommunications policies. This section scrutinizes three cases of 
Korean wireless telecommunications policies during the period of conservative government rule: 
the approval of mergers and acquisitions between the wireless and the fixed industry, the 
introduction of spectrum auction, and competition policies.  
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During the period of conservative government rule, deregulation was driven by free 
market ideology. The decreasing power of regulators accelerated the consolidation of telecom 
market and helped Korean conglomerates intensify the oligopolistic market structure of 
telecommunications (See Table 9). One major regulatory objective during the MIC era was to 
prevent dominant common carriers from abusing their market power, as did other countries’ 
telecommunications regulators. The government adopted a powerful ex-ante prescriptive 
measure in order to control the service rates of any dominant carrier that had more than 50% 
market share. The regulation was the “approval of service terms and conditions.”156 In addition 
to price regulation, Korea maintained strong regulations on the consolidation of common carriers 
in order to promote market competition. The Telecommunications Business Act was revised, and 
mergers of common carriers became subject to approval by the telecommunications regulator, 
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the KCC, in consultation with the authority on competition, the Korea Fair Trade Commission157 
(KISDI, 2010b).  
The MIC maintained a negative attitude towards market consolidation, particularly 
between the fixed and the mobile sectors. This happened because the unique market structure 
found in Korea meant that KT and SKT had dominated the fixed-line and the wireless service 
markets, respectively. Despite the introduction of competition to the fixed-line service market, 
KT’s market share did not fall below 90%. SKT maintained its market share at over 50%, despite 
MIC’s implementation of various asymmetrical regulations, including discriminatory 
interconnection rates and number portability. Given these circumstances, the MIC maintained the 
principle of strict segmentation of the wireless and the fixed markets. This segmentation was 
intended to secure “fair competition” by preventing the spread of market dominance between the 
two markets. In addition, the MIC was concerned that the emergence of private monopolies 
would dampen market competition and undermine the power of government policy 
implementation. The exemplary case was the PCS licensing process, which highlighted the 
regulator’s “segmentation” principle. When the MIC awarded a PCS license to KT in 1996, the 
MIC forced KT to establish a separate entity, KTF, in order to run its wireless business, contrary 
to the company’s expectations.158   
Unlike the previous regulatory agency, the KCC readily approved a series of mergers and 
acquisitions between fixed-line and wireless carriers. In February 2008159, SKT obtained 
government approval to become the major shareholder of Hanaro Telecom by means of 
purchasing 38.89% of its stake from a consortium of two foreign investors, American 
International Group and Newbridge Capital. The goal of SKT was to absorb the second largest 
broadband Internet subscriber base (369 million, 25.2%), landline subscriber base (200 million, 
8.6%), and acquire the enhanced capability to provide IPTV service. Hanaro Telecom, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"')!I0$-0$/2&$(.0&$1-/2$)/2&6$()+,/6-&0B$*&67&6$.,:$.(T+-0-/-),$=`[I?$.(/-A-/-&0$-,$/&'&()**+,-(./-),0$0&(/)6$2.A&$
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second largest broadband/landline service provider in Korea, had offered video-on-demand TV 
since 2006 and accumulated related technology and know-how for the IPTV business. Rival 
companies such as KT and LGT expressed their concerns that SKT’s mobile market dominance 
would spread into broadband and fixed line services. They argued that the government should 
impose strong conditions160 - for instance, shared use of the 800MHz spectrum161 - in approving 
the acquisition (Kim, 2008c). Despite negative opinions expressed by KFTC162, the regulator 
approved the acquisition, and included conditions such as non-discrimination in the wholesale 
market, the bundling of services, and the wireless Internet market (KCC, 2008b). Neutral use of 
800MHz was not included in the imposed conditions. At that time, the regulator did not want to 
reject the acquisition, believing that it would be worse to allow foreign investors to obtain the 
rights of management in important common carriers again (Park, 2007). SKT persuaded the 
regulator to approve its acquisition of Hanaro, and jumped on increasing criticism of speculative 
foreign investors and emphasized that the new business model helped it “enter the global market” 
(Kim, 2007b) 
SKT’s acquisition of Hanaro Telecom triggered a rush of mergers among rival groups. 
Technological changes such as fixed-mobile-broadcasting convergence and emerging importance 
of triple play service (TPS) in market reflected that KT and LGT had prepared consolidation 
strategies but were waiting for an appropriate time to implement their strategies. KT first 
propelled mergers with its mobile subsidiary, KTF, in 2009. Due to the increased competition 
and threat from disruptive services such as VoIP, the company’s overall revenue growth was 
stagnant and operating income decreased to less than SKT’s operating income in 2008.163 KT 
merged with its growing mobile subsidiary because it hoped to overcome its sluggish revenue 
growth problem and assume leadership in the TPS market. However, the merger was criticized !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"(#!E,$^)6&.B$/2&$6&7+'./)6$(.,$-*@)0&$(&6/.-,$(),:-/-),0$12&,$.@@6)A-,7$*&67&60$.,:$.(T+-0-/-),0$-,$)6:&6$/)$
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by rivals and civic groups as constituting “a set back toward monopoly” because the new entity 
born from the merger would be a telecom giant with 90% of the fixed-line market, 45% of the 
broadband market and 30% of the wireless market. SKT opposed the merger itself. LGT argued 
that it should be approved under conditions that secured fair competition such as the separation 
of the last one mile subscriber network. Despite this controversy, the KCC approved the merger 
in March 2009. According to the KCC, the rationale for approval was that the merger was 
anticipated to lead to fixed-mobile-broadcasting convergence and contribute to the growth of the 
IT industry by “laying the foundation for growing as a global player”164 (Shin, 2009). 
Considering the resistance of the other players, the KCC imposed such perfunctory conditions165 
that KT had to secure more access to other carriers and Internet companies, and speed up VoIP 
number portability requests (KCC, 2009a).  
The merger between LG groups’ three telecommunication operators, LG Telecom 
(mobile), LG Dacom (fixed-line), and LG Powercomm (ISP), was approved by the KCC in 
December 2009. The integrated entity, LGU+ was launched in July 2010. All three units had the 
smallest market shares in fixed, wireless, and broadband services. LG’s merger case received 
less attention from the industry and the public than did rivals’ acquisitions and mergers. 
Competitors such as KT and SKT raised concerns about on the merger with respect to 
competition. Vertical integration with LG Electronics, a telecommunications equipment 
manufacturer, could limit competition by providing high-end handsets exclusively to LGU+. 
Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), the largest electrical utility in Korea, would own 
7.5% share of the new entity, and this special relationship would undermine fair competition in 
the smart grid industry. More important is the question of whether or not the benefits that LG 
derived from asymmetrical regulation would continue after the merger. Despite these concerns, 
the KCC approved the merger, imposing the “usual” conditions that LGU+ must increase its 
investments in building broadband infrastructure in rural areas and must not discriminate against 
other players in the wireless Internet market (Yoon, 2009). However, the KCC announced that it 
would gradually change “the effective competition policy,” which had benefited LG, the 
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latecomer, and established a new competition policy that would reflect the reconfiguration of the 
market structure (KCC, 2009b).!
Although three cases had different background details, they had some common points. 
First of all, as technologies such as fixed-mobile-broadcasting convergence developed, and the 
consequent business model (e.g. TPS) emerged, the need to consolidate separate business units 
increased. The convergence of digital technologies, as well as globalization and deregulation, 
was one reason behind the wave of mergers and acquisitions between telecommunications firms 
(Warf, 2003). The retreat of government power in the telecommunications market, which was 
driven by “business friendly” deregulation and the dismantling of MIC, are crucial factors to 
smoothen approval of market consolidation. This researcher’s experience was that the KT-KFT 
merger had already been planned and prepared as one of several feasible growth strategies, given 
that foreign investors pushed KT management to develop measures to escape stagnant growth in 
2006. However, it was difficult for KT to create an atmosphere that was favorable to mergers, 
which would make policymakers think in terms of “back to monopoly” in the policy landscape in 
effect during the liberal government. In other words, the conservative government’s favorable 
disposition toward big businesses contributed to the mergers and acquisitions in Korean 
telecommunications during this period. As noted above, the conservative government thought 
that Korean firms were “too small to compete in global market.” !
A series of mergers and acquisitions reconfigured the market structure of Korean 
telecommunications. The Korean telecommunications market was transformed into a completely 
oligopolistic market primarily consisting of three telecom giants: KT (market share, 47.1%), 
SKT (33.7%), and LGU+ (19.2%). This market reconfiguration was the culmination of telecom 
liberalization, and was driven by privatization, licensing, and deregulation. Except for KT, the 
so-called “privatized public enterprise”, SKT and LGU+, which had become core affiliates of the 
chaebol, SK and LG, are good examples that reflect the extent to which Korean 
telecommunications industry had been liberalized. SK chaebol first entered mobile industry 
through the privatization of KMT166 in 1994, and became expand its business to other telecom 
business domains by purchasing Hanaro Telecom in 2008. In a similar manner, LG cheabol first 
stepped into the mobile industry by obtaining a PCS license in 1996, and expanding its business !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"((!^)6&.$`)5-'&$%&'&()**+,-(./-),$1.0$&0/.5'-02&:$.0$.$0+50-:-.6D$)4$^%$4)6$*)5-'&$5+0-,&00$-,$#F\G"
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by purchasing the public enterprises, Dacom167 in 2000 and Powercomm168 in 2002, and 
eventually succeeded in building a sizable telecom company through the merger in 2009. 
Telecommunications had been increasingly liberalized in accordance with neoliberal 
ideas since the 1980s. Neoliberal ideas were the basis for the dismantling of “public monopolies” 
in the Korean telecommunications industry through the introduction of competition. Neoliberals 
believed that reducing government intervention creates viable markets and increases prosperity 
by increased competition. However, market players often prefer to be monopolistic rather than 
compete on a fair basis. That is why regulators exist: to ensure the continued existence of healthy 
markets and a good economy. During the period of conservative government rule, deregulation 
was driven by free market ideology. The decreasing power of regulators accelerated the 
consolidation of the telecom market and helped chaebol to shape an oligopolistic market 
structure in telecommunications.$$
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The shift from administrative control to spectrum auctions was an exemplary policy case 
that reflected the conservative government’s neoliberal policy orientation in the wireless 
telecommunications industry. A spectrum auction is a method of distribution in which the 
highest bidder acquires exclusive access to specific bands of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Coase (1959) suggested a theoretical rationale for the “property rights approach.” His idea that 
the pricing system would be more efficient than government “command and control” has been 
applied to actual spectrum allocations for commercial licenses169 in many developed countries, 
including the US It seeks to reduce government intervention and emphasizes the efficiencies to 
be derived from market transactions, a spectrum auction can be understood as an intrinsically 
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market-oriented policy that is closely connected to the deregulation or privatization of public air 
waves170 
Unlike other countries, Korea was relatively late to establish a legal basis for spectrum 
auctions. In fact, there had been active discussions on adopting spectrum auctions for licensing 
new wireless carriers for a number of years. For instance, the MIC inserted a new provision into 
the revised Radio Waves Act in the National Assembly, and sought to introduce spectrum 
auctions for IMT-2000 licenses in 1999. A nationwide controversy regarding the scandal 
revolved around PCS licenses171 in 1996 led to the liberal government’s attempt to introduce 
spectrum auctions, instead of administrative allocation, in order to enhance policy transparency. 
However, the revision was rejected in the National Assembly on the grounds that the “pricing 
system has the risk of reducing industry’s competitiveness due to high entry costs” (Lee, 1999). 
At that time, many politicians in the National Assembly thought that it would be premature to 
introduce the US style spectrum auction and that it would be necessary to maintain government 
control over spectrum allocations. Under the liberal government’s policies, a similar discussion 
occurred when the new wireless licensing process for products and services such as WiBro 
opened up. When the government encountered strong opposition from industry players, workers, 
and civic groups, it delayed the introduction of spectrum auctions. Industry players and workers 
in telecommunications and broadcasting were concerned that, if the pricing system were to be 
introduced, companies with large financial resources such as foreign firms and chaebol would 
jump into telecommunications. Civic groups were concerned that the high entry costs required of 
service providers would be passed along to consumers in the form of expensive service charges 
(Son, 2005). !
Negotiations with the US for the KORUS FTA revived the discussion concerning 
spectrum auctions. The US initially argued that Korea should introduce spectrum auctions and 
follow the US model during negotiations for the telecom sector. The US regarded administrative 
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trade barrier. The US eased its initial stance on spectrum allocation172 in the 5th round of FTA 
negotiation (Roh, 2006), and the pressure caused the MIC to propel forward the previously 
postponed reform of spectrum allocation.173 The MIC listed the change of spectrum allocation 
policy in its “Telecommunications Deregulation Roadmap” in 2007 and returned to working out 
the detailed reform plan. However, the MIC once again faced opposition from broadcasting 
companies, media workers, and civic groups. The broadcasting advocacy coalition in particular 
was concerned that 108MHz of spectrum in the 700MHz band, which would be empty after the 
digital TV transition, would be allocated to chaebol and foreign firms for commercial wireless 
service, and thought that the introduction of spectrum auction was the first step in this 
reallocation.174 For this reason, the MIC did not actively push the deregulation of spectrum 
allocation management.175  
The plans for a spectrum auction that had long been postponed in the previous 
government were implemented under the conservative government. In accordance with the 
government’s “business-friendly” orientation, the KCC began to push for the deregulation of 
telecommunications, including broadcasting, “in order to enhance media industry’s global 
competitiveness and promote self-regulated competition in the telecommunications industry” 
(KCC, 2010a). Although the Korea Telecommunications Operators Association (KOTA) raised 
concerns, there was no serious opposition to the introduction of the spectrum auction itself.176 
The government tabled the revision of the Radio Waves Act in January 2009. The revision 
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certain band of the spectrum is high and competitive demands for it exist. Without making 
auctions into the mandatory method, the revised act gives the KCC the discretion to choose the 
allocation method depending on market circumstances. Interestingly, unlike the 1999 rejection, 
the National Assembly passed the revised bill regarding spectrum auctions in June 2010, because 
the conservative party, the Grand National Party, held a majority of seats. !
After establishing a legal basis for spectrum auctions, the KCC held Korea’s first 
spectrum auction for wireless broadband service in August 2011. Wireless carriers needed more 
spectrum bandwidth due to the rapid adoption of smartphones and increasing wireless data traffic. 
The KCC decided to sell the rights to use three separate bands: 10MHz in the 800MHz band, 
20MHz in the 1.8GHz band, and 20MHz in the 2.1GHz band. The auction for the 1.8GHz band 
was fiercely competitive, and the bidding went on for over 83 rounds between SKT and KT. KT 
dropped out of the race for the 1.8GHz band, and SKT won the competition and obtained the 
right to use the spectrum for ten years. The price was relatively high, and amounted to 995 
billion won ($933 million). Two dominant wireless carriers were barred from competition for the 
2.1GHz band, which was assigned to LGT at the initial reserve price, 445.5 billion won ($412 
million). The 1.8GHz band was regarded as more valuable177 than the 800MHz band because it 
was already in widespread use for 4G Long-Term Evolution (LTE). Furthermore, SKT, which 
did not possess the spectrum in the 1.8GHz band, concerned that KT would have a strong 
advantage in 4G LTE by adding the auctioned part of the spectrum to the part of the spectrum 
that was already in use in the same band (See Table 10).  
The interesting thing is that the KCC emphasized deregulation and market autonomy 
when introducing the spectrum auction, but did not completely abandon government intervention 
in spectrum allocation. As regards the auctions, the KCC prohibited SKT and KT from 
participating in the bidding for 2.1 GHz. According to a KCC official, Na Sang Eung, who took 
control of spectrum allocation for commercial uses, pointed out in his interview for this study 
that the KCC wanted to create the “managed spectrum auctions system” by mixing auctions with 
administrative control in order to prevent the development of potential unwanted side effects of 
spectrum auctions such as “spectrum monopoly.” This intervention resulted in concerns !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"))!I0$)4$!>##B$0&A&,$)@&6./-),.'$d%R$,&/1)6<0$1&6&$+0-,7$/2&$#"\NC8$5.,:$.,:$*.,D$)/2&6$)@&6./)60$1)6':1-:&$
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regarding relatively high auction prices and unfair advantages on the part of LGU+. A ban on 
participation in the 2.1GHz band led SKT and KT to rush to compete in the 1.8GHz band. 
Simultaneous ascending bid without a ceiling made auction prices for the band relatively high.178 
In the absence of competitors, LGU+ got portions of the spectrum for 3G and 4G at the 
minimum price. Furthermore, the auction brought about an unexpected change in the wireless 
market. KT failed to purchase the spectrum in the 1.8GHz band for 4G LTE. 800MHz, which 
was allocated to KT instead of 1.8GHz, turned out to not be optimal for launching 4G, because it 
was expected to be unavailable until after 2013, and international standardization for the band 
did not yet exist. These circumstances pushed KT to terminate its 2G network early in order to 
use the 2.1GHz band, which had been used for 2G, for its 4G service. The early termination of 
2G brought about market confusion and later brought about 2G users litigation against KT. 
To sum up, the shift from administrative control to spectrum auctions was an exemplary 
policy case that reflects the conservative government’s neoliberal policy orientation in wireless 
telecommunications. Of course, the shift does not mean the complete retreat of government 
intervention in markets because the government mixed administrative control with a pricing 
system in the 4G spectrum auctions conducted in 2011. Nonetheless, the introduction of 
spectrum auctions can be understood as a turning point for Korea’ developmental policy package. 
The government usually imposed numerous restrictions on carriers in order to promote free 
markets, secure fair competition, and select a certain technical standard under the command and 
control allocation system. It would be difficult for the government to intervene in a major way in 
the market through spectrum allocation process under the auction system. One additional point is 
that only incumbent players were able to obtain parts of the wireless spectrum for new services 
as the results of the first spectrum auctions indicate. Spectrum auctions, at least in Korean, did 
not necessarily enhance market competition by facilitating the entry of new firms. It actually 
intensified the oligopolistic market structure by increasing the autonomy of incumbent market 
players with less government intervention. 
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The conservative government focused on market competition using certain policies: (a) 
the promotion of MVNO and (b) the licensing of a “fourth” wireless carrier. These policy 
measures were closely related to the government’s goal of boosting competition in the wireless 
market and lowering the price of mobile services. Interestingly, the conservative government 
chose these measures to disguise its “business-friendly” nature with “populist” policies in the 
wireless sector. In Korea, household expenditures on communications had increased rapidly 
since the late 1990s.179 This happened because various services, including broadband Internet, 
3G mobile, and other converged services had been introduced in the market, and also because 
multimedia services such as education/entertainment content had been integrated into telecom 
services (Choi & Park, 2008, p. 74-76). Lee Myung-Bak pointed to telecom service rates as a 
major culprit behind rising consumer prices, and pledged!during his presidential campaign to 
reduce mobile service charges by 20%. Given these circumstances, the KCC pushed three 
incumbent mobile carriers to lower their service rates. The regulator’s efforts were partially 
successful in persuading carriers to introduce a per-second billing system, reduce basic 
membership fees, and scrap caller ID charges. However, other measures that could have resulted 
in the transformation of the existing oligopoly into a more competitive market structure were 
unsuccessful due to the market power of incumbent players.  
First, the conservative government attempted to promote the growth of mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNO) in the Korean wireless market. MVNO is an operator that provides 
mobile communications services to users without its own radio spectrum and network 
infrastructure.180 Theoretically, MVNO has been regarded as a policy option for boosting market 
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competition in the wireless industry and for lowering service rates.181 In addition, industrial 
groups182 have expressed intentions of establishing their own MVNO in order to enter a lucrative 
market. Given this background, the KCC attempted to develop a legal basis for introducing 
MVNO by revising the Telecommunications Business Act. However, the regulator’s plans for 
MVNO encountered resistance from incumbent carriers, particularly SKT. SKT, a dominant 
wireless carrier in the market, thought that MVNO would facilitate additional market 
competition and cannibalize its own customer base. The company argued that wholesale prices 
and other conditions should be decided upon depending on self-regulation or contracts between 
MNO and MVNO, even if it became possible for the new competitors to enter the wireless 
service market. !
Despite opposition from SKT, the National Assembly revised the Telecommunications 
Business Act in order to introduce MVNO in February 2010.183 The revision specified that the 
KCC could designate SKT as a dominant player that had to provide its own network when 
MVNO requested a network lease. After one year of negotiations between MVNOs and SKT, the 
wholesale price was formalized in March 2011. The KCC focused on regulating SKT, while 
allowing KT and LGU+ to lease their networks to MVNO based on private contracts without 
government approval. 24 MVNOs, including KCT, Onse Telecom, and CJ HelloVision, have 
entered the wireless industry since 2010. In October 2012, the number of MVNO subscribers 
reached one million184. However, the market share of the million MVNO subscribers out of the 
total number of 53 million Korean subscribers was less than two percent.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"*"!I(()6:-,7$/)$^.'*+0$[$Z-&/2.+0$=!>#>?B$`JU_$-0$+,'-<&'D$/)$6&:+(&$(),0+*&6$@6-(&0$1-/2)+/$7)A&6,*&,/$
-,/&6A&,/-),B$&"7"B$.((&00$6&7+'./-),"$!"*$!aI%J$0&6A-(&$@6)A-:&60B$0*.''$.,:$*&:-+*$'.,:'-,&$(.66-&60B$/2&$:-0/6-5+/-),$-,:+0/6DB$.,:$/2&$5.,<-,7$-,:+0/6D$
1&6&$&.7&6$/)$&,/&6$/2&$1-6&'&00$-,:+0/6D$A-.$`JU_0"$9)6$-,0/.,(&B$/2&$^)6&.,$a.5'&$%J$I00)(-./-),$=^a%?$.,:$aP$
76)+@B$12-(2$&,/&6&:$46)*$/2&$4)):$-,:+0/6D$/)$*&:-.$-,:+0/6DB$,&&:&:$1-6&'&00$0&6A-(&$/)$()*@&/&$1-/2$/26&&$
*.e)6$/&'&()*$(.66-&60$-,$/2&$%QM$*.6<&/"$H-0/6-5+/-),$()*@.,-&0$0+(2$.0$C)*&$Q'+0$.,:$5.,<0$0+(2$.0$/2&$^)6&.,$
9&:&6./-),$)4$O.,<0$2)@&:$/)$&3@.,:$/2&-6$5+0-,&00&0!.(6)00$/2&$()+,/6D$+0-,7$/2&-6$')(.'$56.,(2$,&/1)6<"$M*.''$
.,:$*&:-+*$'.,:'-,&$(.66-&60$0+(2$.0$_,0&$%&'&()*$.,:$/2&$9&:&6./-),$)4$M*.''$.,:$`&:-+*$a)**+,-(./-),0$
a)*@.,-&0$=9M`aa?$1.,/&:$/)$*-76./&$/2&-6$5+0-,&00&0$.1.D$46)*$/2&$:&('-,-,7$1-6&:$*.6<&/$.,:$*-76./&$-,/)$
/2&$'+(6./-A&$1-6&'&00$*.6<&/"$$!!"*%!I(()6:-,7$/)$M2-,$[$a2+,7$=!>#!?B$')55D-,7$5D$-,:+0/6-.'$76)+@0$0+(2$.0$_,0&$%&'&()*$1.0$&44&(/-A&$-,$
@&60+.:-,7$/2&$U./-),.'$I00&*5'D$=@"$Yb?"$"*&!I0$)4$_(/)5&6$!>#!B$/2&$/)/.'$,+*5&6$)4$`JU_$0+50(6-5&60$6&.(2&:$#B>#!B>>>"$#>$`JU_0$/2./$'&.0&:$^%;0$
,&/1)6<$7./2&6&:$Y#YB>>>$0+50(6-5&60"$Y$`JU_0$/2./$+0&:$M^%;0$,&/1)6<$.(T+-6&:$!\GB>>>$0+50(6-5&60"$`JU_0$
/2./$6&,/&:$/2&$,&/1)6<$46)*$dNLu$.//6.(/&:$!#]B>>>$0+50(6-5&60$=a2+,7B$!>#!?"$^%B$/2&$0&(),:$'.67&0/$*)5-'&$
!!
113!
The reason for relatively slow growth was SKT’s delay in negotiations with MVNOs. 
Furthermore, real competition did not increase the wireless market due to the oligopolistic 
market structure, despite the reduced MVNO service prices. MVNOs found it difficult to secure 
a line-up of attractive handsets due to their small subscriber base. Unlike incumbent players, 
their weak financial capacity limited their ability to offer handset subsidies, particularly in the 
relatively expensive smartphone market. In addition, their small number of retail channels and 
the unproven quality of their customer service center were among the disadvantages of MVNOs. 
Furthermore, SKT and KT listed their subsidiaries as being MVNOs in 2011 and prepared to 
launch their MVNO to target the low-end service market.  
In addition to the promotion of service-based competition along the lines of MVNO, the 
KCC also attempted to give a new wireless license to the nation’s “fourth” mobile carrier to 
enhance market competition. The KCC initially hoped to accomplish multiple goals by granting 
a new WiBro-based license to a fourth carrier in order to: (a) bring facility-based competition 
into the oligopolistic mobile market, (b) lower wireless service prices, and (c) revive the home-
grown technology, WiBro, which wound up as a ‘white elephant’ in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, the selection of a fourth wireless service provider was a core policy that had been 
promised during the presidential election campaign in 2008. 
The project failed due to the KCC’s chaebol-oriented policy logic and oligopolistic 
market structure. The KCC opened the licensing process four times since June 2010. The Korea 
Mobile Internet (KMI) consortium applied for a license to provide wireless access based on the 
WiBro network four times since the initial bids in June 2010. The other consortium, known as 
Internet Space Time (IST), submitted applications for a fourth mobile carrier license twice in 
2011 and 2012 (See Table 11). Every application from KMI and IST from June 2010 to 
December 2012 was disqualified by the KCC. The KCC gave the applicants low scores for their 
financial stability and business feasibility (KCC, 2010b; 2011a; 2011b; 2013).  
The KCC put a priority on applicants’ financial and business capabilities and 
technological abilities.185 The KCC’s logic was that a fourth carrier needed to build a new 
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network and facility in order to provide wireless service. Thus, it needed huge capital 
expenditures in its early investment stage and needed to be capable of enduring huge deficits 
before it could reach the breakeven point. If a company selected to be a fourth carrier were to 
suffer large losses and need to retreat from its business, customers would be harmed. This is why 
the KCC wanted the large Korean conglomerates, chaebol, to participate in establishing a fourth 
wireless service provider.186  
Korean conglomerates, including Hyundai, Samsung, and Dongbu187, disagreed with the 
regulator’s policy orientation, and expressed their hope of joining a fourth wireless carrier 
project. Hyundai group decided to join the IST consortium by investing 0.2 trillion won ($0.19 
billion) through subsidiaries such as Hyundai U&I and Hyundai Securities in order to diversify 
its businesses (Moon, 2011). Samsung Electronics was expected to join the consortium in order 
to attempt to resuscitate the waning market for WiBro (Kim, 2011b). Dongbu joined the KMI 
consortium as a leading investor in order to expand its business domain into the wireless industry. 
However, these chaebol eventually gave up on their investments in the mobile business, due to 
the global economic slump, the severe competition in the Korean wireless industry, and the 
uncertain future of WiBro technology.  !
There was a possibility that a new wireless service provider could succeed in the already 
oligopolistic wireless market. As mentioned in the MVNO case, when there is a large subscriber 
base of incumbent players, their ability to supply attractive handsets, the financial ability to 
provide a handset subsidy, and brand power are significant barriers to entry for a new carrier that 
seeks to enter the market. Although a new carrier can obtain a license, it would find it difficult to 
succeed in the wireless market because the business would be based on WiBro. The corporate 
interests of SKT and KT led to the stagnant growth of the domestic WiBro market. Samsung, a 
major WiBro equipment manufacturer, actually abandoned its WiBro business because LTE had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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defeated WiMax in 4G standard battles. Furthermore, three incumbents slightly reduced their 
service charges in response to government policy pressure. This situation led to a skeptical 
attitude regarding the possibility of a fourth wireless carrier license in the telecommunications 
policy landscape, where the consensus was “three players are enough for small Korea. Why do 
we need another wireless carrier?” (Lim, 2013) 
To sum up, the conservative government’s attempt to boost service-based competition 
and facility-based competition was unsuccessful due to the oligopolistic market structure and 
business interests inside and outside of the wireless industry. Although MVNOs could enter the 
wireless market, it was not much of a success given that they took less than a 2% market share. 
This accomplishment came about due to the business strategy that existed among the incumbent 
business players in the wireless industry, not due to the government’s regulatory efforts. As 
regards a fourth wireless carrier, the government failed to grant a license and, even should a 
fourth carrier emerge, market competition makes this unlikely due to the existing oligopolistic 
market structure. 
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This chapter found that the state facilitated the neoliberal transformation of the national 
economy and the wireless telecommunication industry. As regards the nation’s economic system, 
the government took an active role in completing the Free Trade Agreement, propelling the 
privatization of the financial industry, and enhancing market freedom by means of tax reductions 
and deregulation. The neoliberal orientation of the government accelerated Korean economy’s 
integration into the global economy and led to the re-emergence of chaebol.188 
In the wireless telecom sector, the conservative government dismantled the MIC, the 
control tower for implementing the Korean developmental model in the information and 
communications industries. The new ‘independent’ regulatory agency, the KCC, accepted and 
supported the industry’s agenda for consolidating traditional different sectors such as fixed, 
wireless, and broadcasting. The regulatory agency changed the mode of spectrum allocation 
management from administrative control, formerly a core policy tool for developing the wireless 
industry, to spectrum auctions. Furthermore, the KCC propelled various deregulatory measures, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"**!^.'-,)10<-$=!>>F?$@)-,/&:$)+/$/2./$^)6&.$&,/&6&:$W/2&$0&(),:$a2.&5)'$f&@+5'-(X$1-/2$/2&$6&/+6,$)4$
(),0&6A./-A&$7)A&6,*&,/$.,:$/2&$6&c&*&67&,(&$)4$'.67&$^)6&.,$-,:+0/6-.'$(.@-/.'"!!
!!
116!
such as introducing MVNO and licensing a new wireless carrier, in accordance with the 
government’s neoliberal policy orientation. The Korean state appears to have transformed itself 
into a “neoliberal state” during this period. 
However, the state did not abandon its developmental intervention in industry. For 
instance, spectrum allocation was not completely based on a free-market auction system. The 
Korean government continued to maintain its ‘discretionary’ power over the licensing of new 
wireless providers. The KCC disqualified small- and medium- size corporate applications for a 
forth carrier because it believed that only large corporations such as chaebol could effectively 
use the license. Streeter (1996) points that the US government intervened in the creation of 
commercial broadcasting based on “corporate liberalism.” In Streeter’s analysis, radio was seen 
as a big, sophisticated, and new technology, and only the large corporations would be able to 
make the technological investments and keep pace with the fast-evolving technological demands. 
Streeter’s argument also applies to Korean government wireless telecom policy, which is 
undergirded by the belief that only large corporations can succeed in developing a sustainable 
industry. This idea originated out of the past experience with rapid economic growth emerging as 
a result of a state-big business developmental alliance. 
 Interestingly, this chapter also found that the government’s neoliberal policies were often 
unwanted by industry. The conservative government sought to promote market competition by 
establishing institutions based on free market ideology through deregulatory measures, but the 
goal was not fully accomplished due to the interests of incumbent market players. In most cases, 
appropriate state regulation of provision, access, and pricing is unavoidable in naturally 
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets such as telecommunications. For this reason, the 
regulation of telecommunication involved seeking a way to secure fair competition in industry. 
However, in the Korean wireless industry, enhanced competition driven by telecom liberalization 
since the 1990s, finally resulted in an oligopolistic market structure due to the government’s 
neoliberal policy. The government’s neoliberal policies are now often unwelcome among the 
oligopoly. In other words, relations between the state and capital, as examined in this chapter, 
reflect one of the “shadowy areas within the general theory of [the] neoliberal state” (Harvey, 
2007, p. 67).!!
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There is a high degree of similarity between the political economic environment and 
wireless telecommunications policy regimes under the Kim Young-Sam government and under 
the Lee Myung-Bak government (See Table 1). First, the two governments proactively 
participated in neoliberal globalization. During the Kim Young-Sam government’s rule, Korea 
entered into the WTO and multilateral free trade agreements that shaped the global rule of trade 
based on neoliberal idea. In 1996, Korea joined the OECD, an organization of “rich” countries 
that strongly support the free market system. Under the Lee Myung-Bak government, Korea 
finished negotiating the KORUS FTA in 2010. The US government boasts that free trade 
agreements have proven to be “one of the best ways to open up foreign markets to US exporters” 
and are part of a legal framework that supports global free market through bilateral agreements’ 
network.189  
Second, the two conservative governments shared the common characteristic of 
emphasizing neoliberal globalization as their number one political agenda item. The Kim Young-
Sam government declared “globalization” (segyehwa in Korean) to be a leading principle in their 
economic policies. The main argument in support of segyehwa was that it enhanced the 
international competitiveness of Korean society and economy by accepting global standard and 
norms. The Lee Myung-Bak government similarly proclaimed that “advancement” (seonjinhwa 
in Korean) must be an idea that guides the revitalization of the nation’s economy. This is 
congruent with segyehwa, a concept suggested ten years previously. Seonjinhwa highlighted the 
necessity of accepting neoliberal norms as a means of boosting the nation’s international 
competitiveness. Seonjinhwa was often underscored as a rationale for the privatization of public 
sector organizations such as state-owned banks, airports and railroads.  
Third, the neoliberal political agenda significantly impacted the wireless 
telecommunications policy regime. Governments reorganized the regulatory agencies depending 
on their political agendas. The Kim Young-Sam government established the MIC to support 
telecommunications liberalization in the late 1990s. The Lee Myung-Bak government dismantled 
the development-oriented MIC, which functioned as the control tower of the IT industry 
development during the liberal government’s rule, and created the KCC as an integrated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"*+!M&&$/2&$1&50-/&$)4$E,/&6,./-),.'$%6.:&$I:*-,-0/6./-),$=2//@Vnn/6.:&"7)An4/.n?"!
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regulatory agency. The result was that Korean wireless telecommunications was rapidly 
liberalized under the Kim Young-Sam government, as noted in Chapter 1. The KMT, a public 
enterprise that exclusively provides wireless services, was privatized and sold to the SK chaebol. 
Four new licensees entered the wireless service market, and government-led CDMA R&D 
projects came under the influence of chaebol such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai. The Lee 
Myung-Bak government propelled neoliberal policies in the wireless telecommunications. The 
market structure of the telecommunications industry became oligopolistic, spectrum auctions 
were introduced, and competition policies such as the introduction of MVNO and the awarding 
of licenses for a new wireless carrier were attempted. 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this dissertation illuminated that the wireless 
telecommunications policy regime continuously changed depending on the political and 
economic environment (See Table 1). In reaction to major structural changes such as neoliberal 
globalization, domestic political changes, and the changing power of domestic capital, the 
government created different policy regimes in wireless telecommunications. The interactions 
between the state, transnational forces and businesses also produced different policy networks 
and results at each stage. This dissertation elaborates that the role of state and the interactions 
between actors in the Korean wireless telecommunications have continuously changed, unlike 
the proponents of both neoliberal convergence and the return of the state thesis. Historical 
accounts of the Korean wireless telecommunications policy reflect that the role of state has not 
decreased. It has instead been reconfigured, depending on the details of the political economic 
environments. A hybrid concept such as that of the neoliberal-developmental state is necessary 
for conducting analyses that extend beyond simple dichotomization of the evolution of the East 
Asian political economy.  
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“Our country closed its door about one hundred years ago, and the result was that our 
land went under Japanese colonial rule. But, we still don’t throw away isolationism. We should 
realize how rapidly global circumstances change and how important international criteria are.”190 
At first glance, this appears to be part of touching speech delivered by a Korean politician who is 
worried about the nation’s future. However, this is not a political speech, but one of the hundreds 
of online comments that individual users posted on online petition that sought to remove a de 
jure national standard for the mobile Internet platform, the Wireless Internet Platform 
Interoperability (WIPI). Users who gathered online asked for the removal of the WIPI, which 
was considered to be a technical barrier to iPhone imports around 2008. The controversy was one 
reason why the government eliminated the WIPI mandate and allowed domestic wireless carriers 
to import iPhones.!
This unprecedented situation stimulated this researcher to examine the role of individual 
users in the Korean wireless telecommunications policy landscape where the state’s goal and 
business interests have long been dominant. In political science and public policy studies, the 
role of institutional policy actors191 such as legislatures, government agencies, and the courts has 
been a core research subject (Cahn, 2012). Business as a political actor has been scrutinized 
closely both in political science and management studies (Kautto, 2009). The role of consumer 
organizations as policy actor has also been researched in various policy cases. However, the role 
of individual citizens in the policy process has garnered less scholarly attention until they were 
mobilized into a large-scale social movement and a powerful interest group (Birkland, 2011, p. 
133). 
More particularly, individual users have seldom been regarded as potential policy actors 
in telecommunications policy research. Unlike audiences in the broadcasting sector, users in 
telecommunications have usually been framed as being individual consumers in relationship to 
economic goals, not as a collective citizenry from the social and cultural perspective 
(Livingstone & Lunt, 2012). Treating telecommunications users as mere consumers has been 
more prevalent in Korea than in other countries due to Korea’s long-term emphasis on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"+#!M&&$2//@Vnn550]".7)6."*&:-.":.+*",&/n7.-.n:)n@&/-/-),n6&.:r550E:sQ>>#[.6/-('&E:sY>#b>!"+"!E,$/2-0$(2.@/&6B$@)'-(D$.(/)60$.6&$:&4-,&:$.0B$5)/2$4)6*.'$.,:$-,4)6*.'B$-,:-A-:+.'0$.,:$76)+@0$/2./$0&&<$/)$
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information-based economic developmental model. The telecommunications industry has been a 
core domain for national economic growth. As a consequence, individual users of 
telecommunications network and services have often been framed as being passive consumers or 
markets in Korea. As previous chapters illuminated, Korean wireless telecommunication policies 
have been shaped to support corporate interests and realize governmental goals. “Neoliberal-
developmental” practices turned the Korean wireless telecommunications policy regime and 
industry into a closed system. However, users have recently emerged as a possible policy actor in 
the Korean wireless telecommunications landscape. 
Given this context, this chapter will examine the role of users who became involved in 
the controversy regarding the removal of WIPI and iPhone imports around 2008 and 2009 in the 
Korean wireless telecom policy landscape. This chapter relies on historical methods, interviews 
with users and the materials they posted in online forums. This chapter is organized into two 
main sections. The first part of this chapter investigates the formation of WIPI in the context of 
the neoliberal-developmental state. This part focuses on the role of, and interactions between, the 
state, transnational forces, and domestic business players in developing homegrown technology 
and standards. The second part of this chapter analyzes the role of networked users who sought 
to use the iPhone and organized themselves into online communities during the removal of 
WIPI. This part explains how networked users emerged as a policy actor in the wireless telecom 
policy landscape.  
 The main purpose of this chapter is to understand the interactions among actors in the 
policy landscape involved in mobile Internet platform standard policy. This chapter does not 
argue that the role of users was a single crucial factor behind the policy change. Instead, the 
research intends to highlight the necessity of considering the role of users as one possible factor 
behind the policy change and understanding it within the context of online democracy. Thus, this 
chapter begins with an examination of the origin of WIPI and interactions between the state, 
transnational forces and business players. 
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This section examines how the Korean ‘neoliberal-developmental state’ initiated the 
development of the WIPI standard and what were the interactions between the government, 
domestic business players, and foreign pressures in the formation of the standard. WIPI is a 
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middleware platform192 that allows mobile phones to run applications. The government set WIPI 
as a mandatory standard, which meant that any mobile phone that did not have WIPI could not 
be sold and used in Korea. The WIPI mandate had a significant effect that protected the domestic 
wireless Internet industry and mobile handset-manufacturing industry. These industries could 
reduce the license fees they paid for foreign middleware platform. In addition, the WIPI mandate 
gave domestic software developers and manufacturers a grace period193 to prepare for the 
impending entry of foreign players and the rise of the smartphone market. Unlike the situations 
found in other countries194, the development of WIPI was a successful national project for 
building its own standard for a wireless Internet platform and in bringing it into widespread use 
as a mobile Internet platform in Korea. As of September 2008, immediately before the 
government abolished the mandatory loading of WIPI, the market share of mobile phones that 
made use of the homegrown wireless Internet platform was about 86% (KCC, 2009c, p. 24).  
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According to the MIC, the official goal of promoting WIPI was to guarantee 
interoperability between the several platforms that were incompatible at that time, and create a 
virtuous circle of new growth in the wireless Internet industry (MIC, 2002, 17). In a manner 
similar to the wireless Internet market of other countries in the early 2000s, each wireless carrier 
in Korea – SKT, KTF, and LGT – had adopted different incompatible middleware platforms, 
which allowed mobile phones to run applications (See Table 13). In this situation, the MIC had 
expressed concerns regarding two issues brought about by carriers making use of incompatible 
platforms.  
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One of the most frequently-mentioned problems encountered when running incompatible 
platforms was the overlapping investment of content providers. Content providers had to develop 
different version of applications in order to fit their products into each wireless Internet platform. 
The MIC also pointed out that the adoption of discordant mobile platforms had led to 
inconveniences experienced by users, which impeded the increase in consumption of wireless 
content and the expansion of the entire wireless industry. In other words, the standardization of 
platforms was expected to lead to positive consumption externalities195 in the wireless Internet 
market for the benefit of domestic carriers, platform developers, content providers and device 
manufacturers. 
In addition to the official goals, MIC’s underlying motivation for promoting WIPI was 
the protectionist viewpoint and developmental ambitions. Korea’s adoption of CDMA196 as a 
single standard for wireless service led to Qualcomm earning $2.63 billion in CDMA technology 
royalties from Korea between 1995 and 2005 (MIC, 2005). However, government and 
businesses in Korea, primarily wireless handset manufacturers such as Samsung and LG, 
expressed growing dissatisfaction with the royalty structure.197 In addition, Qualcomm 
introduced its own platform for wireless Internet service, Brew, through KTF!in October 2001. 
Brew was closely compatible with Qualcomm’s CDMA chips, and exhibited good performance 
characteristics, such as speed of operation and high stability for wireless Internet service. Had 
Brew been adopted as the de facto standard, Korean companies would have had to pay an 
additional $3 per phone (Jeong, 2004). During 2002, Korean mobile phone manufacturers paid 
$329 million in licensing fees to Qualcomm to use its technologies, including CDMA and Brew. 
This amounted to 7% of Korea’s total exports of wireless handsets (Lee, 2008a). Given these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that a primary goal of WIPI development was to achieve 
“technological independence” by excluding Qualcomm’s platform from the domestic market.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"+'!d&-5&,0/&-,$=#FY>?$0+77&0/&:$/2&$-,-/-.'$(),(&@/"$WU&/1)6<$&3/&6,.'-/DX$-0$)4$4+,:.*&,/.'$-*@)6/.,(&$4)6$/2&$
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However, the MIC’s ambitions while promoting the WIPI standard went beyond shutting 
Qualcomm out of the domestic wireless telecommunications market (Kim, 2011). There was no 
exclusive or dominating international standard for wireless Internet platforms at that time, 
although several standards were competing for market dominance. The MIC and domestic 
business players in the Korean market wanted to create an international pre-standard instead of 
simply waiting for an agreement or being forced to watch foreign high-tech firms such as 
Qualcomm and Sun Microsystems dominate the international standard-setting process. The MIC 
expected developers, device makers, and carriers to develop the capacity to create products by 
mandating the use of homegrown technology for wireless Internet platforms in order to foster a 
potential future international standard.   
“Although we were the first in the world to launch CDMA, Qualcomm earned large amounts of 
royalties from us. As the saying goes, one man sows and another man reaps. (...) When it comes 
to the wireless Internet, Qualcomm has a related technology known as Brew. The company 
exhibited the strong intention of promoting another technological colonization (Gisul 
Jongsokhwa in Korean) in the wireless Internet. We thought we could not endure this unfairness 
any longer. Using a homegrown middleware technology, we wanted to make our own way in the 
wireless Internet industry on a global scale” 
An interview with a government officer in KCC who had been involved in the policy-
making process of WIPI confirmed that the primary motivation behind the promotion of WIPI 
was to develop “technological independence” from foreign firms while also making its own 
technology into an international standard. In the Korean telecom policy field, economic 
nationalism has often been tied to large-scale developments in technology. The interviewee’s 
term, “technological colonization” reminds this researcher of the relationship between 
imperialism, nationalism and decolonization during the 20th century. The spiritual background of 
the developmental project appears to be a fervent desire for economic survival against 
‘imperialistic’ penetration by foreign technology and capital during neoliberal globalization.  
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In order to accomplish these strategic goals, the MIC began the process of setting 
standards for the WIPI platform. An interesting point is that, unlike the previous national R&D 
and standardization project, the MIC delegated the authority for formulating and implementing 
policies related to the development of WIPI to a private organization. In May 2001, the Korean 
Wireless Internet Standardization Forum (KWISF) was founded. 830 companies and 90 technical 
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experts in the industry were members. The forum included most of the key stakeholders in the 
Korean wireless telecommunications industry including software developers, carriers and device 
manufacturers (ETRI, 2001). 
However, it was a semi-governmental organization, given that public agencies affiliated 
with the MIC, such as ETRI, took a leading role in establishing and operating the KWISF. It was 
outwardly an organization led by the private sector.  In practice, it was a government-led 
organization that led the development of WIPI. After the establishment of the KWISF, a 
specialized group within it - the Mobile Platform Special Subcommittee (MPSS) - set the 
technological specifications for WIPI. In April 2002, the preliminary version of WIPI was 
adopted as a formal standard for use with the wireless Internet through the formal standardization 
process of the MIC-affiliated standards body, the Telecommunications Technology Associations 
(TTA).198 The TTA also conducted interoperability testing with the WIPI project group in order 
to ensure the smooth integration of WIPI with newly developed applications, hardware and 
business models.  
 The government led the development and upgrades of WIPI technology. In order to 
create WIPI, the MIC selected a consortium of domestic high-tech start-ups including Sinjisoft, 
Aromasoft, and EXEmobile in November 2001. The research and development behind the initial 
version of WIPI was implemented from December 2001 to November 2002. It is estimated that 
the MIC provided subsidies amounting to $11-14 million to develop WIPI (AEA, 2003, p.2). 
It was not easy for the MIC to coordinate different positions and get them to converge 
toward the new mobile platform. During the standardization process, wireless service providers 
exhibited a negative attitude toward the government-led standardization of mobile platform 
(Yoo, 2002). Since the early 2000s, wireless voice revenues continued to stagnate while mobile 
data revenue surged.199 Each carrier attempted to lock-in its customers with differentiated 
platforms and associated content. Service providers were concerned that the unification of the 
wireless platform would weaken their strategy of service differentiation through mobile !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"+*!%%I$-0$.$@6-A./&$4)+,:./-),$&0/.5'-02&:$-,$#F\\$4)6$/2&$@+6@)0&$)4$0&//-,7$-,4)6*./-),$.,:$/&'&()**+,-(./-),0$
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platforms. For this reason, after the technological specification was set in 2001 and the MIC 
pushed the formal standardization forward, SKT, the largest wireless carrier, announced its 
acceptance of the standard but avoided mentioning its schedule for the development and 
commercialization of WIPI. KTF, the second largest provider, expressed opposition to WIPI due 
to their concern that the difficulties involved in differentiating services would led to market 
domination by SKT. Only LGT reacted positively to the government’s plan. LG announced that 
it would develop a new wireless platform based on WIPI and begin commercial service within a 
year. In addition, despite their approval of the WIPI project, content providers – most of whom 
were small-and medium-size enterprises – raised concerns that wireless carriers would influence 
the standardization process because the CEOs of the three carriers had been appointed co-
chairmen of KWISF.  
Despite these complaints, the WIPI was developed and adopted as a national standard for 
mobile platforms in April 2002. Unlike the CDMA project a decade ago, the government 
encountered various forms of opposition from domestic players and had to coordinate the 
interests of stakeholders such as carriers, developers, and content providers. However, during the 
first stage of the WIPI project, most domestic stakeholders acknowledged the necessity of 
developing a national standard based on homegrown technology and exhibited “cooperative 
conflict” behavior that could be resolved by government coordination (Song, 2009, p. 171). 
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During this stage, one influential input into the WIPI policy-making process came from 
outside Korea. After the KWISF set the technological specifications for WIPI and the TTA 
adopted WIPI as a standard for mobile Internet platforms in April 2002, the MIC showed that it 
intended to mandate the loading of WIPI onto mobile phone. The MIC decided to add the 
obligatory use of WIPI to the interconnection rule in May 2002.200 The KWISF simultaneously 
suggested the adoption of WIPI as an international standard for asynchronous IMT-2000 to an 
international standardization agency, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). This was the 
first step in making WIPI into an international standard, according to the MIC’s strategy. 
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However, this announcement of the MIC in May 2002 sparked a series of protracted 
bilateral negotiations involving the KWISF, MIC, Qualcomm, the US Telecommunications 
Industry Associations (TIA), and US government agencies such as the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR).201 Before the settlement of the issue in April 2004, twelve bilateral 
negotiations were held between Korea and US. The USTR advocated in favor of the interests of 
the US high-tech corporation Qualcomm, which had been a start-up but soon became one of a 
fast-growing wireless technology industry giant due to the global expansion of CDMA.202 
Qualcomm’s strategy was to enter the Chinese market after using the Korean market as a test 
market for its wireless Internet platform, Brew. Qualcomm was concerned that the WIPI 
mandate would result in the exclusion of Brew from the Korean market, which was expected to 
result in Qualcomm losing its proving ground for the larger international market.203  
USTR insisted that WIPI is a type of non-tariff barrier to trade that is prohibited by the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
MIC spoke against the claim, and argued that the standard had been developed by a private 
organization, the KWISF. The MIC often used ostensibly private organizations in developmental 
projects to conceal government intervention and avoid possible trade friction (See also the IMT-
2000 case in Chapter 3). More important, the MIC contended that WIPI was not an issue 
involving the WTO/TBT but rather an issue involving the WTO/GATS204. According to GATS, 
a government can regulate a certain technology voluntarily selected by a service provider if the 
technology prevents the expansion of telecommunications services for the benefit of customers. 
However, the claim from USTR actually delayed the MIC’s schedule for setting WIPI as a single 
mandatory standard for mobile Internet platform. 
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Furthermore, claiming that WIPI infringed on its MIDP205 licensing property rights, Sun 
Microsystems filed a petition with the USTR that called for designating Korea as being on ‘the 
Priority Watch List’ in accordance with ‘Special Article 301’ in March 2003 (Kim & Kim, 
2003a). The MIC argued that WIPI had nothing to do with the intellectual rights infringement 
case (Kim & Kim, 2003b). The application program interface (API) part of WIPI architecture 
used the Java language, and most of Java’s source code was open to the public. This was the case 
because domestic carriers operated their mobile Internet platforms based on the Java language. 
Sun argued that the API part of WIPI violated the intellectual property right of MIDP, a core 
component of the Java ME platform for mobile devices. Sun’s ultimate goal was not to earn 
royalties but rather pursue the de facto standardization of its technology. Sun Microsystems 
intended to make it clear that the new standard, WIPI, had been borrowed from Java. Sun 
Microsystems wanted to acquire a competitive edge over growing rivals such as Qualcomm and 
take the initiative by cooperating with Korea on wireless Internet platform technology. In April 
2003, Sun Microsystems and the KWISF reached an agreement on a royalty of 17 cents per 
phone, joint development for the next version of WIPI, reciprocal licensing, and cooperation on 
WIPI’s expansion.  
The pressure from US high-tech corporations and US government agencies!protracted 
and eventually limited the WIPI standardization project. After a two-year stalemate, USTR and 
the MIC reached a compromise. USTR acknowledged that WIPI was not an issue of technical 
barriers to trade. They also agreed that the Korean government had the right to set a mandatory 
national standard for domestic wireless Internet platforms. The MIC accepted the USTR’s 
request that Brew not be excluded if it was compatible with WIPI. The result was that the MIC 
decided not to exclude the hybrid types of platforms such as WIPI on Brew from the wireless 
market. The original goal of WIPI was undermined and the success of WIPI came to depend on 
the choices made by the end-users of the technology, meaning three wireless carriers.  
As a result, the mandatory use of WIPI was delayed, and complaints from domestic 
stakeholders such as carriers, content providers, and device manufacturers increased again. 
Carriers continued trying to differentiate their platforms in seeking the lock-in effect. The 
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frequent changes in WIPI policies led to increasing costs for device makers and content 
providers, which increased their distrust of government policies.  
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The mandatory use of WIPI began in April 2005206, and WIPI became a national standard 
for wireless Internet platforms in Korea. The WIPI was considered to be a successful project that 
led to the unification of incompatible wireless platforms, reduced the overlapping investments 
made by content providers, and contributed to the development of the domestic wireless 
telecommunications industry (Chae, 2008). However, the government’s mandated usage of WIPI 
as a wireless Internet platform was abolished in December 2008. The abolition of WIPI and other 
forms of deregulation allowed consumers to use smartphones such as iPhone. The iPhone was 
released in the Korean market in November 2009, and the explosive growth of smartphone users 
changed the landscape of the Korean wireless telecommunications industry. 
This section attempts to describe what prompted the abolition of WIPI during that time 
period. First, it examines the technological changes in wireless Internet platforms and how the 
change impacted Korean wireless telecommunications policy and the industry. Second, it 
explores how the conflicting interests of business players surrounding Korean wireless 
telecommunications increased the instability of the existing policy. Third, it reviews whether the 
reorganization of government agencies influenced policy changes. Forth, it illuminates how the 
debate concerning the introduction of the iPhone affected the dissolution of the WIPI policy 
network. Finally, it highlights how the voices of users developed into a political input and was 
utilized by corporations during the transition period. 
ODCDFD)0.B1*/&/;$B"&gW6'$*.'')(/+.&)$**/J"%$/*)$*);&/8"&)(/8$&.)%.&.B/((6*$B"%$/*')
During the late 2000s, the emergence of various software platforms and end-to-end 
Internet architectures in wireless communications increased the pressure on the traditional 
business ecosystem that had been dominated by network-operators (Ballon, 2007). The focus of 
the mobile industry shifted from a single killer application, voice, to various mobile data 
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leaderships in a new ecosystem. NTT Docomo’s i-mode model and Vodafone’s Live! model 
were prime examples of operators’ “walled garden models” that involved mobile portals, 
micropayments and revenue sharing, distinctions among content providers, and dedicated 
handsets (Tee, 2005; Ballon & Walravens, 2008; Ballon, 2009). In this model, middleware is a 
technologically important component of the layers of software architecture on mobile handsets. 
Wireless device platforms usually consist of an operating system (OS) and middleware. The OS 
provides common and basic functions for operating hardware, while middleware provides 
“operator-dependent” functions (Park, 2009a). The telco-centric model was dominant, and the 
focus on middleware was a technological trend until the early 2000s. Thus, the standardization of 
wireless Internet platforms, the WIPI project, was propelled based on middleware technology. 
However, the rise of new types of platform technology and business models restructured 
the global wireless telecommunications industry since the late 2000s. First, new platform 
technologies were introduced by information technology firms, handset manufacturers, and 
Internet-based companies - mainly US-based transnational corporations - in the late 2000s. These 
innovations allowed wireless applications to be built and distributed easily, often without the 
active involvement of network operators (Ballon, 2009, p. 18). Mobile operating systems (OS) 
such as Symbian, LiMo, Windows Mobile, Android and iOS, which run on high-end 
smartphones, became increasingly powerful. In this new OS-based environments, the network 
operator-dependent middleware platform is not always necessary for users who want to access 
various applications and content on their phones (See Figure 2). Moreover, new technology 
supports the development of third-party applications by releasing software development kits 
(SDKs). 
These technological changes were accompanied by business model innovations that 
deconstructed the operator-dominated ecosystem in the global wireless industry. For example, 
Apple experienced success in leading the industry with the innovative iPhone, and a device-
centric business model. Apple’s vertical strategy involved designing the handsets, making the 
operating systems, running the application store, and even choosing the wireless network 
providers. As a device manufacturer, Apple had the right and responsibility to screen 
applications and control the profit-sharing structure for distributing applications. Network 
operators had the power to align content, applications, and device providers in the telco-centric 
model, while in the device-centric model the device maker functions as portal provider by 
!!
130!
choosing and controlling which services will be made available to end users (Ballon & 
Walravens, 2008). Meanwhile, Google, a dominant Internet service company also constructed its 
business model for use in the wireless industry. Its business model was similar to Apple in the 
sense that Google controls the distribution of content and applications made available through its 
application store.  However, unlike Apple, Google opened its OS, Android, which is based on an 
open source license, to member firms of the Open Handset Alliance (OHA) including Samsung, 
LG, and Motorola, which helped them compete against other mobile platforms.207 
Korean government and business players began to recognize that WIPI, which is based 
on middleware technology and an operator-centric model, did not mesh very well with emergent 
technological trends in the age of mobile-Internet convergence. During an interview with a 
government official in KCC who had been involved with the WIPI policy, shows that the MIC 
paid a great deal of attention to technological change and felt pressured by these trends.  
“One of the big disadvantages of WIPI was that we missed the trend of technological evolution in 
the wireless Internet. The technological trend is not a separate middleware, but a general purpose 
OS that covers the function of wireless Internet middleware. One regrettable thing was that WIPI 
could not keep up with the prevailing trends and we could not keep pace with the technological 
trends as quickly as possible.” 
Given that platform technology would soon reshape business models, and even transform 
entire industries, a closed standard such as WIPI had to be abandoned or adjusted to keep up with 
the trends. The MIC first attempted to adjust WIPI in order to avoid falling behind global 
technological trends, and also wanted to avoid being forced to abandon WIPI. In 2007, this 
concern led the government to announce a strategy for upgrading WIPI and making it into an 
integrated middleware platform that would run on a general OS (MIC, 2007). Business players in 
the Korean mobile industry attempted to keep up with the trends. Samsung and LG, the dominant 
mobile handset manufacturers in Korea, organized the Linux Mobile (LiMo) consortium on 
conjunction with other global corporations, including Motorola, NEC, NTT Docomo, and 
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SKT, a dominant wireless carrier in Korea, co-developed an integrated wireless Internet platform!
with Motorola, T-PAK, which was based on the version of WIPI that existed in 2006 (Kim, 
2006d). LGT, the third largest wireless service provider in Korea, also began modifying its own 
integrated platform, which was based on WIPI and intended to run on general purpose operating 
systems such as Symbian and Window Mobile (Park, 2009). 
In conclusion, the pressure exerted by global changes in platform technology and 
business models motivated the Korean government and business players to search for 
alternatives. However, the alternatives were based on maintaining a national wireless platform 
standard. The Korean government and business players - mainly handset manufacturers and 
wireless carriers - were unwilling to consider abolishing WIPI until 2007. 
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Previous sections examine the government’s strategic interest as a developmental state in 
taking a leading role in establishing WIPI during its initial stage. The national standardization 
project succeeded in creating a closed market by blocking inter-standard competition and 
inducing intra-standard competition in mobile Internet communications. From the viewpoint of 
national interest, intra-standard competition was an ideal strategy for expecting the immediate 
network effects in the wireless Internet industry and the increase in consumer welfare through 
price competition. The introduction of intra-standard competition and its consequent walled 
market might be detrimental to consumer welfare. Regardless of whether or not intra-standard 
competition is good, the market structure based on intra-standard competition requires some 
theoretical underpinnings in order to become sustainable: the common interests of the players, 
the continual development of technology, and competitive advantage over and above other 
international standards. 
However, there were insufficient incentives for business players in the wireless industry 
to increase the competitiveness of the WIPI standard by means of continuous upgrading. 
Infrastructure software209 such as WIPI and OSs usually requires greater investments in 
technological enhancement than other types of applied software. In comparison with 
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transnational corporations’ aggressive innovations in platform technology, WIPI made slow 
progress in improving its competitiveness. WIPI was considered to be software that was 
competitive due to its high performance and platform compatibility during its inception as a 
government-led research and development project. However, WIPI has lagged behind Brew210 
soon after the adoption of WIPI as a national standard. Moreover, since the use of WIPI was 
mandated in 2004, there had been no leading organizations or systems that had taken charge of 
organizing follow-up investments or solving potential problems when multiple stakeholders 
worked on upgrading the platform. The KWISF, a forum for the standardization of the wireless 
Internet platform, had insufficient authority to mediate and coordinate complicated interests 
among multiple stakeholders that revolved around the WIPI, and failed to earn the trust of 
stakeholders. 
Given this situation, the interdependent and cooperative relationships between 
stakeholders began to break down due to conflicts of interest. The first fissures originated with 
mobile carriers who possessed power in the value chain of the wireless Internet market at that 
time. Wireless carriers intended to lock in customers by differentiating their wireless Internet 
platforms and associated content. Despite the differentiation strategy, wireless carriers such as 
SKT, KTF, and LGF agreed with the government to set up a national standard for wireless 
Internet platforms during the formation of WIPI. After the adoption of WIPI their agreement 
began to exhibit some limitations, and wireless carriers again turned to the differentiation 
strategy. Despite the original compatibility goal of WIPI, it once again became difficult to 
guarantee the inter-compatibility of different carriers’ wireless Internet platforms. KTF and LGT 
delayed the release of handsets that loaded the WIPI version 2.0 even after developing the one 
and half year version (Kim, 2005a). Wireless carriers used their own interfaces in newly-released 
services such as mobile 3D games, location-based services (LBS), telematics, and mobile 
banking (Kim, 2005b). The greater the extent to which each carrier made use of self-developed 
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service interfaces that differed from WIPI specifications211, the less compatibility each platform 
was able to offer. 
 After the obligatory use of WIPI, there were also the conflicts between carriers and 
device manufacturers (See Table 14). First, the interests of both sides collided with each other. 
Their clashes revolved around sharing the costs of development and maintenance of WIPI. 
Wireless carriers such as SKT argued that handset makers should share some part of the 
development and maintenance costs, while Samsung and LG claimed that doing so was absurd 
because WIPI ownership was shared among wireless carriers and application developers (Kim, 
2005). Carriers and manufacturers later held each other in check concerning platform leadership 
in the domestic wireless industry. SKT,!a dominant wireless carrier, sought to achieve platform 
leadership by developing its own integrated wireless Internet platform, T-PAK, in 2006. 
Samsung, a dominant handset manufacturer, refused to install T-PAK on its products (Kim, 
2006d). Samsung’s opposition to the adoption of the platform led SKT to strengthen cooperation 
with LG and Motorola. The growth of the 3G service market deepened the conflicts of interests 
between the players. Although the IMT-2000 service based on WCDMA first appeared in May 
2002, the carriers’ follow-up investments were delayed. As of June 2005, there were fewer than 
3,000 WCDMA subscribers in Korea (Lee, 2012b). KTF, the second largest wireless service 
provider, began aggressive marketing for 3G service by launching a new brand, ‘Show’, in 2006. 
KTF sought to overcome SKT by promoting WCDMA service. As of December 2005, SKT had 
acquired 50.9% of wireless service subscribers while KTF had acquired a 32.1% market share 
(MIC, 2006b).!
KTF rolled out mobile phone line-up service based on using WIPI on Brew in June 2006 
(Kim, 2006c). The reinstallation of Brew by KTF shows that one of the main purposes of WIPI - 
excluding Brew from the domestic wireless Internet platform market - was actually undermined. 
In addition, the KTF alliance with LG Electronics introduced a low-end non-WIPI phone for 3G 
service in 2007. Non-WIPI phone did not load wireless Internet platform itself and targeted 
consumers who wanted a simple and inexpensive phone without mobile Internet. There were 
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complaints from SKT and LGT, but the government allowed KTF to release non-WIPI 3G-
exclusive phones as an exception to WIPI. 
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One crucial factor in the retreat of WIPI can be found in the government sector. The 
government was confronted with technological innovations and business interests, and 
recognized there were various problems in maintaining the WIPI policy. However, until the 
“business-friendly” government dismantled the MIC in March 2008, the MIC had attempted to 
coordinate conflicts between domestic stakeholders and had tried to resist pressures from outside 
to maintain WIPI, regardless of its actual impact. 
For instance, during the several rounds of the Free Trade Agreement negotiations, US 
delegation strongly maintained that the government-led selection of technological standards, 
including WIPI, was a trade barrier, and demanded that the Korean government follow the global 
trends in favor of the free selection of standards by ending its intervention (Son, 2006). The 
Korean government resisted the US demand, claiming that telecommunications policy, including 
standards policy, is an essential part of national sovereignty, and the government is responsible 
for serving the public interest in areas such as interoperability and spectrum auctions. The 
Korean government did take a few steps towards compromise in the automobile and agricultural 
industries, but did not make concessions to the US in telecommunications. Korea wanted to 
maintain foreign equity limits below 50% on major carriers such as KT and SKT and maintain 
government intervention in the selection of standards (Yoon, 2007). When it comes to the 
standards policy, both sides agreed upon a compromise that “a party can mandate a specific 
technology or standard, or limit an operator’s technology choice on the basis of a rulemaking 
only when market forces have not, or are not expected to, achieve a public policy objective.”212 
Meanwhile, despite conflicts between business players, the MIC still wanted to promote 
WIPI up until 2007. The MIC disclosed a plan, the so-called The Development Strategy of WIPI 
in November 2007, and announced that the government had decided to invest over $6 million in 
developing the next generation of WIPI by 2010 (MIC, 2007). The MIC also intended to 
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establish a non-profit foundation for controlling and coordinating the contradictory interests of 
stakeholders, including wireless carriers, device manufacturers, and solution developers. The 
MIC held several conferences to discuss the development of WIPI 3.0 and establish a 
consultative body in order to promote WIPI again in 2007 (Lee, 2008d). 
However, the MIC, the government agency responsible for promoting the information 
and telecommunications industry for 15 years, was reorganized in March 2008. The Lee Myung-
Bak administration (2008-2013) created the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) by 
consolidating the old telecommunications regulatory body (MIC) and the old broadcasting 
regulatory agency (Korean Broadcasting Commission, KBC). Under the new regime, the former 
centralized information and telecommunications policy-making agency was split up into four 
different agencies: the regulation of telecommunications and broadcasting was assigned to the 
KCC, industry-promotion was assigned to the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), 
regulation and promotion of the content industry was assigned to the Ministry of Culture, Sports 
and Tourism (MCST), and overall control of government-informatization projects was assigned 
to the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MPAS).  
Although WIPI became a major issue in late 2008213, there was no centralized control 
tower to coordinate the decentralized authorities and policy functions related to WIPI. For 
example, there was month-long debate and a great deal of buck-passing between the KCC and 
the MKE regarding who had administrative authority over WIPI (Myung, 2008). The abrupt 
introduction of the Blackberry to the Korean market by SKT in May 2008 reflected the lack of a 
coordinated viewpoint among government agencies and the confusion regarding WIPI and the 
mobile industry. The MKE and KCC allowed SKT to release Research In Motion’s (RIM) 
smartphone, the Blackberry, without loading WIPI, the mandatory platform. The ongoing free 
trade agreement negotiations with Canada might have influenced the government’s decision 
(Song, 2008). Although the market impact of the Canadian state-of-the art mobile phone was 
relatively small, the Blackberry case undermined the credibility of government policy.     
The absence of a control tower and the lack of coordination were aspects of the policy 
environment that weakened the WIPI project. After some initial confusion, the KCC once again !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$"%!%2&$@6-*.6D$-00+&$/2./$/2&$^aa$(),(&,/6./&:$),$-,$/2&$&.6'D$!>>\$1.0$/2&$'&7-0'./-),$)4$/2&$EQ%J$I(/"$%2&$
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became the exclusive authority for dealing WIPI-related issues, but the KCC exhibited a passive 
attitude regarding the WIPI. Unlike the MIC, which had adhered to the development of WIPI 
even in the face of market distrust, the KCC announced that it would reexamine every aspect of 
telecommunications policy, from the ground up since 2008!including the WIPI. !
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Changes in platform technology trends, conflicting business interests, and decreased 
government power led stakeholders to question the legitimacy of continuing the mandate of 
national standards on mobile Internet platforms since 2004. However, aggravated conflicts 
surrounding the introduction of a new technology, the iPhone, triggered the dissolution of the 
WIPI policy network.  !
Wireless carriers began to withdraw from the closed coalition of WIPI. KTF began 
negotiations with Apple to introduce the WCDMA iPhone in the Korean market in August 2007 
(Cho, 2007a). At that time, KTF needed to break down the SKT/Samsung alliance and enlarge its 
own market share. SKT was a dominant wireless carrier which had a market share of over 50% 
as a result of using its purchasing power in the handset supply chain. Samsung, a dominant 
mobile handset manufacturer, had provided its new premium phone line-up exclusively to SKT. 
Samsung later offered its already outdated line-up to KTF. The alliance between dominant 
players in both the wireless service and handset industry gave KTF an incentive to cooperate 
with global handset makers and domestic start-ups such as Pantech. Meanwhile, Apple did not 
consider the Korean market to be important target because it was relatively small and regulatory 
hurdles made it difficult to enter the Korean market, including WIPI. Apple had a strategy of 
giving the exclusive rights to sell iPhones to a single firm in each country. KTF was the second 
largest carrier and had only a 30% market share in the Korean wireless market. In order to 
placate Apple, KTF received help from NTT Docomo, its Japanese partner, and reached an 
agreement with Apple to release the iPhone in the Korean market214 (Cho, 2007b). After 
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reaching an agreement with Apple, KTF began to push the government to remove legal 
constraints215, including WIPI. 
Meanwhile, SKT had gradually changed its stance on WIPI. Prior to 2007, SKT had 
supported WIPI. When KFT attempted to introduce non-WIPI phones, SKT opposed such 
attempts by stating that the release of non-WIPI phones would undermine the development of a 
Korean wireless industry ecosystem based on WIPI. SKT had its own integrated platform, T-
PAK, which was based on WIPI. SKT wanted gain platform leadership over other carriers, 
software developers and even device manufacturers. However, changes in the market and 
regulations since 2007 induced SKT to rethink its strategy. The commercialization of 3G 
WCDMA progressed after the nation-wide launch of 3G in March 2007. KTF’s marketing 
increased its 3G subscribers and threatened SKT. It was not until February 2009 that the number 
of 3G subscribers of SKT surpassed that of KTF. The KCC began to rethink the Universal 
Subscriber Identification Module (USIM) in 2007 and forced wireless carriers to unlock the 
USIM chips in the handsets of their subscribers in July 2008, in an effort to broaden user choices 
and boost sales of third-generation (3G) data-enabled phones (Kim, 2009c). It was supposed to 
allow subscribers to use any 3G handsets, iPhone and other handsets, by inserting their own 
USIM chip into it, regardless which carrier had released the device. SKT was concerned that it 
would be difficult to benefit from exclusive handset sourcing based on its market dominance. In 
addition, conflicts with device makers such as Samsung and LG increased due to the platform 
strategy of SKT using T-PAK. As the negotiating leverage of Samsung and LG in price and 
manufacturing specifications increased, SKT had an incentive to call for the removal of WIPI to 
check the growing power of the dominant handset manufacturers. At that time, SKT was 
considering both LiMo and Android. SKT thought that both were economically advantageous 
compared with WIPI. Both were open-source products that did not require SKT to pay 
technology royalties. Given these backgrounds, SKT, which had once been a supporter of WIPI, 
sought to break away from the WIPI policy coalition.216 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$"'!I0-:&$46)*$ZEQE$*.,:./&0B$/2&6&$&3-0/&:$()*@'-(./&:$<,)/0$)4$6&7+'./-),0V$=.?$')(./-),c5.0&:$0&6A-(&$.(/B$=5?$
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In a manner contrary to the stances maintained by other carriers, LGT and software 
developers opposed the abolition of WIPI. LGT returned its 3G license to the government 
without launching a service based on the North American-style synchronous standard. LGT 
chose to use the CDMA-2000 1x EV-DO Revision A as an interim solution. This meant that 
LGT could not provide a WCDMA-based iPhone, unlike KTF and SKT in 2007. LGT claimed 
that the introduction of popular foreign handsets such as iPhone would increase the disparity 
between the three carriers and undermine the government policy goal of fostering the mobile 
industry by promoting “effective competition” between the three carriers. Content providers and 
software developers with business interests in developing content and software based on the 
WIPI platform called for the maintenance of the WIPI standard using the "infant industry" 
argument: temporary protection of new firms can help foster the development of competitive 
national industries (Cho, 2008a). Even the proponents of the removal of the WIPI in the content 
and software industry argued that a step-by-step method was necessary for handling the WIPI 
and iPhone issues. !
Dominant handset manufacturers such as Samsung and LG had most benefited from the 
WIPI mandate, and bitterly opposed the introduction of iPhone by means of abolishing WIPI. 
The closed market structure allowed both manufacturers to become key players in the global 
wireless telecommunications market. Their virtuous circle of development involved (a) acquiring 
monopolistic positions in the domestic wireless handset market, (b) accumulating capital and 
technological knowhow using the domestic market as a “test-bed”, and (c) making inroads in the 
global market using low price and high quality. Samsung and LG were concerned that the iPhone 
would inevitably disrupt the existing markets and value network in the Korean wireless 
industry.217  
Samsung and LG had the follower’s advantage because they approached the global 
leading manufacturer, Nokia, in their production of premium feature phones. However, their 
smartphone manufacturing capabilities lagged behind those of Apple in 2007. Even if they were 
unable to stop the introduction of iPhone in the domestic market, Samsung and LG, hoped to 
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making capabilities. It was considered to be an open secret that the government delayed the 
removal of the WIPI mandate in order to give Samsung sufficient time to prepare its own 
smartphone line-up218 (Kim, 2009d).  Samsung exerted pressure on wireless carriers to delay the 
introduction of the iPhone. Jae-Yong Lee, the vice executive officer and the son of Samsung’s 
owner Geon-Hee Lee, requested that Tae-Won Choi, the owner of the SK Group, postpone 
introducing the iPhone.219 SKT accepted this demand (Kim & Lee, 2010). Seok-Chae Lee, the 
CEO of KT group, expressed in an email to KT employees, “It was hard for us to introduce the 
innovative iPhone to our country’s wireless market, but we could not have anticipated 
encountering strong obstruction from two chaebols” (Jeong, 2012).  
In conclusion, innovations in technology and business models, the absence of a control 
tower, and the conflicting interests of business players led to the poor performance of WIPI 
policy. Increasing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of WIPI policy reduced the legitimacy of 
the mandate. As a result, the government’s WIPI policy attracted increasing criticism from the 
industry and citizens. They thought that the WIPI policy served policy network insiders who 
benefited from the closed ecosystem of the mobile industry. The wireless industry and 
consumers both began to think that WIPI was blocking the diffusion of technological innovations 
from outside Korea, stifling market competition, limiting consumer choice, and eventually 
weakening national competitiveness in the global mobile industry.  
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It is noteworthy that user voices played a role in abolishing the WIPI mandate using 
various channels. In the telecommunication policy landscape, the actual users of mobile 
technology were considered to be a market that business players either sought to capture or 
passive subjects who conformed to public policy. Understanding individual users as passive 
consumers was intensified by the neoliberal-developmental policy orientation in Korea. Korean 
telecommunications policy emphasized the supplier-centric approach that prioritized the growth 
of the telecommunications industry while ignoring user voices. However, the voices of users 
became an input that supported the political legitimization of the WIPI policy change.  
Consumer organization and the National Assembly have traditionally functioned as a 
channel for representing user voices. In the WIPI case, the Seoul Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA) was involved in the debate. The KCC delayed making a decision regarding 
whether or not it would remove the WIPI mandate without a single public hearing. The YMCA 
held a public hearing to discuss problems and the future of WIPI on August 27, 2008. The panel 
that made the decision consisted of industry representatives who exhibited a negative view of 
WIPI. They put forth the opinion that the mandate should be deregulated in order to expand 
consumer choice, enhance the competitiveness of the mobile industry, and promote overseas 
expansion (Cho, 2008b). The public hearing contributed to arousing public attention to the policy 
change. The KCC responded by saying, “it is very difficult to make a quick decision on WIPI 
due to the large number of stakeholders, but we will reexamine it and devise a new measure” 
(Hwang, 2008a). The National Assembly was a venue where public opinion questioned the 
continuation of WIPI. They gathered and exerted pressure against the KCC’s policy decision. 
Lawmakers in the Committee of Culture, Sports, Tourism, Broadcasting and Communications 
pushed the KCC not to delay the policy decision regarding WIPI in a National Assembly audit in 
October 2008. The problems involved in continuing the WIPI mandate made the committee 
recognize the voices calling for change: (a) the WIPI mandate weakened the competitiveness of 
the mobile Internet industry, (b) it caused the price surge for mobile handsets and limited 
consumer choice, and (c) it made it more difficult to enter overseas markets due to technical 
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isolation and trade friction220 (Kim, 2008f). KCC chairman See-Joong Choi said to lawmakers, 
“the regulatory body was leaning toward lifting the WIPI requirement,” although citing the need 
for further discussions due to the complicated web of interests entangling wireless operators and 
handset manufacturers (Kim, 2008e). 
In addition to these traditional channels, individual users who were dissatisfied with the 
WIPI policy began to express their opinions of the ‘problematic’ government 
telecommunications policy in cyberspace. Dissident voices online constituted one source of the 
pressures that affected the WIPI policy change. First, users gathered online and issued an online 
petition on June 11th 2008, called “The KCC and the MKE should remove the WIPI mandate” at 
the Daum Agora. About 3,000 netizens signed up in several days. Daum Agora is a popular 
online discussion space that leads public opinion on the Internet in Korea. In this extended 
“public sphere,” individual opinions grew more powerful and influential on social issues to the 
extent that it threatened the power of the mainstream media, including Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng 
Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo (Kim, 2008a; Lee, et al., 2010). Online discussion spaces such as Daum 
Agora took a leading role both in amplifying dissident voices against the government policy 
regarding US beef imports and in promoting massive participations by citizens in the 2008 
candlelight vigils in Korea. 
 The main argument behind the petition was that the WIPI mandate should be removed to 
allow innovative foreign mobile handsets to enter the Korean market in order to benefit users. 
Hundreds of online comments posted to the online petition221 reflect several significant points 
regarding the creation of consensus online. First, online comments were largely based on public 
distrust of the “business friendly” policy orientation of the Lee Myung-Bak government, closed 
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thought that the government policy was a problem because it prioritized the interests of domestic 
device-manufacturers based on economic nationalism. For instance, ID zvz443 argued that the 
most serious problem in the WIPI removal debate was Korean conglomerates disguising their 
business interests as “flimsy patriotism.” ID ibadak expressed the idea that the WIPI policy is 
“the reiteration of isolationism in late 19th century Korea” that failed to see global trends and 
instead followed an anti-modern and feudalistic ideology.  
Second, there were balanced debates on the WIPI policy, instead of unilateral arguments. 
In addition to arguments calling for the removal of WIPI, there were also opinions to the effect 
that the WIPI mandate should be maintained for the purpose of national industry protectionism. 
For example, ID haengbok lamented that citizens who had cheered “IT powerhouse Korea” 
abolished the nation’s homegrown mobile Internet platform. ID oribal argued that the original 
goal of the policy was to support small and medium-size software developers instead of 
protecting handset-manufacturing conglomerates, and that the removal of the policy would lead 
to the meltdown of domestic software companies and content providers. 
Third, the online comments reflect that the debate began with ambiguous objections to 
the WIPI policy but did reach a sort of consensus. During the initial stage, emotional reactions to 
the online petition continued without knowledge of the nature, effects, and problems with the 
WIPI policy. Participants who did possess sufficient information regarding the policy began to 
express their opinions, and the discussions became more informed, polished, and less polarized. 
Unlike the initial stage, the debate posted with the online petition appeared to reach a consensus: 
(a) participants acknowledged the positive accomplishments of the WIPI in promoting the 
domestic information and communications industry, (b) nonetheless, the WIPI did restrict 
consumer choices for the benefit of domestic device manufacturers, and (c) the right thing to do 
was not to shut down the entire WIPI program but rather eliminate the WIPI mandate.   
The argument that the government would keep WIPI, while not making it mandatory, 
does not appear at first glance to be a reasonable solution, given developmentalist and 
protectionist motivation behind WIPI. The WIPI mandate, not WIPI standard itself, functioned 
as a technical barrier to trade that blocked foreign handset makers from entering the Korean 
market. However, before the online discussion occurred in 2008, few predicted that smartphones 
would diffuse so rapidly in the Korean market. In the wireless industry, industry experts and 
government officials thought that a compromise - the removal of the WIPI mandate while 
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maintaining WIPI itself – was a rational option. One reason was that the regulatory agency could 
“save face” by keeping their ‘successful’ WIPI project alive and keep open the possibility of 
upgrading WIPI for non-smartphone handset market. The other was that the proponents of the 
removal of WIPI in industry could import foreign smartphones such as the iPhone. Interestingly, 
the consensus in the online debate conformed to the prevailing view regarding the future 
direction of the WIPI policy among policy experts at that time.  
In addition to the online petition, the role of the users online community called for a 
closer examination in order to better understand the deconstruction process of WIPI regulation. 
For instance, Asamo (http://cafe.naver.com/appleiphone), Korea’s largest iPhone user 
community had 1.31 million members as of December 2012. It took a leading role in mobilizing 
public opinion against the WIPI mandate in cyberspace. Asamo was built in December 2006, 3 
years before iPhone’s release in Korean market. It functioned as an information window where 
users who were potentially interested in iPhone congregated and exchanged information about 
iPhone features such as design, user experiences, release date, and so on. Hundreds of online 
posts in Asamo show that the process of exchanging information led the members of the online 
community to start to define the WIPI mandate as a problem and a barrier to the introduction of 
iPhone.  
Users in Asamo began to call for the removal of WIPI and the introduction of iPhone. 
They engaged in various online and offline activities. First, users in Asamo brought up issues 
related to the introduction of iPhone to the government, filed complaints with government 
organizations, shared replies from the government with other users and explained how to file 
official complaints. For instance, article 58(2) of the Radio Waves Act in Korea specified that all 
mobile devices should pass authentication procedures or spectrum conformity assessments 
conducted by the National Radio Research Agency (NRRA) before import, production and sales. 
ID padacel asked the NRRA whether iPhones purchased in the US could be used in Korea and 
posted the government’s negative reply on Asamo on June 6, 2008. ID myungsu95 suggested the 
filing of a joint complaint with the KCC and shared information about how that could be done on 
June 11, 2008. Users in Asamo also became actively involved in the online petition on Daum 
Agora. For example, ID myungsu95, bumcar2, wish114, and other users collaborated to revise 
the text of the petition several times, and this included gathering opinions from the online 
comments made by other users. Users such as ID river_kr and ID hawk 1520 encouraged Asamo 
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members to participate in the online petition during this period. Users in Asamo often tipped off 
the news media by providing information about the WIPI policy. For instance, ID bumcar2 
posted email he had sent to the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), Munhwa Broadcasting 
Corporation (MBC), and several newspaper companies, requesting that they release news about 
the “injustice” of WIPI regulation on June 11, 2008.   
Although these activities had no legal effect on the government’s decision, it contributed 
to arousing public opinion calling for the rethinking of the WIPI mandate. These protests 
pressured the government because it had delayed deciding whether or not to remove the WIPI 
mandate. An interview with a KCC officer revealed that government recognized the voices of 
user in cyberspace and it was an issue for the government to consider in deciding the direction of 
WIPI policy.  
“We knew that early adopters who want to buy iPhone and users who had experiences using 
while overseas raised their voices in cyberspace. They said that WIPI had blocked the 
introduction of iPhone. They filed an online petition at Daum Agora but the number of 
participants in the petition was not large. I remember several tens of thousands of people 
gathered. It was one of the factors surrounding the WIPI to be reconsidered at that time, but it 
was the voice of some heavy users, and not from the large masses of ordinary consumers.”!
During the open-ended interview, the government officer mainly talked about the 
accomplishments of the WIPI policy and stressed the necessity of reviving the “IT control tower.” 
The officer was a statist and developmentalist who often exhibited negative attitudes towards the 
dissident users who disliked the WIPI. The interviewee attempted to stress the legitimacy of 
WIPI policy by emphasizing the development of the domestic software/wireless device industry. 
The officer intended to differentiate dissident users from the silent majority who he described as 
“ordinary consumers.” Nevertheless, the KCC officer overestimated the number of people who 
participated in the online petition. This shows that the activities of users in online spaces exerted 
pressure on policy-makers in the regulatory agency.!
An interview with a KTF manager who was involved in the introduction of the iPhone 
indicates that the voices of users in online communities were one type of pressure that forced the 
government to rethink the WIPI policy. Both the KCC officer and a KTF manager remembered 
that more people gathered than was actually the case. The online user movement against the 
WIPI mandate may have exerted some psychological pressure on business elites and political 
elites in the policy field. More important, wireless carriers were interested in eliminating WIPI. 
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These carriers were also involved in using the voices of online users to achieve a specific 
political goal. Non-institutional policy actors’ desires for policy change are often realized when 
they exerted political influence through institutional policy actors such as the National Assembly 
and mainstream media.    
“It was true that Netizen pushed the government to change the policy in the introduction of 
iPhone. Users online wanted iPhone, and were the largest source of pressure on the government. I 
often met the head users of online communities such as Asamo, Setizen and so on, asking them to 
file petitions with the National Assembly and letting them know where they could do so. Our 
team actually led them to petition in online for the abolition of WIPI. I remember that it took only 
two days for the online petition to gather over 6,000 people. The voice of Netizen was useful in 
strengthening the pressure on the government. I think that the government officials substantially, 
at that time, considered the voice as a pressure.” 
The dissident voices of users in online space were used to promote the interests of 
business players. KTF, the second largest wireless carrier in Korea, wanted to challenge the 
market dominance of SKT by introducing the iPhone to the domestic wireless service market. 
Users voluntarily gathered and protested the telecommunications policy that had been created by 
the mixture of government goals and business interests. Ironically, the corporate interests soon 
leveraged users’ motivations and movements in online space. In taking the boastful mind of the 
interviewee into account, some overstatement may be present but it is obvious that there was a 
close connection between lead users and the wireless carriers in the context of the controversy 
regarding the introduction of the iPhone. 
The linkage between wireless carriers and the online community of iPhone users was 
close during the introduction of the iPhone. In addition to making concerted efforts to remove the 
WIPI mandate, carriers and the user community cooperated in solving problems brought about 
by “unprepared” launch of the iPhone. In the contemporary telecommunications industry, users 
appear at the center of technological innovation (Hippel, 1988; 2005, Tuomi, 2003). It is 
common for corporations to work with user groups in testing user experiences or usability for the 
purpose of enhancing product/service quality (Kuniavsky, 2003). In this sense, making use of 
users in online communities as a test group does not appear to be new or noteworthy. However, 
the iPhone case is unprecedented because carriers released it without sufficient pre-testing before 
release. For a network operator, a network reliability test is required before the service release. 
Testing is common. Specialized departments within a wireless carrier must confirm that a device 
!!
146!
that is scheduled for release will fit into its network following a series of tests for a new mobile 
handset release. Carriers were once able to control the supply chain of device under the operator-
centric business model and ecosystem, but things have changed. Wireless carriers actively 
cooperated with online user communities for iPhone. An interview with a head user of Asamo 
reveals why and how carriers sought help from the user community.  
“The iPhone case was very unusual. Service operators could not complete enough tests before its 
release (...) So, many problems occurred. The wireless companies contacted us and gave us the 
new phone whenever it was released. We tested the new services a lot. (...) For example, before 
SKTelecom released its iPhone, the company asked us to check whether voice calls and Facetime 
worked on its network. (...) Before the service was released, users and staff members of our 
online community attended a lot of meetings with SKT.” 
What brought about this paradoxically close relationship between users online and 
wireless carriers? Users voluntarily gathered online and contributed to arousing public opinion 
against a government policy developed in a closed wireless policy-making system. The closed 
system mainly served for the interests of business players in the industry, including wireless 
carriers. The desire of users in this case was in accordance with that of wireless carrier on the 
key point that both parties wanted the government to allow imported iPhones into the Korean 
wireless market.  
The growth and commercialization of user communities is another answer to the 
phenomenon. Interviews with lead users revealed that Asamo was initially a “small-world 
network” used by a handful of bloggers and early adopters with expertise and an interest in new 
technology products such as the iPhone. Before the release of iPhone, Asamo functioned as an 
online forum that called for the removal of WIPI. The early membership of Asamo was 
enthusiastic about sharing their knowledge of new trends in information and communication 
technology, including the iPhone. The opinion leaders of this online community whose members 
shared a “family-like” sympathy and took pride in being a “trendsetter.” The information that 
Asamo produced rapidly diffused to other blogs and online forums through the cutting-and-
pasting of member writings. The number of members increased before and after the iPhone 
release, and soon reached over one million members. The quality of shared information began to 
degrade and “lighter” and irrelevant online writing became much more common. The result was 
that active members of the original small-world network dropped out of the Asamo online 
community. 
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The commercialization of the user community increased as the number of community 
members skyrocketed. There was an increasing need to make group purchases of iPhone 
accessories among community users. One crucial function of the user community in Korea is 
community buying. The practice of community buying challenged traditional commerce works 
by providing individual users with bargaining power. Group purchasing saves users’ money, 
time and effort. Unlike other brands, Apple had a large preexisting fan base because it had an 
innovative and “cool” cultural image. A long queue of fans on the iPhone’s new model launch 
day was an emblem of “cool” in popular culture and reflected the high degree of brand loyalty 
among Apple fans. This maniacal brand loyalty often led iPhone users to become obsessed about 
iPhone accessories. After group purchasing skyrocketed, the nature of Asamo gradually changed 
from being a self-informed user community to becoming a commercial community. Some lead 
users established a small company to administer and support group purchases and other 
commercial activities. This researcher was able to identify the commercialization of online 
communities in Korea during interviews. Online communities with large numbers of members 
have been traded between lead users and community administrators in Korea because popular 
online communities have been regarded as profitable business opportunities. 
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This chapter examined interactions between the state, transnational corporations, foreign 
governments, domestic corporations, technology and users during the formation and 
deconstruction of the Korean mobile Internet platform standard, WIPI. This chapter identified 
some of the relationships that existed between them and uncovered facts that have received little 
previous attention. 
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Some scholarly research on the WIPI has highlighted the leading role of government. Cho (2003) 
suggested the concept of “flexible governance” could be used to explain features of the policy-
making process in Korea after telecommunications liberalization. According to Cho (2003), 
government abandoned its position as the exclusive provider of telecommunications services, but 
it maintained leadership over the industry by promoting national R&D and standardization 
projects despite liberalization. Lee and Oh (2008) point out that other projects such as digital 
multimedia broadcasting (DMB) and wireless broadband (WiBro) exhibit similarity to the WIPI 
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project. Song (2009) argues that “closed policy network” and “path dependency” are crucial 
reasons for government-led policy-making in national R&D and standardization (p. 177). Kim 
(2011) points out that the WIPI project shows that the Korean state retains a strategic long-term 
approach to its industrial policy, and the developmental state model has not yet withered away. 
These arguments make it plausible to say that the developmental state model never went away. 
The tradition of state intervention was repeated in the wireless telecommunications industry 
despite accelerated liberalization and deregulation after the Asian economic crisis in the late 
1990s (the so-called the ‘IMF crisis’). Their arguments are useful for understanding the initial 
stage of the WIPI policy.  
However, the WIPI case should be understand in the context of the Korean-specific 
neoliberal-developmental state.!The state exerted strategic leadership over the domestic telecom 
industry for the purpose of improving national economic growth while interacting with global 
forces. At the same time, the state functioned as a facilitator that sought to create favorable 
business conditions and support business interests. However, the power relationship or linkage 
between state and business has been continuously reconfigured, depending on the changing 
political and economic environments on both the global and national levels.  
During the formation, and dismantling, of the WIPI policy, interactions between the state, 
transnational corporations, and domestic business changed continuously and reconfigured the 
policy network surrounding the WIPI. The government took the leading role in forming the WIPI 
project, which was driven by its information-based economic model. The interests of 
transnational corporations and foreign governments were one of the primary pressures on the 
government’s autonomy and developmental practices. The interests of domestic business players, 
including handset manufacturers and wireless carriers, were sometimes in agreement with the 
government and were sometimes in conflict with government goals. However, in the early stage 
of the WIPI policy, the close state-business linkage facilitated the development of WIPI while 
reacting strategically to pressures from transnational forces.  
The previous chapters illuminated how control of the Korean wireless industry shifted 
from the state to domestic corporations. When government policies failed to meet the business 
players’ needs as a result of changes in the technology and business environment in the global 
mobile Internet industry, the legitimacy of WIPI policy rapidly weakened due to resistance from 
business players. Given that the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
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framework for meeting business needs, it was inevitable that government eventually removed the 
WIPI mandate because it became discordant with business needs.  
There was an alliance between domestic corporations and transnational corporations at 
each stage of the WIPI policy change. Global competition for platform leadership in wireless 
telecommunications was tied to the Korean domestic market situation. Conflicts of interests 
between coalitions were amplified and the policy landscape surrounding WIPI became more 
complicated. The Korean market was a proving ground or test-bed for transnational corporations 
in the global information industry that was used to scrutinize the business potential of their 
products and services. The WIPI case shows that the alliance between domestic and transnational 
corporations was an influential factor that decreased the power of government within Korea’s 
borders.  
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Users in online communities emerged as actors who were not so easily ignored in the policy 
landscape as before. In the WIPI case, potential users of the iPhone took a partial role in arousing 
public opinion in favor of the removal of the WIPI mandate. It might be an overstatement to say 
that the voices of users were the key factor in the WIPI policy change. However, it was true that 
their voices were a form of pressure in the policy-making process, which included channels such 
as civic groups, the national assembly and media.  
User activities in the case of WIPI are not evidence of deliberative democracy, though 
online deliberations during the online petition process may be a precursor of more discursive and 
democratic changes in Korean wireless telecommunications policy. Some cyber-pessimists 
question the quality of deliberation in online space and consider online discussion spaces to be a 
chaotic space where personal attacks or polarized opinions predominate (Davis, 1999; Shapiro, 
1999; Sunstein, 2001). Online discussions may be too superficial a forum for sustaining robust 
political deliberations, as skeptical scholars argue. However, online discussions that occurred in 
the context of the online petition for the removal of WIPI reflect informed and less polarized 
forms of discussion. This researcher found that the online debate emerged out of ambiguous 
objections to the WIPI policy, grew to include opposing voices that supported WIPI, and 
eventually reached a consensus regarding the need to abolish the WIPI mandate. 
Online community culture allows widely-dispersed users to create an online space to 
discuss and protest telecommunications policy. Users dissatisfied with the status quo organized 
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themselves in online communities using new media. New media reduces the cost of organizing, 
participating, and protesting to the extent that it allows a single individual to create and circulate 
an online petition using a small laptop (Earl & Kimport, 2011). Their actions might occur 
without such technologies, but the technologies allow users to organize their desires or 
motivations more easily than before. Shirky (2008) points out in his book Here Comes 
Everybody, new media tools do not necessarily create the desire to organize but instead provide 
an alternative platform for human desires to be achieved. He provides a description of power law 
distribution which shows that leaders exist in online groups, unlike the concept of leaderless 
crowds. In the WIPI case, ‘potential’ users who desire to use new wireless communications 
device such as the iPhone gathered online and created large user communities by sharing their 
knowledge, experience, and opinions. The small-world network of lead users led the formation 
of the online community, and established the foundation for user community growth.        
In the WIPI case, networked users exhibited the potential to be understood as active 
citizens through online deliberations. However, their deliberations were limited to small-scale 
discussions of a particular issue. Their online participation did not directly influence policy 
changes, but did influence policy changes indirectly through existing political channels such as 
the national assembly and traditional media. Furthermore, they questioned the closed Korean 
telecommunications policy system, but their desires were essentially founded upon consumer 
interests. In this case, this researcher cannot assert that users were deliberative citizens in the 
context of online democracy. Nevertheless, it is true that they constitute an emerging policy actor 
and also represent a new concept of users, meaning networked users, who may be pointing the 
way to a more discursive and deliberative policy-making process that extends beyond the closed 
system found in Korean wireless telecommunications. 
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Castells (2009) provides a larger perspective for understanding the resistance of users in online 
communities. “Counter-power” is the capacity of social actors who do not believe they are well-
represented by the existing system to challenge existing power relations. Social change occurs 
when the counter-power succeeds in challenging the norms and rules of society’s institutions. 
“Mass-self communication” involves using new communications technology to provide social 
actors with a medium for confronting existing institutions. “Autonomous” mass-self 
communication does not require the approval or intervention of the state or mainstream media. 
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Castells suggests that there is a crisis of legitimacy of the nation-state due to globalization and 
the rise of communal identities which challenge the boundaries of the state. His view is that the 
decline of the nation-state was precipitated when “the principles of citizenship and the principles 
of self-identification” come into conflict with each other (Castells, 1997). 
In the WIPI case, networked users in online forums and communities are motivated to 
challenge the existing policy regime that was previously been dominated by state goals and 
business interests. The new media allow networked users to inform themselves, initiate 
discussions and deliberations, and act as policy actors in the changing policy network of the 
WIPI. However, their influence on the policy-making process was realized through the existing 
powers of institutional policy actors such as the national assembly and the mainstream media. 
Users’ self-identification as global consumers, and their antipathy to the government’s 
nationalistic policies led them to resist against the WIPI policy. This researcher is uncertain 
whether or not user activities undermined the legitimacy of the state in this case. More important, 
networked users in the WIPI case were neither autonomous nor free from the state, the 
mainstream media, and businesses. The interviews in this chapter reveal that business players 
such as wireless carriers actively utilized the emerging voice of users to help induce the 
government to change the WIPI policy. This chapter notes that the growth of user communities 
and its consequent commercialization allowed the collective actions of users to be utilized by 
business players. !!
It can be said that the role of users in online community in the WIPI case was limited in 
comparison with other online user communities, which played a leading role in opposing the 
unification of mobile prefixes. This topic is examined in depth in the next chapter. This chapter 
argues that networked users cannot change existing power-relations by acting alone. However, 
their power of resistance has a positive effect on the wireless telecommunication policy-making 
process by virtue of complicating interactions and policy networks that involve policy actors. 
Thus, this researcher suggest that policy researchers pay more attention to users in cyberspace as 
a new policy actor in order to better understand the recent changes of policy-making process and 
policy networks in telecommunications. !!
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Telephone numbers are more than just numbers. Telecommunications networks always 
require a system of numbers and/or letters that enable communications by identifying the 
location of each party. Telephone numbers are an integral component of telecommunications 
infrastructure, and function in a manner similar to street addresses in traditional mail and IP 
addresses in Internet communication.222 Telephone numbers are not a scarce resource in and of 
themselves, because the number of telephone numbers is theoretically infinite. However, 
telephone numbers would be a worthless combination of numbers without rules and numbering 
systems. Thus, telephone numbers have been regarded as a ‘scarce’ national resource whose 
utilization should be decided by the state in many countries, just like the radio spectrum. !
The modern telephone numbering system is the outcome of international rules and 
national policies. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) assigns the country codes 
for individual nations and regulates the use of digits. The international public telecommunication 
numbering plan in ITU-T E.164 specifies that a complete telephone number should have 15 or 
fewer digits. Given this rule, a nation-state is free to implement the exclusive right to assign 
telephone numbers within its borders and develop different types of numbering plans. For 
instance, the US developed the North American Numbering Plan (NANP), an integrated 
‘geography-based’ system consisting of three-digit area codes and seven-digit telephone numbers 
used for both landline and wireless services. The U.K. took a different approach when it created 
a ‘service-based’ numbering plan in which landline phone numbers require area codes while 
mobile phone numbers have their own service codes depending on carriers.  
Despite the importance of telephone numbers, policies regarding telephone numbers 
attracted little attention outside of technical circles. However, the deregulation of 
telecommunications markets worldwide brought into existence some policy issues regarding 
telephone numbers: What is the most efficient way to allocate telephone numbers, who should 
own telephone numbers, and what should be the best telephone number policy for promoting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$$$!%&'&()**+,-(./-),0$-,46.0/6+(/+6&$+0+.''D$6&4&60$/)$.$0&/$)4$5.0-($@2D0-(.'$0/6+(/+6&0$0+(2$.0$&3(2.,7&60B$
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market competition. In order to address these issues, scholars and policy-makers focused 
attention on number portability. Number portability, including local number portability (LNP) 
and mobile number portability (MNP), refers to rules or systems that allow telephone users to 
retain their telephone numbers when they move between telephone service providers. 
Many scholars have researched number portability using either the market-based 
approach or the economic approach. Gans et al. (2001) suggests that governments implement the 
“transferable ownership” of telephone numbers and require carriers to bear the costs of 
implementing number portability. Haucap (2003) proposed moving away from administrative 
number allocation to a market-based auction mechanism on the grounds of non-discriminatory 
access, efficient number allocation, and low transaction costs. Their studies draw upon the idea 
that using a market-based and property rights-based approach is the most efficient way of 
allocating scarce resources such as the radio spectrum (Hayek, 1945; Coase, 1959). More 
particularly, a great deal of economic analysis has focused on illuminating the impact of MNP 
implementation on market competition and consumer welfare (Aoki & Small, 1999; Buehler & 
Haucap, 2004; Park, 2011; Srinagesh & Mitchell, 1999). Another stream of studies on wireless 
telephone number policy has primarily involved statistical analyses of subscriber preferences or 
customer behavior regarding MNP (Gerpott, et al., 2001; Shin, 2006; Park et al., 2007; Shin, 
2011). These studies have provided insights that are useful for understanding policy issues that 
are related to wireless telephone numbering systems. 
However, market-based, number portability-centric, and economic analyses are not 
helpful for understanding the Korean mobile telephone number policy which various actors 
influenced and continuously changed. Korean wireless telecommunications has a unique 
background. First, the main debate concerning mobile telephone numbers has not involved a 
MNP but rather the prefix unifications policy in Korea. After telecommunications liberalization, 
the government gave separate prefixes to each new licensee, and this consequently led to six 
different mobile prefixes (010, 011, 016, 017, 018, and 019) being used in Korea. The carrier-
specific allocation of mobile identifications numbers223 was thought to have caused the 
“inefficient use of limited national resources” (KISDI, 2009, p. 31) and undermined market !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$$%!E,$^)6&.B$*)5-'&$/&'&@2),&$,+*5&60$2.A&$.,$##c:-7-/$,+*5&6$0/6+(/+6&$=&"7"$>#hcUhhhchhhh?"$%2&$4-60/$/26&&$
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competition. In order to solve this problem, Korean telecommunications regulators have pursued 
mobile prefix unification to 010 since 2004. However, this policy was delayed and often changed 
to forms that were different than the original plan due to conflicting interests among wireless 
carriers. Second, the more noteworthy and unusual element was the recent development of an 
active user community that resisted the mobile prefix unification policy. An online user 
community that opposed the consolidation of mobile prefixes into a single prefix 010 
(http://cafe.naver.com/anti010) exerted political pressure that could not be ignored during the 
policy making process. 
Given this background, this chapter seeks to understand (a) the historical changes in 
mobile number policies by focusing on interactions among policy actors and (b) the role of 
‘networked’ users in the democratic changes that occurred in the telecommunications policy-
making process. The first part of this chapter thus examines how telecommunications 
liberalization led to problems with the wireless telephone numbering system in Korea. The first 
part of this chapter investigates how interactions between business interests and governmental 
goals led to inconsistent changes in mobile telephone number policy. The second part of this 
chapter will examine the wireless telephone numbering controversy that occurred from 2008 to 
2012. This chapter analyzes how and why networked users, who wanted to continue to keep and 
use their wireless numbers, resisted the government and corporations. This chapter will rely on 
historical methods, interviews with users and the materials they wrote in online forums.  
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This section provides a historical account of how Korea came to have a unique wireless 
number unifications policy and examines the main factors that led to its ‘inconsistent’ changes. 
This section argues that the carrier-specific allocation of mobile telephone prefixes was the 
outcome of a power-shift in the Korean wireless telecom industry following telecom 
liberalization. In addition, this section analyzes how ‘neoliberal-developmental’ government 
policy goals and business interests led to the complicated and problematic mobile prefix 
unification policy used in Korea. 
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Korea developed a hybrid style of telephone numbering plan based on both geographic 
area and services, unlike countries such as the US (See Table 15 and Table 17). As of April 
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2013, local landline phone numbers consists of both an area code and a subscriber code. Korea 
uses 37 area codes, 16 codes of which are in use, while the remainder are classified as reserved 
codes. Subscriber codes consist of 3-4 digit exchange codes and 4-digit subscriber numbers. 7-8 
digit subscriber codes are used in Seoul metropolitan area, and 7-digit subscriber codes are used 
in other areas. As regards mobile phone services, the structures of telephone numbers are similar 
to landline telephone numbers in the sense that they also consist of network identification codes, 
exchange codes, and subscriber numbers. However, network identification codes were allocated 
to each wireless service provider, instead of area codes, until the government decided to give a 
common code, 010, to 3G service providers in March 2002. For this reason, six different 
“carrier-specific” codes (010, 011, 016, 017, 018, and 019) have been used for mobile telephone 
numbers in Korea. 
The carrier-specific allocation of wireless prefixes was the result of wireless telecom 
liberalization under the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1998). Prior to the rapid 
introduction of market competition by means of privatization and new licenses, Korea Mobile 
Telecom (KMT) provided analog cellular service using the prefix “011” and 10-digit numbers 
(011-NYY-YYYY).224 The SK group, one of the leading chaebols225, became a major 
shareholder of KMT when public enterprises were privatized in January 1994. SK Telecom 
(SKT), the new name given to what had previously been a public monopoly, continued using the 
popular 011 mobile prefix, which had a considerable subscriber base. After privatization, a series 
of new licenses for wireless telephone service were given to conglomerates. Shinsegi Mobile 
Telecom (SMT), whose dominant shareholder was POSCO, the largest steel manufacturer in 
Korea, received a license for a new cellular service in June 1994. Three new telephone service 
providers, KT Freetel (KTF), LG Telecom (LGT), and Hansol M.Com (HMC), obtained their 
licenses for Personal Communications Service (PCS) from the government and launched their 
service in 1996. Market competition increased, and the number of mobile subscribers went up 
from 6.8 million in 1996 to 32.3 million in 2002 (See Table 16). !
The introduction of market competition to the wireless telecom industry brought about a 
policy issue concerning wireless telephone number allocations. When the government gave a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$$&!E,$/2&$/&'&@2),&$,+*5&6-,7$0D0/&*B$U$0-7,-4-&0$!wFB$j$*&.,0$#wFB$.,:$h$*&.,0$>wF"!$$'!I$B1".8/&$-0$.$4.*-'Dc(),/6)''&:$(),7')*&6./&$-,$^)6&.$0+(2$.0$M.*0+,7B$CD+,:.-B$dN$.,:$M^"$%2&D$.6&$.'0)$
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new cellular license to SMT, it was concerned about which identification code would be 
allocated to the service. The Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) initially 
intended to allocate the same prefix, “011,” to SMT. The prefix “011” was originally intended to 
be an identification code for mobile service, not as a proprietary code for a dominant wireless 
carrier (Kim, 2010).  
However, because SKT was already using 3-digit exchange codes (NYY) based on 
geographic areas at will, the number of available exchange codes that made use of “011” was 
insufficient for allocation for SMT’s new cellular service. Faced with the problem, the MIC 
reviewed an alternative plan to have SMT and SKT share the same prefix “011” by extending 
exchange codes to include 4-digits number (NYYY). However, the incumbent player vehemently 
opposed to the MIC’s plan. SKT argued that memory chips in mobile handsets were designed 
specifically to be used with a 10-digits number plan (011-NYY-YYYY), and contended that the 
overall cost of handset replacements would become excessively high. In addition, SMT also 
requested a new prefix for its service in order to use numbers as a marketing tool. The MIC 
eventually assigned the prefix “017” with a 10-digit number plan to SMT. Mobile telephone 
number resources that amounted to 16 million combinations under two different prefixes (011-
NYY-YYYY and 017-NYY-YYYY) entered use for mobile services at that time. This was the 
beginning of “carrier-specific” mobile numbering plans, as opposed to the service-specific plans 
which were then common in Korea. 
The MIC looked at their past experience with “017” and thought that it might be best to 
determine identification codes for PCS service before awarding licenses. During the first half of 
1996, the MIC created a task force for the purpose of developing a new number allocation policy 
for PCS, and held a public hearing to collect opinions from businesses and other parties. The 
prevailing view that emerged from the task force and the public hearing was the suggestion (a) 
that the common identification code “018” should be allocated to three PCS licensees, (b) that 
subscriber codes would be eight-digit numbers (NYYY-YYYY), and (c) that different blocs of 
exchange codes would be assigned based on carriers. In addition, it was suggested that “011” and 
“017,” which were already in use by two cellular service providers, would be integrated into a 
new mobile number system based on the prefix “018”.  
However, market players were strongly opposed to these policy suggestions. Three PCS 
licensees argued that allocating additional one-digit numbers would be contrary to the principle 
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of fair competition. They were concerned that eight-digit numbers would be less competitive in 
the market than seven-digits cellular numbers (Choi, 2006). Meanwhile, the incumbent cellular 
service providers, SKT and SMT, were against the plan to integrate “011” and “017” into “018” 
as a long-term project, on the grounds that handset replacement costs would add up to over $1 
billion (Choi, 2006). At that time, unifying mobile numbers into “018” was suggested as being 
the most reasonable alternative for securing fair competition, increasing consumer benefits, and 
for meeting the need to have numbers in reserve for future services. While the policy decision on 
wireless number allocation was delayed, the process of awarding licenses for PCS was hastily 
completed due to the neoliberal policy orientation of Kim Young-Sam government (See Chapter 
2). This situation led the MIC to succumb to the interests of PCS licensees and allocated 
different identification codes (016, 018, 019-NYYY-YYYY) to each licensee. !
 It is possible that the MIC was unable to fully comprehend the future problems that were 
to be brought about by the “carrier-specific” allocation of numbers. An interview with a KCC 
officer who was involved in policy-making at that time shows that the MIC “did not think that so 
many wireless communications numbers would be used like that during a short period at that 
time” and decided upon the policy for bureaucratic expediency purposes. They failed to 
anticipate the enormous growth of the mobile market and the sorts of problems that would occur 
in the future. The MIC allocated different mobile identification numbers to each licensee so as to 
avoid conflicts with business players in the mobile industry. 
However, more significant is the fact that the telecommunications liberalization program 
driven by the Kim Young-Sam government in the 1990s functioned as a political or structural 
constraint on the MIC’s decision. Power in the telecommunications policy-making process 
shifted away from a handful of elite bureaucrats to business players during the 1990s 
telecommunications liberalization program. The problem is that neoliberal policy package 
included privatization and licensing decisions that were conducted in a quick and unprepared 
manner. The MIC did not have sufficient time to prepare long-term guidelines for the mobile 
numbers policy during the hastily implemented liberalization of wireless telecommunications. 
Mobile identification numbers were allocated after the license awarding process had concluded, 
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so it was inevitable that the MIC would decide upon a mobile number policy that met the 
interests of licensees.226  
To be short, the interests of business players in the Korean wireless industry influenced 
policy decisions regarding the allocation of wireless prefixes. The hasty liberalization program 
for wireless telecommunications was driven by the Kim Young-Sam government’s active 
acceptance of neoliberal globalization, and this led to the inefficient allocation of mobile prefixes. 
The ill-planned and hastily implemented allocation of mobile prefixes resulted in excessive costs 
and efforts in seeking to establish a unified “service-specific” wireless numbering plan later on. 
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The introduction of the International Mobile Telecommunications-2000227 (IMT-2000) 
meant that policy issues regarding mobile number allocation were once again in the spotlight. 
The MIC acknowledged the existing mobile number policy was a failure and hoped to reform it 
during the process of awarding 3G licenses (Seong, 2010). The MIC had learned from the 
cellular and PCS cases, and attempted to develop a long-term plan for establishing a common 
mobile identification number system before beginning the licensing of IMT-2000.  
After a 2002 review by a task force and outside experts, the outline of the new mobile 
number policy was determined: (a) “010” was to be a common code to be allocated for 3G 
services, (b) 2G identification numbers such as “011”, “016”, “017”, “018”, and “019” would be 
withdrawn, and (c) mobile identification numbers would be integrated into “010” within five 
years after the launch of 3G service. Along with mobile number unification to “010”, mobile 
number portability (MNP) was also designed to be one of the crucial measures for implement the 
reform. However, the reform was drawn out over the course of time and modified by the interest 
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of business players during the 2000s. It eventually led to the rise of the voices of users protesting 
the unification of mobile numbers. 
It is important to note that the reform of mobile number policy was based on the idea 
know as “fair competition” or “effective competition.” Generally speaking, liberalization 
involves a market opening that aims to stimulate competition in the expectation of some sort of 
economic welfare benefit such as improved market growth or customer choice. However, that 
benefit is insufficient because incumbents are likely to both possess advantages over latecomers 
and engage in actions detrimental to competition. There is thus a strong need for regulation to 
secure “effective competition” after liberalization. Telecommunications is a key network 
industry, along with electricity and transportation, to which this logic of effective competition 
has been applied. After telecommunications liberalization, most countries devised and 
implemented policy measures to help ensure “effective competition,”228 such as essential facility 
sharing, price-cap regulations, asymmetric interconnection rates, and so on.  
The monopolistic market structure of the Korean wireless telecommunications service 
market began to change after the entry of new operators such as SMT, KTF, HMC, and LGT. 
During the two years after the introduction of competition, the market share of SKT, the leading 
incumbent, declined (See Table 16). The fierce competition among the five wireless service 
providers in seeking to acquire new subscribers resulted in the rapid growth in the number of 
mobile phone users. The number of mobile service subscribers was approximately 6.8 million in 
the end of 1997, and reached about 32.3 million as of December 2002 (See Table 16). During 
this period, mobile operators waged a marketing war that involved offering handset subsidies to 
new subscribers and deploying massive advertising campaigns229 in order to increase their 
market share as rapidly as possible. However, financial strains increased due to large marketing 
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expenditures combined with large mobile handset subsidies230 and led to mergers and 
acquisitions among operators. KTF acquired HMC in April 2001, and SKT acquired SMT in 
March 2002. SKT’s acquisition of SMT raised concerns about the possibility of reduced 
competition in the wireless service market. This concern led the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) to approve the M&A on the condition that SKT reduce its market share to less than 50%. 
SKT actually became the largest shareholder of SMT in December 1999. One result of this ruling 
was that SKT decreased its market share by declining to accept new subscribers. As of July 5, 
2001, the market share of SKT fell below the 50% target. Soon afterwards, SKT’s market share 
began to increase again and rose to over 53% at the end of 2002.  
The market structure which had been created around 2002 solidified, and the dominant 
market position of SKT became unbreakable.!This situation of the mobile market led policy 
makers to think that further market concentration would produce undesirable results such as the 
stifling of competition and limited consumer choice, and they became aware of the need for 
appropriate policy measures. A typical set of policy measures was “asymmetric regulation,”231 
which both provided advantages to new entrants and also placed stringent regulations on the 
dominant incumbent. The MIC forced asymmetric interconnection rates for both fixed and 
mobile service that were favorable to new entrants. For example, the amount that new entrants 
had to pay to the incumbent was set close to the cost of termination on the incumbent’s network, 
and the incumbent’s equivalent fee to the entrants was arranged to represent the higher cost of 
termination on the entrants’ networks. Considering the retail price regulation imposed on SKT, 
these cost-oriented access charges on termination certainly benefited new entrants (Yoon & Kim, 
2004, p. 755).  
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 The reform of the mobile number policy was another asymmetric regulation based on the 
principle of “effective competition.” The regulatory agency recognized that advertising mobile 
identification numbers as brand names was a barrier to entry in the form of existing consumer 
buying preferences. It would cost new entrants large amounts of money to buy market share. The 
market dominated by SKT constituted an impediment to fair competition. SKT created a strong 
brand known as “Speed 011” and it was associated with the numerical mobile prefix. From 1997 
to 2004, SKT never used its company name or product name. It instead emphasized the carrier-
specific mobile prefix, “011” in its advertising campaign. Many users preferred “Speed 011” 
service because they perceived that they exhibited prestige when they used it. The result was that 
“Speed 011”232 became the dominant brand and was ranked first among consumer brands, 
including cars, electronics, foods, and so on. Yoon and Kim (2004) illuminate that the brand 
image of the dominant player is strongly related to subscriber churn and customer loyalty in the 
Korean wireless service market.   
“People in the wireless telecommunications industry started to indicate that one of the main 
reasons for SKT’s dominance might be its brand marketing, ‘Speed 011’. The need for a mobile 
prefix unification policy arose out of that. Some argue that a mobile prefix is a public asset or 
national asset, and there is no reason for government to allow a certain company to benefit from 
having the exclusive right to use the prefix, 011.” 
An interview with a KCC officer who had been involved in the mobile number policy 
change reveals that the reform of the mobile number policy sought to weaken the advantage held 
by the incumbent player, meaning the brand power it had acquired from using a carrier-specific 
prefix. The officially mentioned objectives of reforming number policy233 included the crucial 
goal of creating a “fair competition” environment by making it impossible for operators to use 
their mobile identification numbers as sources of marketing power. In order to accomplish this 
policy goal, the government developed two basic policy approaches: (a) overhauling the existing 
carrier-specific mobile number allocation system and (b) allowing users to retain their mobile 
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approaches, the government promoted the unification of mobile prefixes to “010” since 2002. 
The government also introduced mobile number portability (MNP) and began imposing MNP on 
mobile carriers ‘asymmetrically’ in 2004.234!
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The MIC began implementing the reform of mobile number policy in 2002. The conflicts 
of interests between network operators made policy implementation protracted and inconsistent 
starting during the initial stage. In February 2002, the MIC released the basic plan for changing 
the mobile number system. The essential point of the plan was to integrate existing mobile 
identification numbers into “010” within five years after the launch of 3G service and implement 
mobile number portability (MNP) within 6 months after at least two providers launched 3G 
services. The MIC decided to introduce MNP only to 3G services, saying “if we introduce MNP 
directly to 2G service, it would be damage the competitiveness of latecomers” (Kim, 2002a). 
However, latecomers such as KTF urged the government to deploy a full-scale MNP in 2G 
before launching 3G services (Kim, 2001). KTF and LGT also proposed introducing number 
pooling235, instead of number portability, to 2G services in order to eliminate the tipping effect 
driven by “011” brand marketing. These proposals triggered a backlash from SKT. SKT 
supported the original plan of the MIC and argued that “number pooling in 2G service will 
undermine the government’s efforts to reform mobile number policy” (Kim, 2002b). It appears 
that SKT expected the carrier-specific number system in use at that time to be maintained under 
the plan. SKT also expected to maintain its competitiveness based on using “011” brand 
marketing for some time to come. 
The conflicting interests between the three network operators led the government to 
change the original policy direction. The “mobile number improvement plan” announced in 
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citing consumer confusion. The MIC instead decided to introduce “010” to 2G service earlier 
than had been scheduled. 2G users were expected to use mobile phone number with “010” 
because MNP would start on January 1, 2004, according to the MIC’s new plan. In addition, the 
plan specified that MNP, which had been intended for use only with 3G service in the original 
plan, would be expanded to 2G service and would be imposed on each carrier on a six-month 
interval basis. 
The early introduction of “010” to 2G service and the asymmetric introduction of MNP 
incited controversy among stakeholders. KTF and LGT welcomed the plan, while SKT opposed 
it, claiming that mobile phone numbers are “just about consumer choice, and are not an object of 
government regulations” (Kim, 2003a). Furthermore, this raised the suspicion that the Minister 
of Information and Communication, Sang-Cheol Lee, had bestowed unfair benefits on 
latecomers because he had been a chairman of KT group immediately before being appointed 
minster. SKT even threatened to take a legal action against the plan (Park, 2003). The MIC 
refuted the allegations, pointing out that they conducted public opinion surveys. The MIC also 
claimed that third party institutes conducted research and that “number pooling would have been 
adopted if the MIC had intended to disadvantage SKT” (Shin, 2003). Meanwhile, the KT group 
was accused of directly benefiting from the new plan. KT countered the suspicion by claiming 
that number pooling favorable to KT was denied by the MIC for the benefit of SKT and that the 
introduction of MNP to 2G was late in comparison with other countries.  
The conflicts between the regulatory agency and business players surrounding mobile 
number policy were dampened by political factors. The ruling party, the Millennium Democratic 
Party, supported the MIC’s plan through a policy consultation meeting, and claimed that they 
were concerned that “nationwide confusion might take place if the previously-announced policy 
is overturned” (Kim, 2003d). The presidential transition committee for incoming president Moo-
Hyun Roh also supported the MIC on the condition that it introduce measures to reduce shocks 
caused by the early introduction of “010” and number portability (Kim, 2003e). The debate over 
the new mobile number plan in early 2003 reflects that the power of regulatory agency was 
decreasing to the extent that the regulator alone was unable to coordinate the conflicting interests 
of business players.  
However, in December 2003, the MIC modified its number policy because public opinion 
had become unfavorable towards it. After the result of public opinion surveys conducted by the 
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Korea Information Strategy Development Institute (KISDI) turned out to be fabricated236, the 
MIC’s mobile number plan in early 2003 was criticized as being the result of closed and 
undemocratic decision-making. It was revealed that the MIC and the KISDI concealed the survey 
results that were contrary to its policy. SKT pounced on the opportunity, and tried to arouse 
public opinion against the MIC’s mobile number policy. The conflict surrounding the mobile 
number policy began to attract the attention from the National Assembly. The Minster of 
Information and Communications, Dae-Jae Jin, who had been inaugurated under the Roh Moo-
Hyun regime (2003~2008), acknowledged the need for flexible implementation of the number 
policy during the parliamentary audit and inspection of the MIC held on September 23, 2003 
(Kim, 2003b).  The original plan to mandate the compulsory integration of existing mobile 
identification numbers to “010” by 2007 was abandoned at the end of the year. New guidelines 
that were released in December 2003 decided that the unification of mobile prefixes would be 
reviewed when the transition rate to “010” reached 80%. 
Conflicts among mobile carriers continued after the revision. Disputes over mobile 
number prefixes often escalated into legal actions. For instance, in November 2003, KTF filed a 
complaint over SKT’s application for making “Speed 011” its trademark, claiming that their 
exclusive marketing rights to the prefix “011” should be nullified because a mobile prefix is a 
national resource controlled by the government (Jung, 2003). The Korea Intellectual Property 
Tribunal denied SKT’s exclusive rights to the prefix in May 2004, and ruled that SKT could not 
register “Speed 011” as its trademark. In addition, mobile carriers raised the issue of the 
allocation of exchange codes. The MIC decided that it would reallocate exchange codes under 
“010,” except for 3XXX for new subscribers for 3G237. If a 2G user who had a 011-2XX-XXXX 
telephone number wanted to get 3G service, he could use a 010-N2XX-XXX telephone number 
for his new 3G service. However, carriers were divided over the issue of who would get 010-
9XXX-XXXX telephone numbers, because over 8 million 2G subscribers from three carriers 
were already using 9XXX telephone numbers that used the 011, 016, and 019 prefixes.  
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Despite these disputes, the mobile number unification policy continued without major 
changes until 2007. Although number portability from 2G to 3G, and a detailed number 
unification plan was supposed to have been developed further, the center of gravity in wireless 
telecommunications policy shifted to the early settlement of number portability during this 
period. In April 2006, the MIC modified their existing policy, established in 2003, that MNP 
should be applicable only to 3G. According to the “Plan for the Introduction of MNP between 
2G and 3G,” a 2G user who was already using the “010” code could subscribe to WCDMA 
service without changing their telephone number. This meant that users who were not using the 
“010” code could not switch their service over to WCDMA without changing their current phone 
numbers.  
The interests of mobile carriers once again came into conflict when LGT launched its 
Revision A238 service as an alternative for 3G in 2007. LGT argued that the existing “019” prefix 
should be used for its new service because the service was based on the 1.8 GHz frequency band, 
which was already in use for its 2G service, and evolved out of the same technology along with 
2G, EV-DO (Cho, 2007c). SKT requested the MIC to stop them from launching the Revision A 
service if “010” were to be allocated to the service. KTF was the only company to insist that 
“010” should be used for the service in order to ensure policy consistency and fair competition. 
SKT’s intention was to postpone the unification to “010” for as long as possible because it 
benefited from its carrier-specific prefix, “011”. KTF concentrated its’ efforts on expanding 3G 
and transitioning into “010” in order to remove SKT’s advantage in the 2G market. The 
relatively high conversion rate to “010” among KTF subscribers indicates that KTF had adopted 
rapid transition to 3G as a core competitive strategy (See Table 19). After the dispute over prefix 
allocation, the MIC decided to allocate “010” for Revision A service and mandated that LGT 
comply with MNP policy in October 2007. Part of the background for this decision was that the 
MIC thought that LGT was greedy not only because it had abandoned its responsibility for 
investing in synchronous CDMA1x EV-DV network in order to save its 3G spectrum fee,239 but 
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also because it had attempted to keep its prefix “019” for use in the new service in order to 
prevent subscriber churn. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the reforms of mobile number policies the MIC had 
attempted since 2002 had been affected and modified by the conflicting interests of mobile 
carriers (See Table 18). During this period, mobile number policy was basically supplier-centric. 
User confusion was created by the policy, but was seldom taken into consideration during the 
policy-making process. There was a power game going on between the regulators and business 
players during every stage of the mobile number policy. The legacy of the developmental state 
perspective induced the regulators to push for reform of the mobile number policy, while 
business interests were the main forces in favor of modifying the path of the policy. However, 
there was no room for the voices of the users in the policy landscape during this period. Users 
had begun to resist the government by pointing out the problems caused by the inconsistent and 
supplier-centric mobile number policy in effect since 2009. The next section in this chapter 
examines how the voices of users emerged, their influences on mobile number policy, and how 
interactions among users, corporations, and the government unfolded in the context of the recent 
wireless telecommunications policy landscape. 
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Around 2009, the regulatory agency and business players in Korean wireless 
telecommunications began encountering an unusual element not previously found in former 
telecommunications policy landscape: the ‘networked’ users. Although there had been changes!
in the environment surrounding mobile number policy, meaning changes such as the market 
transition to 3G, the introduction of the iPhone, and the reorganization of government agencies, 
the rise of the voices of users was an exceptional development, given that users had previously 
been considered to be passive consumers in supplier-centric policy and the market. This section 
explores the changes in the mobile prefix unification policy and focuses on the role of users. 
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The number of “010” users rapidly increased after the MIC began to allocate “010” to 3G 
users and new subscribers by revising the Rules for Number Administration in 2004. One key 
reason for the increase is that mobile operators sought to attract 3G subscribers because the 
average revenue per user (ARPU) for 3G users was higher than for 2G users. KTF was the 
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second-largest mobile carrier to adopt the “3G All-In” strategy in seeking to overcome their 
dominant rival, SKT. The strategy used by KTF resulted in a rapid transition to “010” both in its 
own subscriber base and across the entire wireless service market (See Table 19). 
The transition rate to “010” began to approach 70% in the late 2008. The KCC, a new 
regulatory agency, suggested that it would implement the compulsory unification of mobile 
identification numbers into “010.” In October 2008, the KCC reaffirmed the guideline that the 
unification to “010” would be reviewed by an external professional organization and would be 
fully implemented when the transition rate reached 80% in order to “guarantee the efficient use 
of numbers, one of Korea’s limited national resources” (Hwang, 2008b). As examined above, the 
three mobile carriers were divided on the issue of mobile number unification. SKT hoped to 
maintain its current benefits from existing number system, and did not welcome rapid unification. 
Although the market trend leaned toward 3G, SKT attempted to slow down the transition of its 
subscriber base to 3G. For example, SKT released more than ten types of 2G-only mobile 
handsets in 2009, while other companies rushed to provide 3G terminals, including the iPhone. 
Meanwhile, KTF and LGT supported the rapid implementation of mobile number unification, 
expecting to find an opportunity to disrupt SKT’s market dominance by removing its prefix-
associated brand power in the 3G service market. 
During this period, unlike the case for the policy-making process in the past, new 
pressures militating against the mobile number unification policy emerged. For instance, 
Netizens began to file and sign the online petition expressing opposition to compulsory mobile 
unification to “010” in online spaces such as Daum Agora, then the most popular online 
discussion forum for expressing public opinions on the Korean Internet. The main argument 
made by the petitions was that mobile phone numbers were an important part of user identities 
and that the state had no right to coerce users to abandon their mobile phone numbers.!Several 
online petitions regarding the mobile prefix unification policy had been sporadically filed since 
late 2007. It appears that they failed to gather a considerable amount of signatories.240 
Nonetheless, the petitions were a precursor of user resistance against the policy, which started 
becoming organized in the online “public sphere.”  
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More noteworthy was that users gathered in the online community and began expressing 
opinions concerning mobile phone number policy. The exemplary case was the Movement 
Headquarters Against 010 Unification (http://cafe.naver.com/anti010, 010"#$%&'() in 
Korean, hereafter the headquarters). The headquarters was a small online community established 
at the Naver Cafe241 service in August 2007. In its early stages, the headquarters was an online 
space for facilitating simple social gatherings among users who wanted to share complaints 
regarding the mobile number policy. However, as problems related to mobile number unification 
policy began to attract intense media attention around 2009, the number of users who joined the 
headquarters increased to more than 27,000. It is important to note that this headquarters was not 
exceptional among the online community cultures, which emerged after the rapid diffusion of 
broadband Internet service in Korea in the early 2000s. Netizens were accustomed to expressing 
and sharing their opinions using a variety of online formats such as writings, photos, and videos. 
They became actively involved in shaping public opinion on specific issues and began taking 
action offline as well. Historic mass protests such as the nationwide candlelight vigils in 2002242 
and 2008243 in Korea reflect that the seeds of protests that had been sown in online discussion 
forums such as Daum Agora and discourses from cyber space exerted significant influence on 
the development of later protests. This online culture became depoliticized and later expanded 
into other topics in everyday life. 
The arguments made by headquarters users were relatively simple. As previous chapter 
reveals, the closed market system driven by the de jure national standards for mobile Internet 
platforms in Korea had led to a three-year delay in the introduction of smartphones such as the 
iPhone compared to the US After the removal of the WIPI mandate, the iPhone was released in 
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service market in Korea was reshaped by the rapid spread of new technology. In this situation, 
the number of users who wanted to adopt smartphones and keep their existing mobile phone 
numbers also increased. However, they were unable to do so because using 2G prefixes for 3G 
services was not allowed under the mobile number unification policy. A user whose mobile 
phone number was 01X-NYYY-YYY was not allowed to use 3G-based smartphones without 
changing the phone number to 010-NYYY-YYYY. The dissonance between user desires and 
government policy led online community users to raise their voices against the policy.!
 “From the beginning, we did not oppose the mobile number unification policy itself. We did not 
care whether and when government would unify mobile prefixes. Our only wish was to keep 
using the same phone numbers that we have been using for a long time. Let us use smartphones 
as others do, while maintaining our numbers. That’s all.” (From interview with Min-Ki Seo, a 
lead user at the headquarters) 
In 2010, users at the headquarters began taking actions in the policy landscape regarding 
mobile phone number unification. The debate concerning whether and how to implement the 
mandatory use of the mobile prefix “010” intensified when transition rate to “010” exceeded 80% 
in February 2010. Users at the headquarters went beyond simply posting and sharing their 
complaints, and started to become actively involved in shaping public opinion regarding the 
number policy. First, users developed a cooperative relationship with civic groups such as the 
Korean Young Men’s Christian Association (KYMCA) and the Korean Green Consumers 
Network (KGCN). These civic groups have been calling for the abolition of the mobile number 
unification policy, and argued that a phone number is “a consumer’s precious property for 
keeping human connections and the primary goal of mobile number policy should be the 
protection of this right” (Lee, 2009b). Lead users at the headquarters began accumulating basic 
knowledge about the mobile number unification policy by contacting civic activists and 
acquiring unofficial and hard-to-find documents produced by regulatory agencies and companies. 
Min-Ki Seo, a lead user of the headquarters said in his interview for this study,  
“We were frogs in a well that did not know much about the policy. After understanding what’s 
wrong and how to solve it, we began letting the world know that we’re here. For example, when 
we got news that a forum or a hearing was going to be held, we clarified our stance by emailing 
journalists. When the KCC announced a related policy, we released a statement about that. These 
activities allowed our movement to attract more media attention, and the number of our members 
increased.”  
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Media attention increased, and the headquarters became more active than before. They 
continued to call and email the KCC to complain about the number policy. In addition, the 
headquarters held an online fund-raising campaign among community members to pay for 
several newspaper advertisements to inform public about the unfairness of mobile prefix 
unification. Furthermore, lead users began to attend public forums and hearings that discussed 
the direction of the mobile number unification policy. On July 7, 2010,!Yong-Gyeong Lee, a 
National Assemblyman, organized a policy conference where the key policy stakeholders in the 
policy, the KCC, KT, SKT, LGU+, the ETRI, and the KGCN, participated. Min-Ki Seo, a lead 
user at the headquarters, attended the conference and claimed that the government should 
“acknowledge the failure of compulsory mobile number unification and reexamine the policy 
from the ground up” (Myeong, 2010). It was unprecedented in the Korean policy landscape that 
a lead user of a small online community was officially invited to a policy conference and that his 
claim attracted media attention. !
 The KCC had difficulties persuading various stakeholders during this time period. For 
example, when the KCC held a public debate forum to justify the mandatory unification of 
mobile prefixes in March 2010, this action served only to recognize once again the difficulty of 
coordinating various interests. A survey conducted by KISDI revealed that 93% of 01X users in 
Seoul and six major cities did not intend to change their mobile phone numbers (KISDI, 2009, p. 
54). SKT insisted on program involving the gradual integration of mobile prefixes in order to 
protect their “011” and “017” subscriber base, while KT and LGT supported rapid unification in 
order to guarantee fair competition in the mobile service market. Interestingly, KT proposed an 
alternative in the forum, and said that “if a used phone number with 01X could be displayed on a 
receiver’s phone even after a caller changes his/her phone number to 010, it will contribute to 
reducing consumer complaints” (Chae, 2010). Civic groups such as the KYMCA argued that the 
policy goals of preventing the development of prefix-associated brand power and securing fair 
competition had already been accomplished, and that 01X should be retained for the benefit of 
users (Lim, 2010). In addition, the revision of the Telecommunications Business Act was 
proposed in the National Assembly by lawmaker Yong-Gyeong Lee on July 18 2010 in order to 
allow 2G users to use 3G service without changing their phone numbers (Sim, 2010).!
The KCC was pressured by conflicting interests among carriers and critics regarding the 
policy, and decided not to implement compulsory mobile number unification. In September 2010, 
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the KCC announced the policy of “temporary number portability” as a modification of the 
mobile number unification policy. The new policy postponed the mandatory transition to “010” 
until after all of the wireless carriers terminated their existing 2G services. “01X” users were 
allowed to use 3G service without being forced to transition to “010” for 3 years. “01X” numbers 
were to be displayed on a receiver’s phone even for callers who changed their numbers to “010” 
(KCC, 2010d). It was a collection of compromises. The KCC wanted to maintain the framework 
of the mobile number unification policy while avoiding criticism by temporarily allowing 01X 
users to use 3G-based smartphone without changing their numbers.  
Interesting point is that the reorganization of the regulatory agency facilitated the 
acceptance of users’ voices. Since 2006, business players and politicians had continuously 
voiced the need for an integrated regulatory agency that would regulate both broadcasting and 
telecommunications in order to adjust to the trend towards media convergence. Before the 
reorganization, the industry and the policy network was divided into two advocacy groups: 
telecommunications and broadcastings. As converged media services such as IPTV emerged, 
two groups were divided and fought with each other. After debates and preliminary works, an 
independent regulatory commission, the KCC, was established in February 2008. It was modeled 
on the FCC in the US This reorganization of the regulatory agency meant that the centralized 
decision-making system under the control of one minister changed into a more politically 
pluralistic decision-making system under the control of six commissioners (See Table 20). The 
ministry-type governance system emphasized speed and efficiency in the policy-making process. 
However, under the new commission-type governance system, policy-makers in the regulatory 
agency were required to listen to additional opinions on policy issues. An interview with a KCC 
officer, Jun-Hee Lee, revealed that a fundamental change in the policy-making process occurred 
under the commission-type governance system. !
 “There’s a crucial change in the policy-making process regarding telephone number policy since 
the reorganization. In old times, things went like this. ‘Hey, listen to the voice of grumbler and 
just go according to our plan. What matters is policy consistency.’ But, now, ‘Hey, listen to the 
loud voices of users. What’s wrong? Is there a way to accept their demands? What if we cancel 
the policy?’” 
It is obvious that the voices of users exerted an undeniable influence on the policy-
making process regarding temporary number portability, although the interviews conducted as 
part of this research reflect that some had differing opinions regarding whether or not user voices 
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actually affected the policy For instance, a KCC officer, Yeon-Jin Kim, who had charge of phone 
number policy, tended to devaluate the role of users in the policy-making process, saying “I 
think the policy unfolded with consistency. There has been no major change. The real problem is 
that a small group of users have completely false ideas about the policy.” However, other 
interviewees with the KCC and wireless carriers acknowledged that the collective voices of users 
in the online community were too loud for them to ignore. Jun-Hee Lee, a KCC office directly 
involved in establishing the temporary number portability policy in 2010 stressed that users from 
the headquarters gave KCC officers a hard time.  
 “Consumers had never acted in an organized manner before that time, even though they made 
complaints about government policies. Only carriers knew how to mobilize political power...At 
that time, users and civic groups made a big thing about the policy and pressure from the National 
Assembly. And then, we all were called by lawmakers and had to explain the policy to them over 
and over again. It was a really tough time.”!
This interview indicates that an important change driven by networked users had emerged 
in the wireless telecom policy landscape. According to the KCC officer, business players in the 
wireless industry mobilized political power over the government regulatory agency in order to 
pursue their corporate interests. Wireless carriers had many years experience at influencing 
government policy through various channels, including the National Assembly, the mainstream 
media, and others. The result is that wireless telecom policies has been developed and 
reconfigured mainly by corporate interests in conjunction with the government goals. However, 
networked users in this case began to mobilize political power to change policy.244  
Telecommunications policy scholars have given little attention to the role played by 
individual users in the policy-making process. Markets, interest groups, and even the state have 
been regarded as the key force that drives policy changes. However, a limited victory on the part 
of networked users in a battle involving mobile telephone number policy in Korea shows that 
individual users who gather together online can function as an active policy actor and exert 
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Although the KCC mandated temporary number portability as a compromise in 
September 2010, users at the headquarters were not satisfied with this “makeshift” measure. The 
users were concerned that they would be required to change their 2G numbers three years later 
and be in conformance with the temporary number portability policy. The revision of the 
Telecommunications Business Act that sought to allow 2G users to use 3G without changing 
their numbers was proposed in July 2010 and was pending and unlikely to be passed by the 
National Assembly. The proposed revision failed to attract attention from politicians because the 
proposer was a member of the Creative Korea Party that had a small number of seats in the 
National Assembly, and larger political parties had reservations about them and their ideas. The 
KCC managed to dampen the attention of politicians from the major parties by announcing 
temporary number portability. Users at the headquarters began to think about taking legal action.!!
The first important legal action involved filing a petition with the Constitutional Court. 
Before users at the headquarters filed a constitutional petition, they requested that the Korean 
Board of Audit and Inspection (KBAI) investigate the unfairness of temporary number 
portability policy on December 8, 2010.245 However, it was just an action that was intended to 
retain media attention immediately before the constitutional petition. The users’ move to bring 
the case to court was the strongest action ever attempted to urge the government to revoke the 
mobile number unification policy. If the Constitutional Court accepted the petition, the KCC 
would have to completely abolish the “unconstitutional” policy.!The headquarters gathered 1,447 
petitioners online in one day - December 11, 2010. After holding an explanatory meeting and 
hiring a law firm, Jang Baek, to act as their legal representatives, users at the headquarters 
submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court on February 2, 2011. The submitted petition 
claimed that the KCC’s policy decision infringed on the right of “human worth and dignity” and 
the right to “pursue happiness” protected by the Constitution (Article 10), the right to equality 
(Article 11), the right to privacy (Article 17), and the right of property (Article 24). The 
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Constitutional Court decided to refer the case246 to trial on February 28, 2011. The percent of 
constitutional petitions dropped was approximately 79% in 2010, according to data released by 
the Constitutional Court for the annual parliamentary audit (Lee, 2011a). Users at the 
headquarters considered it to be a victory for their resistance to the policy. On the contrary, the 
KCC shouldered an “enormous burden” in proving that the mobile prefix unification policy was 
legitimate and that it did not infringe upon the rights of petitioners.  
Noteworthy thing is new media technology and online culture facilitates legal 
mobilization among users. The constitutional petition was a collective lawsuit of a type that had 
previously been rare in the Korean legal environment. The Korean law system is modeled upon 
European and Japanese civil law, and basically had not adopted the idea of US-style class action 
lawsuits. The only exception was the Securities-Related Class Action Act introduced to the 
Korean legal system in 2005. Consumer organizations are ineligible to bring legal claims on 
behalf of individual consumers. Thus, it has been difficult for individual consumers to claim 
damages against the government or a company due to the high cost of litigation. However, online 
communication allowed individual users to solve problems related to filing their lawsuit against 
the government: encouraging participation, sharing expenses, and saving time. 
The lead users in the anti-010 headquarters posted the writings on the necessity of using a 
constitutional petition. Soon afterwards, 1,677 petitioners who were scattered around the country 
participated in the constitutional petition. Individual online community users only had to express 
the will to join and send a small legal fee in support of the petition by means of a mobile-phone 
payment system. Each participant in the constitutional petition against the government’s mobile 
prefix unifications policy paid about 10,000 Korean won, which is approximately US $8. The 
online community culture and widespread adoption of mobile payments facilitated the rapid 
mobilization of individual users for a constitutional petition. The mass recruitment of petitioners 
online reduced the legal fee that individual petitioners had to pay. After the petitions were filed, 
the lead users at the headquarters shared information about what was going on by posting all of 
the official documents related with the constitutional petition online. The users informed 
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themselves about the nature of the issues surrounding the mobile prefix unification policy and 
their constitutional petitions. !
The Constitutional Court held a public hearing regarding the petition on May 10, 2012. 
The public hearing shows that users at the headquarters and the KCC were sharply divided about 
whether or not the right of petitioners to keep a mobile network identification code (011, 016, 
017, 018, and 019) was a basic human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. They also held 
different viewpoints regarding whether or not the means and ends of a government decision on 
the mobile number policy was appropriate, and whether or not the decision might restrict basic 
human rights. Users argued that the government decision not only violated the principle of due 
process and the principle of the rule of law247, they also contended that it infringed upon their 
constitutional rights. The KCC argued in response that a telecommunication number is not a 
user’s property but rather a national resource and thus “the decision to prohibit users from using 
3G with 2G prefixes cannot be an exercise of public power which is applicable to a constitutional 
petition. Rights that users argue cannot be recognized as constitutional rights” (Yeo, 2012).!
Users consider their mobile phone number to be their individual property and the 
embodiment of one’s personality. The remarks of In-Ho Lee, a constitutional law professor who 
stood up in favor of the rights of users in the hearing, indicates how users perceived their mobile 
phone numbers. He pointed out that users who filed the petition thought that “pushing them to 
abandon the mobile numbers they had used for 9 – 28 years is nothing less than forcing them to 
change their names in the mobile world” (Jwa, 2012). The arguments made by the users is 
interesting in the sense that the legal nature of mobile phone numbers has not been discussed in 
the telecommunications policy field in this manner. Just as in the cases of the wireless spectrum 
and Internet domain names, a great deal of attention has been given by scholars and policy-
makers to these three specific issues: (a) whether or not telephone numbers are a national 
resource, (b) whether or not telephone numbers are to be recognized as private property owned 
by a firm, and (c) whether it is more cost-efficient to allocate telephone numbers through the 
marketplace or to allocate telephone numbers through administrative procedures.  
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In Korea, there had already been a juridical decision regarding the legal nature of mobile 
telephone prefixes. In May 2006, Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that “011” as a network 
identification code is a national resource that the government owns and controls and that it was 
thus unacceptable for a company to hold the exclusive rights to use a government-owned 
network identification code as a corporate trademark.248 This legal judgment of the Supreme 
Court was about to determine whether or not a mobile identification number could be recognized 
as being the private property of a carrier. Prior to the filing of the constitutional petition by the 
headquarters users, there had been little discussion or juridical decision whether or not wireless 
phone numbers are the individual property of users. 
The users’ constitutional petition led to a debate concerning the legal nature of mobile 
phone number. After the users’ petition, Korea law and policy scholars suggested two different 
views: the public good approach vs. the private property approach. The public good approach 
considers telephone numbers to be a public good owned and controlled by the state. This 
viewpoint is that individual users cannot claim a possessive right over telephone numbers 
because the state can take it back or remove it at any time, so mobile number unification is 
essentially a legitimate policy. The private property approach regards telephone numbers as 
private property under certain conditions. This approach means that users of mobile phone 
numbers, such as carriers, have the exclusive rights to use it within certain limits, just as 
spectrum users have certain exclusive rights to use the spectrum, although the spectrum was 
allocated on the premise that it is a public good and the state can take it back. This means that it 
might not be illegal for a carrier to keep using 2G identification codes by making its own 
decision. The expanded version of the private property approach is that individual users can 
claim to have rights over telephone numbers. 
The legal mobilization of users was significant in the sense that they forced the 
government to review policy issues that had been neglected in their top-down policy-making 
practices. This researcher’s view, however, is that the property rights approach does not provide 
the best solution to the policy problem in this case. Given that mobile telephone prefixes such as 
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the Korean wireless service market, it is not desirable to acknowledge that carriers have property 
rights over mobile telephone prefixes. If individual users’ rights over telephone numbers are 
accepted and the trading of numbers is permitted, administrative costs will increase and the 
policy reform for a better numbering plan will become more difficult. Of course, certain interests 
of users can be acknowledged as a result of the long-term use of their numbers although 
individual users do not have any ownership or other exclusive rights over their phone number. 
When the interests of individual users are infringed upon without good reasons, legal measures 
such as loss protection become desirable. More important, given technological feasibility and 
reduced costs, the government should have allowed users to maintain 2G prefixes for their 3G 
services instead of requiring the compulsory unification to 010. Top-down policy making 
practices led to unproductive debates and lawsuits that the government might have avoided. 
In addition to the constitutional petition, users at the headquarters took additional legal 
actions to resist the government’s decision. One exemplary action involved the termination of 2G 
services. The KCC rejected two previous bids from KT250, but later approved the KT plan to end 
the PCS service in its 1.8 GHz bandwidth on November 23, 2011. The approval allowed KT to 
begin its long-term evolution (LTE) service on the band. KT failed to obtain the 1.8 GHz portion 
of the spectrum for LTE service during the spectrum auction held in August 2011. SKT won the 
auction and prepared to launch its LTE service using its 1.8 GHz bandwidth. Given this situation, 
KT needed to reuse its 1.8 GHz frequency for the new service by terminating its 2G service early. 
KT thus accelerated the transition of its subscribers to 3G to the extent that the number of its 2G 
users decreased from 1.1 million in March 2011 to only 150,000 in November 2011. 
In response to the KCC decision, 776 users who had gathered in the online community 
both filed a lawsuit with the Seoul Administrative Court against the KCC in seeking to invalidate 
the decision, and also asked the court suspend the KCC’s approval until it issued a verdict on the 
matter. Users at the headquarters technically argued that the KCC had violated the 
Telecommunications Business Act, which requires landline and wireless communications service 
providers to notify users of service changes 60 days in advance. However, the aim of the 
administrative lawsuit was to block or delay the termination because it could advance the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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timetable for mobile number unification to “010.” The KCC released the temporary number 
portability policy in 2010, and decided to unify mobile identification codes in a non-compulsory 
manner. The unification would be completed at the time when all of the carriers terminated their 
2G services. If all of the 2G services were shut down, users would have no choice if they wanted 
to keep their numbers. That is why users at the headquarters opposed KT’s termination of 2G. 
While the constitutional petition was still an ongoing project, the administrative lawsuit 
that users filed against the KCC ended as a failure. The administrative lawsuit users filed against 
the KCC failed. The prospects were bright for users when the court accepted the users’ request to 
suspend the KCC’s approval on December 07, 2011. The court’s decision meant that KT could 
not shut down its 2G service, at least for a while. This was anticipated to deal a blow to the 
company, because it would leave the company unable to provide LTE service as scheduled, and 
leave it lagging behind SKT and LGU+. The upper court accepted the appeal of the KCC and KT 
on December 26, 2011. The Supreme Court rejected the appeals made by the users in the upper 
court decision on February 01, 2012. After several appeals from both parties, the Seoul High 
Court rejected a lawsuit filed the headquarters users251 because “the disadvantage of 2G service 
termination is not large enough to harm the public interest,” according to a decision made on 
September 27, 2012 (Lee, 2013).  
However, it is obvious that the legal actions of users played a crucial role in arousing 
tensions among stakeholders involved in the policy-making process. The courts finally rejected 
administrative lawsuits filed by headquarters users and the constitutional petition remains 
ongoing without definite results. Nonetheless, the legal actions of users attracted media attention 
and contributed to raising public awareness regarding of the mobile number unification policy 
and the termination of 2G services. The interviews conducted as part of this research revealed 
that government officers in the regulatory agency experienced unaccustomed stress due to the 
legal actions of users. During interviews conducted by this researcher, government officials who 
had been involved with the mobile number policy often criticized the “absurd” constitutional 
petition and administrative lawsuit, and claimed that these actions made their work more 
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complicated and difficult than before.252 The legal mobilization of users exerted political 
influence on the telecommunications regulators. Although the regulators expected the arguments 
of users to be rejected by the court, the government officers were concerned that the media and 
the public regarded litigation itself as a sign of their incompetence in the face of problems.  
Managers who worked for wireless carriers acknowledged that the legal actions of users 
affected firms’ decision-making to a certain extent. For instance, KT ran a task force team that 
managed the termination of 2G service starting in July 2010. The main task of the organization 
was to reduce the number of 2G subscribers, to prepare for the transition, prepare the customer 
care policy, and communicate with the regulatory agency and users. A member of KT’s task 
force team recalled during an interview with this researcher that it was a difficult time to try to 
communicate with users. He agreed with the argument made by the users about the origin of the 
problems. He ascribed the rise of user resistance against 2G service termination and their legal 
actions to a regulatory “wrong decision” that forcefully linked telephone service to numbers: 
“010” should be used for 3G unconditionally. He thought that KT had exerted a great deal of 
effort to minimize user backlash during the period when the company terminated their 2G 
service. The company allowed 2G users to cancel their contracts without penalty, offered 
subsidies and discounts for 3G phones, and even provided 2G users with compensatory payments 
for their 2G cancellations. KT did not expect user resistance to evolve into lawsuits. The court 
accepted the request made by users for the suspension of the KCC’s approval of KT’s 
termination of 2G service. The company had to postpone its 2G-termination schedule and delay 
its LTE launching until later. 
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The battles over the mobile prefix unification policy described above reflect some 
interesting and insightful points about users, regulators, and business players. Most importantly, 
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identities and subjectivities as citizens into being. Users began to identify themselves not as 
passive consumers who conformed to government policy but rather as active dissident citizens 
who were free to reject or resist policies that had been created behind closed doors without 
sufficient public consultation. Users began to redefine their identities and sought out new ways 
to express their voices. The modus operandi of regulators in old days, which had been 
development-oriented, supplier-centric, and involved top-down communication to the public, 
faced unexpected resistance rising up from the bottom. 
Online community cultures can grow rapidly in new media environments and provide 
widely-scattered users with an easy opportunity to organize themselves as dissident citizens. 
First, users who distrust and feel antipathy regarding the government’s policy were able to 
connect with each other online more easily than before. An interview with Seong-Ho Cha, a lead 
user who was in charge of administering the Seoul metropolitan area at the headquarters, reflects 
how individual users began participating in the online movement. 
 “When I heard the news about the compulsory unification of mobile prefixes, I felt anger welling 
up inside of me. I really disliked changing my telephone number that I had used for so long. 
Although I wanted to raise my voice about that, I knew it was difficult for me to stand my ground 
alone against the government. While surfing the web, I found that there were lots of people who 
had the same feeling as I did.” 
Second, users trained themselves through interactions with other stakeholders that 
revolved around the number policy and by sharing knowledge they had learned from their 
interactions. It is usually difficult for ordinary users to understand telecommunications policy in 
detail because there exist many legal and technological jargon terms that must first be understood. 
However, users who were interviewed for this research have a solid knowledge of the history and 
problems of the mobile number policy than this researcher initially thought. This was made 
possible as a result of knowledge-sharing practices in the online community. Lead users acquired 
relevant information by calling, emailing, and meeting civic groups, the news media, regulators, 
and mobile carriers. The information that was collected from these policy actors was organized 
and shared with other users at the headquarters. Every known document regarding the progress 
of the litigation was immediately uploaded online. Other users online community users could 
learn what the problems were and what else was going on, and then felt free to express their 
opinions by posting online comments. 
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What prompted users at the headquarters to actively resist government policy to the 
extent of filing a constitutional petition? Some government officers and company managers 
interviewed for this research denounced the users at the headquarters saying that they only 
wanted to get monetary compensation for their resistance. Although it is true that some users 
expected to receive monetary compensation, the interviews conducted with users reveals that 
they already knew there would be little compensation. There was a desire to tell people about 
their “sense of justice,” “anger,” and their “critical opinions” about the government policy. An 
interview with a lead user at the headquarters indicates that users became to develop a 
democratic desire to stand up against a “bad” supplier-centric and development-oriented 
government policy. 
“See the movement, Occupy Wall Street. It is time for direct democracy. We live in an era where 
unconditional obedience to government is a thing of the past.”  
Lead users at the headquarters who this researcher interviewed from July to September 
2012 often linked their resistance to the government policy with anti-neoliberal protests such as 
Occupy Wall Street253. The initial desire of the online community users was not to engage in a 
legal mobilization but instead share their complaints about the mobile prefix unification policy. 
This policy did not allow users to use 3G service or smartphone service without first changing 
their 2G wireless phone numbers. In the process of sharing their complaints, the online 
deliberation process allowed users to learn about the history of the mobile number policy and 
inform themselves about policy problems. Users at the headquarters soon began thinking of 
themselves as dissident citizens, who “should” resist a policy that served only the government’s 
developmental goals and business interests. These activities of the users first emerged two years 
before Occupy Wall Street, but they often cited global movements such as Occupy Wall Street. 
In addition, given that the users’ argument involved a call for a more liberalized, or less 
regulated, telecommunications policy for the benefit of users, it is paradoxical for them to link 
their actions to anti-neoliberal movement such as Occupy Wall Street. However, users’ attitudes 
that equated their particular form of resistance to the global movement, shows that their desire 
evolved out of complaining about government policy and into calling for more democratic 
policy-making process in telecommunications. This part of their background helps explain why !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$'%!%2&$*.-,$-00+&0$6.-0&:$5D$/2&$_ZM$*)A&*&,/$-,$!>##$1&6&$0)(-.'$.,:$&(),)*-($-,&T+.'-/DB$()66+@/-),B$+,:+&$
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users in the online community turned to legal mobilization activities such as constitutional 
petitions, instead of ceasing their activities when the government partially accepted their 
arguments through the temporary number portability policy issued in 2010. 
Government officials had already recognized the policy environment changes produced 
by the growth of online community culture and civic spirit. An interview with a KCC officer 
who had been involved in the policy-making process regarding the mobile prefix unification 
policy acknowledged that user questions and their resistance to the government policy were the 
result of their new identity as self-empowered citizens and their growing desire for new types of 
civic engagement in recent Korea. 
 “It happened because users began to be awakened by their desires. In other words, it can be said 
that their civic consciousness matured. They had readily complied with government’s policy in 
the past, but they developed the desire to keep their mobile phone numbers, and asked “why do I 
have to give up my number because the government is pushing?” Recently, citizens have begun 
expressing their complaints about the government’s actions and they do that in an organized way 
both online and offline.”  
There was a policy inertia that was the legacy of the decision-making model based on the 
developmentalist idea that the regulators had accepted for decades. The interviews revealed that 
the government officers in the KCC usually responded that the first priority of the mobile 
number policy should be “policy consistency.” The original goal of the mobile number policy in 
its early days was to make efficient use of telephone number resource and guarantee “fair 
competition” by preventing number-associated brand marketing. The regulators believed that 
carrier-specific allocation of mobile prefixes had undermined “desirable” market competition 
and prevented the efficient and flexible allocation of telephone numbers for new wireless 
telecommunications service markets such as LTE, MVoIP and MVNO. However, after a decade, 
policy consistency itself appears to have become a policy goal. The excuse that the regulators 
made to the courts, in media releases, and in replies to users’ complaints254 reflects that they 
often emphasized the consistency of mobile number unification policy over other issues. 
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The interviews conducted for this research revealed that government officers in the 
regulatory agency often expressed nostalgia for good old days that they could take a leading role 
in making plans, implementing them and coordinating the interests of the stakeholders that 
existed at that time without encountering major resistance. They perceived that the autonomy of 
the government and regulators had been undermined as the power of corporate interests 
expanded after telecommunications liberalization in the late 1990s. They also felt pressured 
because they had to consider user complaints in the policy-making process after networked users 
began to emerge in the policy landscape. Government officers had yet to become accustomed to 
having to consider the interests of this new policy actor. 
The atmosphere and the perceptions inside the government and the regulatory agencies 
resulted in the recent reorganization of telecommunications regulator. Policy experts in 
government and business continued to see a need for a control tower for efficient policy-making 
and policy enforcement. They argued that ministry-type governance is better for promoting 
nation’s industrial growth than commission-type governance for the purpose of handling 
information and communications technology (ICT) policy. The new Korean government created 
the Ministry on Future, Creativity, and Science (MFCS) as a control tower of ICT policy. Tasks 
and authority over ICT policies, including telecommunications, were transferred from the KCC, 
the MKE, the MCST, and the MPAS to the new control tower, the MFCS, in March 2013. 
One aspect of the controversy regarding mobile prefix unification is that business players 
attempted to use online opinion in the battle over telephone numbers, although their attempts 
were not very successful. When the KCC began a review process regarding temporary number 
portability in March 2010, KT sought opinions online in support of the company’s arguments. 
The company asked power bloggers255 to express opinions that government should introduce a 
number change display service instead of compulsory prefix unification (Electronic Times, 2010). 
SKT, whose stance was negative toward mobile prefix unification, have attempted to create good 
relationship with users in the headquarters. SKT provided lead users at the headquarters with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$''!WQ)1&6$5')77&60X$*&.,$@&)@'&$12)$@+5'-02$/2&-6$16-/-,70$),$),'-,&$5')70$.,:$2.A&$,+*&6)+0$6&.:&60$)6$
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otherwise inaccessible data/documents when users made requests. During an interview 
conducted by this researcher, a manager from SKT said that he had expected “users to oppose 
mobile number unification and termination of 2G, and their collective actions will finally end in 
failure.” SKT nevertheless tried to help users at the headquarters because the company 
considered user resistance to government policy to be “useful anyway” for achieving the 
company’s goal of delaying the implementation of the mobile number unification policy. Each 
mobile carrier had a special division for maintaining contact with civic groups. When an issue 
related to civic organizations emerged, the company attempted to solve problems or improve 
public opinion by mobilizing or negotiating with civic groups. It appears that wireless carriers 
applied this practice to online community users during the battles over numbers. Interviews with 
lead users at the headquarters, as well as company managers, revealed that this practice was 
expanded to networked users when temporary number portability policy and 2G termination 
became hot issues in the Korean wireless policy landscape.  
An important finding is that users at the headquarters were extremely well acquainted 
with the conflicting corporate interests that existed between wireless carriers and their treatment 
of civic groups. During interviews, this researcher recognized that headquarters users had strong 
anti-corporate sentiments and a deep distrust of government policy. Despite their animosity to 
corporations, lead users kept in contact with each wireless carrier and leveraged corporate 
interests in order to strengthen their dissident activities. For instance, lead users obtained data 
and documents from each wireless carrier that were usually unavailable to the public. 
Furthermore, lead headquarters users suspected that workers at wireless carriers monitored their 
online posts. During the administrative litigation and the constitutional petition, users shared 
what was going on with other members of the community by uploading every document related 
to their legal actions. They wanted to reduce the amount of time that carriers and the government 
had available to prepare their response. Users posted lawsuit-related documents from which the 
case numbers of litigations had been eliminated, and posted documents after the courts had sent 
the documents to companies and the KCC. 
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This chapter examined what were the roles of the state, domestic business players, and 
users during the development and evolution of mobile phone number policy in Korea. This 
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chapter historicized how mobile phone number policy were determined, and outlined the 
interactions between policy actors involved in the policy change. This chapter identified some of 
the relationships between the actors, and the emergence of networked users who functioned as a 
new policy actor in the telecommunications policy landscape. 
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Interactions between the state and business complicated the trajectory of the mobile telephone 
number policy in Korea. First, carrier-specific allocations of mobile identification codes resulted 
from the rapid introduction of competition in the wireless industry. The Korean government’s 
active acceptance of neoliberal globalization in the 1990s led to the rapid liberalization of the 
wireless telecommunications industry. The regulatory agency did not have sufficient time to 
prepare long-term policy plan, and had to accept new licensees’ requests for carrier-specific 
mobile prefixes. The power shift towards business players during privatization and new licensing 
processes (See Chapter 2) also impacted the mobile telephone number policy-making process. 
Wireless carriers wanted to obtain and market their own telephone prefixes. Number allocation 
and spectrum allocation is a prerequisite for new wireless communications services, so it is not 
surprising that business interests were the driving force behind the creation of a carrier-specific 
mobile numbering plan.  
Second, regulatory intervention in market competition and the reactions of business 
players dragged out the mobile telephone number policy process and often modified it later on. 
The role of the neoliberal-developmental state as a facilitator varies with the political and 
economic environments. The government gave top priority to introducing market competition in 
wireless communications in the late 1990s. However, the incumbent, SKT, soon came to 
dominate the wireless service market during the early 2000s. Carrier-specific allocations of 
mobile prefixes were thought to be one reason for the monopolistic market structure of the 
wireless service market. The telecommunications regulatory agency wanted to promote “fair 
competition” by implementing wireless number policy reform. The compulsory unification of 
mobile prefixes was designed to promote number policy reform, and the regulator wanted to 
push reforms forward. However, policy reform based on interventionist principles were dragged 
on and modified due to conflicting interests among business players in the 2000s.   
Policy debates regarding mobile phone numbers went on within a closed circle where 
government goals and business interests predominated, and such practices created some policy 
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problems. First, the reform of carrier-specific allocation was protracted for over a decade, and 
the social costs of telephone number change increased. Many wireless service users had their 
social relations based on old numbers with diverse prefixes. Second, the telecommunication 
regulators tied compulsory mobile prefix unification to network/service transition from 2G to 3G. 
This linkage led to many users becoming dissatisfied with the mobile prefix unification policy. 
Users who wanted to subscribe to 3G mobile services had to first abandon their old 2G telephone 
numbers, and they were required to use new numbers with 010 prefixes. In conclusion, the 
specific Korean neoliberal-developmental characteristics of telecommunications policy led to 
inefficient telephone number allocations and widespread user discontent. 
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This chapter showed that the voices of dissident users in cyberspace began to emerge in the 
wireless policy landscape where government goals and business interests had once predominated. 
In a manner similar to the WIPI situation examined in Chapter 5, networked users informed and 
organized themselves online, and went on to exert influence over government policy. Networked 
users emerged as a policy actor who affected the wireless telephone number policy-making 
process. In this case, the online and offline activities of users influenced the KCC to temporarily 
retreat from implementing compulsory mobile prefix unification in 2011. This chapter does not 
argue that the voices of users were the single factor that tilted the decision in favor of the policy 
change. This chapter also indicates that cultural, technological, and institutional changes 
facilitated the emergence of the networked users movement. The growth of online community 
culture provided dissident users with a cultural platform for their activities. The introduction of 
smartphones partly motivated users to resist the government policy. The reorganization of the 
regulatory agency into a commission-type of governance allowed user voices to be reflected 
more readily in the policy-making process. Furthermore, networked users interacted with other 
institutional/non-institutional policy actors and helped to shape the policy network that 
surrounded the mobile telephone number policy. 
More important, this chapter found that networked users evolved into collective citizens 
who challenged the status quo by using legal mobilization to call for policy change. Many 
scholars have researched the democratic implications of online space by linking the theories of 
democracy with online participation. There is no consensus definition of digital democracy or e-
democracy. The research on digital democracy makes use of a variety of different positions 
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(Dahlberg, 2011). Behind the academic enthusiasm for digital democracy, there is the belief that 
digital media technology can be used to expand political participation on the part of citizens. It 
appears to be true that digital media facilitates citizens’ participation in political issues, although 
the pessimistic view of the role of new media in democracy also exists. However, it is unclear 
whether online participation influences actual political decisions and through which ‘channels’ 
make such influences possible. 
Political participation has been regarded as a necessary condition for the existence of 
democracy, whether it is characterized as serving the maximization of interest (Dahl, 1961), 
creating a sense of commonality (Barber, 1984) or as a means towards the end of the self-
realization of humanity (Arendt, 1958). There are different forms of political participation. Legal 
mobilization is a crucial form of citizen participation “by which the citizenry uses public 
authority on its own behalf” (Zemans, 1983, p. 690). Mobilizing the law can produce a long-
lasting, substantial effect on political decisions, including public policy (Salzman, et al., 2011). 
For this reason, legal mobilization can serve as a social movement tactic so that the minority’s 
desire for a social change can be made possible through “proper channels”  (Burstein, 1991).  
Networked users as examined in this chapter show that there is a possibility of linking 
online participation and legal mobilization for democratic social change. Users in the online 
community first gathered together online to voice and share their complaints regarding the 
mobile prefix unification policy. They wanted to use 3G service or smartphone service without 
being required to change their 2G mobile phone numbers. However, in the process of sharing 
their complaints online, users began to think of themselves as dissident citizens and decided to 
exert political influence by means of legal mobilization. In this case, users acting as collective 
citizens filed a constitutional petition and administrative litigation against the government and 
carriers. In this case, the online community culture and technology facilitated the legal 
mobilization of users. Online communication allowed individual users to solve problems that 
could be anticipated when taking legal action against the government. Online communication 
encouraged large-scale participation in legal action, sharing expenses, and saved time.  
In the WIPI case, networked users faced a limitation as a policy actor. Their dissident 
voices had to be transferred and filtered through channels of institutional policy actors such as 
the national assembly or the mainstream media. Networked users in the number policy case also 
made use of official actors as channels for actualizing their voices. However, the networked 
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users examined in this chapter went further and made active use of the Korean legal system to 
call for a policy change. Their collective legal actions were unprecedented in the Korean 
telecommunications policy landscape and thus had not been anticipated by either regulators or by 
business players. The legal mobilization of users challenged and undermined the legitimacy of 
the mobile telephone number policy created by government goals and business interests.  
This research argues that previously passive individual users of telecommunications 
service became ‘networked users’ who informed and organized themselves online and evolved 
into collective citizens who mobilized the legal authorities to resist government telecom policy. 
More particularly, headquarters users examined in this chapter exhibited more autonomous 
aspects that were free from the power of the state and corporations in comparison with the users 
in the WIPI case. The emergence of networked users can have a positive effect on the democratic 
policy-making process that goes on in the Korean telecommunications policy landscape. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This dissertation examined historical changes in Korea’s wireless telecommunications 
policies from 1993 to 2013. This research focused on changing interactions and power relations 
between the state, transnational actors, domestic businesses, and even individual users in 
telecommunications who organized themselves online. This research draws on historical 
methods and interviews with users and policymakers, and suggests that scholars should pay more 
attention to the active role the state played in the neoliberal transformation of Korean wireless 
telecommunications. This research also proposes a new role for networked users in 
democratizing the telecommunications policy regime, which has long been dominated by 
government developmental goals and corporate interests. This chapter provides a summary of the 
major findings, discusses the contributions and implications of this research, and suggests how 
this research can be extended beyond the limitations of this study. 
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This dissertation found that the interactions between transnational pressures, the 
developmental goals of the state, and domestic business interests shaped the neoliberal-
developmental features of Korean wireless telecommunications policies on a continuous basis.  
First, transnational forces, including the US government, international institutions such as 
the WTO, OECD, and IMF, US-based transnational high-tech firms, and free trade agreements, 
continuously functioned as external pressures that stimulated change in Korean wireless 
telecommunications policy. The pressures initially focused on the liberalization of the Korean 
wireless telecommunications industry through privatization and deregulation. After the 
liberalization of the Korean wireless telecommunications market, these external pressures were 
brought to bear to produce the expansion of foreign ownership and the reduction of government 
intervention in technical standards and spectrum allocations. These pressures triggered the 
change away from the traditional wireless telecommunications policy regime, which had been 
based on a developmental state model, to a neoliberal economic model. Korea’s export-
dependent economic structure and information-based developmental strategy led to tensions 
between embracing these external pressures and resisting them. 
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Second, the locus of power in the wireless telecommunications gradually shifted away 
from the government and migrated to domestic corporations after wireless telecommunications 
liberalization in the late 1990s. Korean conglomerates, which had accumulated capital and 
bolstered their economic power during the state-business alliance, continuously sought to liberate 
themselves from state control. Many of the policy cases256 examined in this dissertation reflect 
that business interests, together with government’s developmental goals, were a crucial factor in 
shaping and reconfiguring the policy network in wireless telecommunications. In some policy 
cases, domestic corporations maintained a close-knit state-business linkage when their corporate 
interests were in accordance with government goals. When government polices failed to meet the 
business players’ needs due to changes in technology and the business environment in the global 
mobile industry, domestic corporations often challenged the legitimacy of government’s 
developmental wireless telecom policies. In some policy cases, domestic corporations and 
transnational corporations allied with each other to exert influence in favor of government policy 
change.!
Third, the role of the state was not passive. It was instead active in creating hybrid styles 
of wireless telecommunications policy in which both neoliberal and developmental features were 
embedded together with each other. The Korean state reacted strategically against external 
pressures. Korea actively accepted neoliberal globalization, but did not abandon its 
developmental leadership in the wireless telecommunications industry. The government 
intensified the power of the telecommunications regulatory agency as the control tower for 
designing and implementing industrial promotion policies. The regulatory agency focused more 
on industrial promotions rather than on regulations. The government strategically led large-scale 
research and development projects in the wireless telecom sector, including CDMA (2G), IMT-
2000 (3G), WiBro (3.5G/4G), and WIPI (mobile internet platform standard), with the goals of 
attaining “technological independence” and supporting the infiltration of domestic corporations 
into the global market. 
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This dissertation also found that neoliberal-developmental policy-making practices led to 
policy problems and resistance from individual users. Two policy cases examined in this 
dissertation reflect that individual users gathered in online communities later emerged as a 
collective policy actor who complicated the existing policy network and brought about changes 
in wireless telecommunications policy. Individual users even evolved into citizens who were 
self-informed and self-organized in cyberspace and challenged the legitimacy of government 
policy by means of a legal mobilization.  
First, the neoliberal-developmental features of Korea’s wireless telecom policies usually 
considered individual users in telecommunications to be passive consumers or markets. 
Government developmental goals and corporate interests dominated the policy-making process 
for many years and the changes were driven by interactions between the government and 
corporations. This neoliberal-developmental practice contributed to the rapid growth of the 
Korean wireless telecom market, and led to the global successes of Korean-based transnational 
IT conglomerates such as Samsung and LG. However, under these closed policy-making system, 
the voices of individual users were often neglected.  
Second, online community culture in Korea allowed scattered users to create a space to 
discuss and protest wireless telecommunications policies. Users who were dissatisfied with the 
status quo organized themselves using new media such as online forums. These networked users 
later emerged as a collective policy actor that partially influenced the abolition of the nation’s 
mobile Internet standard in the WIPI case. A new type of active role for users, which went 
beyond the idea of passive individual users of telecommunications, was also identified in the 
mobile telephone number policy. Networked users in the mobile telephone number policy case 
evolved into a collective citizenry who called for democratic change in the policy-making 
process. Networked users relied on new media technologies and online community culture. In 
the mobile telephone number policy case, they actively mobilized legal authorities as a channel 
for realizing their desired policy change. Networked users filed a constitutional petition and 
administrative lawsuits against government policy. Individual users gathered together online in 
an unprecedented manner and called for changes in the closed telecom policy-making system 
which had previously been dominated by government developmental goals and business 
interests. 
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This dissertation offers several contributions to knowledge in the field of international 
political economy, the political economy of communications, and user studies in 
telecommunications policy.  
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First, this research contributes to knowledge in the field of international political 
economy by revealing that the dichotomous simplification of the role of the state in neoliberal 
globalization is rather unproductive. Most globalization theories appear to neglect the role of the 
state due to an emphasis on transnational forces during the relentless globalization process. Of 
course, not all globalization studies overlook the role of the state. Revisionist works on 
neoliberal globalization suggest that the role of the state did not decrease when facing a 
neoliberal hegemonic order. For instance, Linda Weiss argued in her book The Myth of the 
Powerless State (1998) that the capacities of states for domestic transformative strategies 
influenced the successes of national economies under global capitalism, and the strength of 
external economic pressures was largely determined domestically. Empirical works written from 
the revisionist viewpoint indicated that globalization per se undermines neither the capacities of 
nation-states to handle foreign economic relations nor their catalytic function with respect to 
domestic economic developments (Guillen, 2001, p. 254; Weiss, 2003). Nonetheless, many 
globalization theorists appear to forecast the dissolution of national boundaries, industries, and 
economies, after which everything will converge into transnational organizations beyond the 
reach of nation-state power (Cable, 1995; Castells, 1996; Friedman, 1999; 2005; Fukuyama, 
1992; Robinson, 2003; 2004; Sklair, 2000; 2002).  
This prediction is often referred as the neoliberal convergence thesis. It has achieved 
general acceptance in the field of international political economy studies, one of whose core 
research themes has been the delineation of the mechanism of economic and social development 
of East Asian countries. The proponents of the convergence thesis have argued that the role of 
the state as a driver of social and economic changes was diminished during neoliberal 
globalization in the Asian region. Their common thread is that the developmental state, whose 
primary feature was strong state intervention in markets, ceased strategic market intervention and 
passively converged upon the neoliberal model of capitalism (Amyx, 2004; Haggard, 2000; 
Jayasuriya, 2005; Pang, 2000; Pirie, 2005a; 2005b). The neoliberal convergence thesis has often 
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been used to analyze Korea’s political economy and industrial policy. The perspective of these 
scholars is that Korea provides irrefutable evidence of a powerless state that abandoned its 
developmental strategy and relinquished the hands-on market approach after neoliberal 
globalization (Kim, 1999; Minns, 2001; Pirie, 2008).  
In contrast, “the return of the state” thesis has been proposed in reaction to the 
predominant viewpoint. Another viewpoint posits that there has been a greater degree of 
continuity with the developmental past than there have been substantial changes, despite 
neoliberal reforms in East Asia (Hundt, 2005; Lee and Han, 2006; Thurbon and Wiess, 2006; 
Vogel, 2006; Walter, 2006). The view often emphasizes “the return of the state” by highlighting 
the fact that the Korean state regained the power to reform the private sector and coordinate the 
interests of business players after the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Hundt, 2005). The large fiscal 
stimulus package that emerged in response to the 2008 global economic crisis is also considered 
to constitute evidence of a “selective limited retreat from neoliberalism” (Pirie, 2012). 
However, the analysis presented in this dissertation demonstrates that neither the 
neoliberal convergence thesis nor the return of the state thesis is innately superior or appropriate 
for explaining the historical development of Korean wireless telecommunications policies and 
the Korean economy. This dissertation finds that the neoliberalization of the Korean wireless 
telecommunications has been continuously modified since the 1990s, and the role of the state 
never decreased. The Korean state never abandoned strategic intervention in the wireless telecom 
industry for the purpose of promoting information-based economic development, and also took a 
leading role in initiating the neoliberal transformation of the wireless telecommunications 
industry. This research argues that the paradoxical coexistence of neoliberal and developmental 
features in Korean wireless telecommunications policies cannot be fully explained using existing 
dichotomous viewpoints. 
Using a fixed definition of the state often leads to a discrepancy between the definition 
and the historical and contingent variations in a state’s existence and power. The developmental 
state is a distinctive brand of capitalism often found in East Asia. It should not be interpreted as 
being an unchangeable concept that represents strong state intervention in the market for the 
purpose of pursuing economic growth. It is incorrect to argue that only one strategy and tactic for 
capital accumulation is possible in many capitalist states. Jessop’s notion of “strategic 
selectivity” means that the state exhibits not a single accumulation strategy but rather multiple 
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flexible accumulation strategies in specific spatial-temporal contexts (Jessop, 1990). Old forms 
of development in East Asia were based on economic protectionism, authoritarian control over 
markets, and state-monopoly capitalism. However, developmental strategies were repeatedly 
reconfigured and adjusted to mesh with changing political economic environments. 
Developmental states facing neoliberal globalization actively accepted the rules of free trade and 
facilitated market competition, but retained their strong interventionist legacies both in creating 
favorable conditions for domestic corporations and developing technologies/infrastructures for 
catching up with other advanced economies.  
Thus, this dissertation used the concept of the neoliberal-developmental state to move 
beyond this unproductive dichotomy. This dissertation does not wish to suggest a new fixed 
concept of the state, but rather calls for the need to understand the role of the state in a more 
flexible and balanced manner beyond the simple dichotomy. Liow (2012) coined the term to 
explain the “neoliberal political rationality” behind Singapore’s labor policies and institutions. 
Liow attempted to theorize a hybridity created by neoliberalism and the Asian developmental 
tradition based on the Foucauldian understanding of neoliberal governmentality. This 
dissertation adopts the term to explain the hybridity257 in Korean wireless telecommunications 
policy wherein neoliberal and developmental features are embedded within each other. However, 
this research also extends the term and suggests another notion of the neoliberal-developmental 
state by focusing on the nature of hybridity from the approach of political economy. 
Neoliberalism as a theory is based on the imperatives of “small government” and the 
abolishment of state intervention. But the primary agent or apparatus in the process of actual 
neoliberalization is the state. Neoliberalism in practice is so flexible that developmental legacies 
are not excluded. The developmental state in practice is strategic, as old forms of development 
and state intervention are incessantly reconfigured.!
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Second, this dissertation contributes to knowledge of the political economy of 
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telecommunications policy. This research largely focuses on how the Korean wireless telecom 
policy has been transformed, and which interactions between political and economic actors 
impacted the change in a historical and holistic manner. The political economic approach used in 
communication studies differ from the approach used by other economists in its holistic 
understanding of relations between economic practice and political organization, its focus on 
analysis of historical transformation, and its emphasis on social justice and democratic change 
(Wasko et al., 2011, p. 2). The critical approach provides valuable insights by situating the 
changes in global telecommunications industry and policy within a larger social context. Critical 
scholars reveal that the neoliberal change in telecommunications has been a global project that 
sought to establish conditions favorable to capital accumulation. The role of state has involved 
creating and preserving an institutional framework that meets the needs of business (Schiller, 
2000; 2007, Hills, 1986; 2007). 
Critical scholars have expended academic effort to illuminate the structural changes 
within the Korean communications industry and policy. Jin (2011) analyzed the structural 
transformation of the Korean communications industry (1987-2002), including broadcasting, 
newspapers, film and telecommunications by focusing on media ownership and the role played 
by transnational capital in the changes. His research revealed that the neoliberal changes in the 
communications industry in Korea were the outcome of both internal factors such as government 
policy and the growing power of domestic conglomerates, together with external factors such as 
the economic crisis and transnational forces. Lee (2012) considered the KII project (1995-2005) 
to be the systematic response of government and business interests to the new digital mode of 
capitalism. His analysis considers the Korean state to be a strong, undemocratic, active player in 
the telecommunication policy-making process which took a leading role in designing and 
implementing the project as “an agent of local and global capital” (p. 11). These studies provide 
valuable insights for understanding the structural changes of the Korean communications 
industry and policy.  
However, the political economic perspective has not yet been used to understand the 
historical changes in Korean wireless telecommunications policy. This dissertation delineated the 
neoliberal transformation of Korean wireless telecommunications from 1993 to 2013 by focusing 
on the analysis of policy changes. This dissertation examined twelve major wireless 
telecommunications policies in Korea related to privatization, licensing, deregulation, and 
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national research and developments projects. Examining the policy changes led to this 
dissertation’s finding that the neoliberal changes in wireless telecommunications in Korea were 
the result of incessant interactions among transnational pressures, the Korean state, and domestic 
businesses.  
Korean wireless telecommunications was no exception to neoliberal globalization. Public 
assets in wireless telecommunications were privatized into domestic/transnational capitals 
through privatization. The locus of power in the wireless industry shifted from the government to 
domestic capital as a result of deregulation. The role of the state was crucial in the establishment 
of favorable conditions for capital accumulation. At the same time, the Korean state never 
abandoned its strategic role in initiating large-scale technological development projects in 
wireless telecommunications. This dissertation contributes to new knowledge that facilitates the 
understanding of the dynamic and flexible changes in the political economy surrounding Korean 
wireless telecommunications. 
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Third, this dissertation contributes to knowledge in the area of user studies in 
telecommunications policy research by analyzing users as policy actors and collective citizens. 
Users in telecommunications have seldom been regarded as policy actors or citizens in 
traditional telecommunications policy research. The role of institutional policy actors258 such as 
legislatures, government agencies, and courts has been a core research subject in policy studies 
(Cahn, 2012). In addition, the role of non-institutional policy actors such as businesses, 
mainstream media, and consumer organizations has also been widely researched. However, the 
role of individual citizens in the policy process garnered little scholarly attention until after they 
were mobilized into a large-scale social movement and became an influential interest group 
(Birkland, 2011, p. 133).  
This bias of the policy research field is amplified in telecommunications policy research 
due to the particular logic of telecommunications. Audiences in broadcasting have often been 
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telecommunications users have been framed as individual consumers from the economic 
perspective (Livingstone & Lunt, 2012). Treating telecommunications users as mere consumers 
or as a passive market has been more prevalent in Korea than in other countries due to Korea’s 
long-term emphasis on the information-based growth model. The telecommunications industry 
has often been described as the “growth engine” of the Korean economy, and economic 
efficiency has been a top priority in policy debates and policy research on telecommunications. 
Given this situation, the role of individual users in telecommunications policy has seldom been 
researched from a normative or democratic perspective.  
 This dissertation suggests that networked users can be understood as a new form of 
policy actor that can influence the telecommunications-policy making process. In the WIPI and 
wireless telephone number policy cases, users who were dissatisfied with telecommunications 
policies emerged as policy actors who actively interacted with other policy actors and attempted 
to influence policy changes. Users organized and informed themselves in online communities 
using new media. New media tools do not necessarily create the desire to organize, but instead 
provide an alternative platform for the achievement of human desires (Shirky, 2008). New media 
reduces the cost of organizing, participating, and protesting (Earl & Kimport, 2011). Contrary to 
the pessimistic view of the quality of online deliberations (See Davis, 1999; Shapiro, 1999; 
Sunstein, 2001), the online user deliberations that were examined in this research exhibited 
informed and less polarized forms of discussion. Networked users linked their arguments in 
online deliberations with offline activities. They actively attempted to use existing policy actors, 
including the National Assembly and mainstream media, as channels for actualizing their voices.  
More important, this dissertation suggests that networked users be understood as 
collective citizens who can mobilize the legal authorities to change policies. There are sober and 
cautious views regarding the role of new media, e.g., using the Internet to enhance democracy 
(Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Hindman, 2009; Moscow, 2004), but it appears that digital media 
can be used as an instrument for facilitating citizens’ online participation. However, it is unclear 
whether or not online participation influences actual political decisions and which channels make 
such political influence possible. Legal mobilization is a crucial form of citizen’s political 
participation “by which the citizenry uses public authority on its own behalf” (Zemans, 1983, p. 
690). Mobilizing the law can have a long-lasting, substantial effect on political decisions, 
including public policy (Salzman, et al., 2011). For this reason, legal mobilization can function 
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as a social movement tactic such that the minority’s desire for social change can be realized 
through “proper channels” (Burstein, 1991). 
Networked users who were examined in the mobile telephone number policy exhibit a 
form of effective online democracy in which online participation and legal mobilization for 
democratic social change are linked with each other. When users mobilized the legal authorities, 
they went beyond their unstable initial status as limited policy actors. In the WIPI case, 
networked users faced a limitation in operating as a policy actor. Their dissident voices had to be 
transferred and filtered through the channels of other policy actors such as the National 
Assembly and the mainstream media. Business players often regarded the dissident voices of 
users as mere resources for pushing the government and changing the WIPI policy to favor 
corporate interests. However, users demonstrated their own independent agency as well. In the 
wireless telephone number policy case, users exhibited autonomy free from the power of 
government and corporations. This was not the case for users in the WIPI debate.  
The different findings in these two cases have an implication in relation to Castells’ 
normative and optimistic theory regarding social movements online. Castells (2009) argues that 
“mass-self communication” using new media technology can bring about “counter-power,” 
which is autonomous and free from intervention by the state or the mainstream media. In his 
view, counter-power is the capacity of social actors who do not believe they are well represented 
by the existing system to challenge existing power relations. In his recent book Networks of 
Outrage and Hope, Castells (2012) theorizes that the trigger for recent social movements is 
anger. He also theorizes that the repressor is fear, and that mobilization ensues when fear is 
overcome by individuals sharing their outrage online. In the WIPI case, users’ self-identification 
as global consumers and their antipathy to the government’s nationalistic policies led them to 
resist the WIPI policy. However, their movements were not autonomous from business players 
due to the strategic capacity of corporations to treat online opinions and the commercialization of 
online communities as useful resources. On the contrary, in the mobile telephone number policy 
case, users exhibited certain aspects of a counter-power. Users shared their anger at being 
excluded from the closed policy online and then evolved into a group of dissident citizens who 
mobilized legal actions against the government and corporations. This dissertation found that 
closer examinations of specific cases are necessary in order to generalize about Castells’ concept 
of “counter-power” in new media environments.  
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Finally, this dissertation makes a methodological contribution to telecommunications 
policy research by adding user interviews to a historical examination of policy changes.!
Research on telecommunications policy has been mainly approached using the legal and 
economic perspective. Rowland (1986) criticized the dominance of legal and economic 
perspectives over telecommunications policy research in the US, and called for the full range of 
humanistic and interpretive social science to be brought to bear on telecommunications policy. 
Nearly three decades afterwards, it appears that legal experts, economists, and engineers 
continue to dominate telecom policy debates and research in the U.S. telecom policy landscape. 
This predominance of the legal and economic perspective has often led telecom policy research 
to excessive reliance on methods such as formalistic legal analysis, technological analysis, 
market research, and economic simulations.  
Some research has been conducted to address telecommunications policy “from below” 
through user interviews. Mueller & Schement (1996) adopted user interviews when investigating 
the actual situation of universal landline service in Camden, New Jersey. Their research found 
that low telephone penetration existed in inner cities, and was associated with the young, the 
transient, and ethnic minorities, contrary to universal service’s popular perception as an issue 
that involved rural areas and the elderly. Sandvig (2011) interviewed with users of the license-
exempt spectrum in local situations, and found that the obligation of engineers to their profession 
was stronger than government regulations. The research suggested that policy-makers and 
scholars pay more attention to “the law as it is lived” in order to make better telecommunications 
policy in the future. Nevertheless, mainstream telecommunications policy research continues to 
be dominated by the top-down approach in the US. 
Research on Korean telecommunications policy has also been dominated by the legal and 
economic approach. For instance, 483 journal articles related to Korean telecommunications 
policy have been published in Telecommunications Policy to date since 1980. None of these 
articles adopted user interviews to address Korean telecommunications policy issues. In a similar 
manner to research in the US case, most research on Korean telecommunications policy typically 
employed methods such as descriptions of legal/technological/market changes or economic 
evaluations of a single policy. This predominance of the legal and economic approach in 
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telecommunications policy studies has resulted in little examination of individual users in related 
policy issues. 
Users of telecommunications service are also actual users of telecommunications policy, 
so user interviews can be a useful tool for researching the social effects of specific 
telecommunications policies on the daily lives of ordinary people and determining which 
telecommunications policy would be the best option from the user viewpoint. This research 
adopted user interviews as one method of understanding the new role of culture and the voices of 
networked users in specific telecommunications policy-making processes.  
The user interviews used in this dissertation were useful for uncovering qualitative 
knowledge about policy issues that could not be researched using existing forms of legal or 
economic analysis. For instance, networked users in the mobile telephone number policy case 
argued that telephone numbers were their private property. Existing policy debates in 
telecommunications usually focused on whether telephone numbers were national resources or 
the private property of corporations. This researcher’s view is that what was necessary for 
policy-makers in the case was not to evaluate whether or not the argument was legally correct. 
What was actually important was the motivation and backgrounds behind user resistance. The 
top-down approach cannot address what users thought of telephone numbers, which functioned 
as an embodiment of rules and norms of telecommunications in the everyday lives of users. 
Making use of interviews with users to investigate user resistance would be useful for 
understanding the democratic desires of ordinary users of telecommunications policy. It would 
also be useful for making more open and efficient – not economically efficient, but rather 
politically efficient – telecommunications policy.  
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This dissertation has certain limitations that originate from its organization/method, unit 
of analysis, and scope. This section discusses the limitations of this dissertation, and connects 
limitations with a call for future studies. In addition, this researcher suggests further studies on 
other important policy debates and recent changes in the Korean mobile broadband industry.  
First, this dissertation has two primary research foci. One emphasizes the role of the state. 
The other emphasizes the role of networked users. This dissertation is the first to combine and 
synthesize both viewpoints. This researcher’s synthesis requires further studies regarding the role 
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of users based on additional user research. Explaining the relation between structural 
determination and human agency is a central academic concern broadly in the social sciences, 
particularly in the political economic approach. Policy studies in telecommunications often focus 
on structure rather than human agency under the assumption that policy is the outcome of 
interactions between institutional powers. This dissertation added users’ roles to the analysis of 
historical changes in Korean wireless telecom policy so as not to overlook the role of human 
agency. Nonetheless, the dialectic tension between agency and structure was not fully and 
explicitly described in the policy analysis in this dissertation. This researcher considers the 
limitations of organization and methods to be one reason.  
This study mainly relied on a historical account of structural change in wireless 
telecommunications policy (mainly in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4) and attempted to 
examine and analyze the role of users through lead user interviews (in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
This method can be assessed as a novel attempt to understand the evolving role of individual 
users in telecommunications. However, this method had a limited capability to provide a rich 
explanation regarding who the networked users were, and how their desires for change interacted 
with the existing policy-making structure. Thus, further research should focus on the culture and 
identity of networked users and the patterns of their roles in the policy-making process in a more 
detailed manner. Additional interview research on networked users should be conducted in the 
telecommunications policy landscape in order to provide more nuanced interpretations. 
Second, the simplification of political entities in this dissertation requires further research 
in order to understand the multi-layered interactions between policy actors in a more detailed 
manner. This study was mainly based on institutional analysis in delineating major political and 
economic events surrounding Korean wireless telecommunications policies (particularly in 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4). This institutional approach often led this researcher to 
present the state as a monolithic entity that single-mindedly sought to accomplish its neoliberal-
developmental goals. Furthermore, it often equated the state with the government and the 
telecommunications regulatory agencies, including the MOC, the MIC, and the KCC. 
Government is an administrative bureaucracy that controls the state apparatus during a particular 
period. A political entity in a democratic society usually consists of divided groups of politicians, 
affiliated interest groups and various government agencies. In certain cases in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6, this dissertation attempted to provide a rough analysis of the policy network in which 
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various political actors played their roles in support of their interests. Nonetheless, this study 
often adopted simplified concepts when describing political entities related to the wireless 
telecommunications policy. Thus, further research can supplement the shortcomings of this study 
by conducting research based on policy network analysis or an advocacy coalition framework.259 
Given these approaches, further research can provide additional detailed insights for 
understanding patterns of linkages between various actors, including politicians, regulatory 
agencies, relevant interest groups, as well as their rational/irrational political motives and shared 
beliefs. 
Third, the limited scope of this dissertation requires additional studies that would be 
based on a comparative approach. This dissertation has limited usefulness for generalizing 
findings regarding the role of the state and networked users in the Korean wireless 
telecommunications policy field. This research is restricted to one country and does not provide a 
comparative perspective for other countries. The comparative approach has been a primary mode 
of scientific knowledge production in social science. This dissertation’s stress on the active role 
of the nation-state and the evolving political role of users in telecommunications cannot be 
generalized until after similar cases, at least in other Asian countries, have been studied. China, 
Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore have shared political experiences comparable to those of Korea, 
particularly, in their state-led developments of their IT infrastructures, industries, and policies. 
For this reason, further research on these countries’ historical development of their wireless 
telecommunications policies and the changing role of users is necessary. Without this research, it 
is impossible to determine whether or not the findings in this dissertation are particular only to 
the Korean context. 
Fourth, the growth of mobile broadband communications and social media in Korea calls 
for additional studies of the mode in which networked users engage with policy in evolving new 
media environments. This research mainly focused on the voice of users in online forums that 
influenced the policy-making process in Korean wireless telecommunications. In contemporary 
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usage facilitate political participation among citizens. The Korean smartphone penetration rate in 
Q1 2013 was 73.0% (Statista, 2013). Korea has been the home of one of the largest blogging 
communities in the world, second only to China. The smartphone environment facilitated the 
rapid diffusion of microblogging services such as Twitter and me2DAY260 and social networking 
services such as Facebook in Korea. Political actors such as Korea’s Democratic Party 
experimented with citizen political participation in the party’s pre-election for 2012 Korean 
parliamentary election via smartphone. These changes provide tools that citizens can use to call 
for additional democratic policy-making processes. Further research is necessary to identify 
whether or not dissident voices become self-organized in changing media environments and in 
which directions the roles of networked user evolved under the influence of smartphones and 
social media. 
Lastly, further research can help clarify the concepts of the neoliberal-developmental 
state and networked users by applying these concepts to other Korean telecommunications policy 
cases. The compulsory use of ActiveX for e-payments and resistance from users may possibly 
constitute one example. In the late 1990s, Korea developed its own encryption technology 
standard, SEED.261 This homegrown technology began to require users to use an ActiveX control 
in Internet Explorer (IE) for online banking services and e-commerce, because no major Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL) libraries or web browsers supported the SEED algorithm. After the mandate, 
developers optimized banking and e-commerce websites to work only with IE. Consequently, 
users with operating systems such as Apple’s OS X and Linux, which do not support IE, were 
unable to use for online banking and e-commerce purposes in Korea. Thus, there has been user 
resistance against the mandates that has been expressed using online petitions and legal 
mobilization since the late 2000s.  
OpenWeb (http://opennet.or.kr/) has been at the center of a user movement pushing back 
against the obligatory use of digital certification. Users filed various class action lawsuits against 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MPAS), the Korean Financial 
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Telecommunications & Clearings Institute (KTCI), and Korean commercial banks.262 The 
Supreme Court denied users’ claims that the mandates were illegal in 2009. However, there are 
other ongoing lawsuits related to the ActiveX mandate. In addition, the Supreme Court’s legal 
interpretation of the mandate included the recommendation that commercial banks had the right 
to decide which technologies they would use for e-payments. This decision led to the recent 
launch of OpenBanking service in major commercial banks, which did not require digital 
certification based on ActiveX. 
Another recent controversy regarding mobile network neutrality also provides an 
example. The rapid diffusion of smartphones led to a messaging and VoIP application, 
KakaoTalk263, gaining a huge popularity. 38 million users in a country of almost 50 million 
people registered and used the application, as of July 2012. KakaoTalk launched its messaging 
service in March 2010, and launched a VoIP service in Korea in June 2012. Wireless carriers 
were concerned about increasing mobile Internet traffic and reduced revenues from their wireless 
voice services, and decided to degrade service for the lowest two tiers of their data plans in 2012. 
This measure produced dropped VoIP calls for customers who used KakaoTalk. This response of 
wireless carriers to KakaoTalk led to a controversy about net neutrality in mobile broadband. 
The controversy led the KCC to establish a new guideline for net neutrality in July 2012. During 
the net neutrality debate, users gathered online (i.e., Net Neutrality Forum, http://nnforum.kr/) 
and emerged as an influential policy actor that moved the focus of discussions beyond the closed 
structure that had been limited to carriers and content providers. Although the KCC released 
guidelines for net neutrality, online opinions still call for allowing extensive MVoIP in all data 
plans.   
This researcher believes that the emergence of networked users is not a short-lived 
phenomenon, and may possibly becoming an ongoing movement that can further democratize 
the Korean telecommunications policy-making process. The neoliberal-developmental 
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through interactions between government goals and corporate interests, and created supplier-
centric and Korean-specific rules and norms in the use of telecommunications (i.e., the mandate 
of WIPI, mobile prefix unification, and ActiveX). The voices of individual users, who inform 
and organize themselves with the help of new media technology, will be crucial in the continuing 
democratization of Korean telecommunications policy. This movement is likely to increase in 
strength through alliances with traditional civic groups. Additional research is thus needed to 
identify similarities, differences, and the prospective sustainability of the influence of networked 
users on various Korean telecommunications policies in the future.264 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$(&!_4$()+60&B$4)'')1c+@$6&0&.6(2$-0$.'0)$,&&:&:$/)$&3.*-,&$/2&$4-,.'$6&0+'/0$)4$/2&$(),0/-/+/-),.'$@&/-/-),$/2./$
,&/1)6<&:$+0&60$-,$/2&$*)5-'&$/&'&@2),&$,+*5&6$@)'-(D$(.0&$4-'&:$.7.-,0/$/2&$7)A&6,*&,/"$
!!
206!
?3OPJQ(3RS(TD,UKJQ(
$
%.5'&$#$-0$@6&0&,/&:$./$/2&$&,:$)4$a2.@/&6$#"$
%.5'&$!"$Q6-*.6D$/&'&()**+,-(./-),0$'&7-0'./-),0$.,:$/2&$4+,(/-),0$)4$/2&$`Ea!
Legislation Major Provisions (Under the responsibility of the MIC) 
Telecommunications 
Basic Act 
- Basic guiding principles for telecommunications. 
- Ministerial authority regarding promotion of telecommunications 
technology and technical standards for telecommunication facilities. 
- Management of telecommunication networks.  
- Organization and operation of the Korea Communication Commission as 
a sub-committee of the MIC. 
Telecommunications 
Business Act 
- Licensing criteria and reporting procedures for telecommunication service 
providers. 
- Telecommunication service providers’ competition safeguards.  
- Rights of telecommunication service users.  
- Construction and maintenance of telecommunication facilities. 
Telecommunications 
Construction Business 
Act 
- Basic guiding principles for telecommunications construction principles. 
- Telecommunications construction business classification, licensing 
criteria and scope. 
- Establishment of the Association of Telecommunications contractors. 
Cable TV Broadcasting 
Management Act 
- Licensing of CATV operators. 
- Technology standards of CATV facilities. 
Basic Act on 
Informatization 
Promotion 
- Basic guiding principles for building KII and creating an information 
society. 
- Basic and Action Plan for Informatization Promotion.  
- Operation of the Informatization Promotion Fund. 
Radio Waves Act - Efficient utilization and control of radio waves. - Establishment of Basic Plan for Promotion of Radio Waves. 
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Classification Main Contents 
Fair trade regulation 
1. Strengthening punishment for ‘unfair’ internal transactions 
2. Revival of regulation of the amount of investments in related firms limited 
to 25% of net assets of a business group  
3. Abolition of debt guarantees between the affiliates of chaebol 
Accounting standards 
1. Introduction of consolidated financial statements 
2. Obligation to establish election committee for assignments of outsider 
auditors for listed companies and affiliates of chaebol 
Financial market 
discipline 
1. Regulations in banks loans: 
- Debt-equity ratio 200% became a de facto limit when providing loans 
- Prohibition of new loans with guarantees made by affiliated firms 
- Establish a system for constant assessment of corporate credit risks, 
including introduction of forward-looking criteria (FLC) 
2. Liberalization of M&A market: 
- Permits hostile takeovers 
- Abolition of regulations on shareholding by foreigners 
Internal governance 
1. Outsider director system: 
- One quarter of board of directors should be outside directors 
2. Responsibilities of major shareholders 
- Registration of controlling shareholder as the representative directors of 
leading affiliates 
- Removal of the ‘Chairman’s Office’ 
3. Rights of minority shareholders 
- Loosening conditions for derivative suits, inspection of accounting books, 
and requests for the dismissal of directors and auditors by shareholders 
- Introduction of a cumulative voting system when appointing directors 
4. Rights of institutional investors: 
- Allowing voting rights for shares in funds managed by investment trust 
companies and bank trust accounts 
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Date Events 
1987!
- Public Enterprises Privatization Promotion Committee established 
- Decided on gradual privatization of Korea Telecom to boost efficiency of 
management. 
October 1993 – 
December 1996 
- Seven sell-offs of KT stocks under the Kim Young-Sam government. 
(28.79%, public offerings, domestic investors) 
December 1998 
- KT listed on Korean Stock Exchange Market to facilitate stock selling in 
domestic stock market. 
May 1999 
- Issued the American Depositary Receipts (ADR) in the United States and 
sold 14.4% of KT stock. 
September 1999 
- Upgraded the aggregate foreign ownership limitation of KT from 20% to 
33% 
June 2000 - Decision to fully privatize KT 
September 2000 
- Revision of the Telecommunications Business Act to increase foreign 
ownership ceiling from 33% to 49% of KT 
February 2001 - Sell-off of KT stocks (1.07%, domestic stock market) 
June 2001 - Issued the ADR in the United States and sold 17.8% of KT stocks. 
December 2001 
- KT bought 11.8% of stocks back from the government (treasury stock) 
- Issued foreign convertible bonds (CB, 8.6%) 
- Issued bonds with warrants and sold to Microsoft (BW, 3.2%)!
May 2002 
- Domestic sell-off of KT stock 
- Completed full privatization of KT. 
- SK group bought 9.64% of KT stock.!
December 2002!
- Exchange 9.27% of SK Telecom shares owned by KT and 9.64% of KT 
shares owned by SK Telecom.!
January 2003 
- Brandes Investments bought 6.07% of KT DR and became the largest 
shareholder of KT. 
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 Cdma2000 (synchronous) W-CDMA (asynchronous) 
Technological 
difference 
- Synchronous mode  
- Based on 2G CDMA technology 
- Standardized by 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2) 
- Market share of CDMA: 10-15% 
worldwide 
- CDMA mainly used in the US and 
Korea 
- Asynchronous mode 
- Uses the same core network as the 
2G GSM networks deployed 
worldwide 
- Developed by NTT Docomo 
- Standardized by 3GPP 
- Market share of GSM: 80-85% 
worldwide 
- GSM is used all over the world 
except Korea and Japan 
Stakeholders 
- CDMA-based handset manufacturers 
(Samsung, Hyundai) 
- MIC and its affiliates such as ETRI 
- Wireless carriers 
(SKT, KT, and LGT) 
- Handset manufacturer 
(LG) 
 
 
Reasons to support 
 
 
 
- The need for multiple standards 
- Maintain the competitiveness of 
CDMA that Korea accumulated 
- The possibility of CDMA standards 
exports to South East Asian countries 
- Faster commercialization than W-
CDMA 
- Broader alliance with global carriers 
than cdma2000 
- Larger number of wireless 
subscribers 
- Expected increase in revenues from 
global roaming 
- More business opportunities than 
cdma2000 
x$M)+6(&V$I+/2)6$6&0&.6(2$
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Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FDI 
($ billion) 11.3 9.1 6.5 12.8 11.6 11.2 10.5 11.7 11.5 13.1 13.7 16.3 
M)+6(&V$`-,-0/6D$)4$%6.:&B$E,:+0/6D$.,:$R,&67D$=2//@Vnn111"*)/-&"7)"<6?$
$
%.5'&$b"$a26),)')7D$)4$*.e)6$@6)(&00&0$4)6$/2&$^)6&.cLM$96&&$%6.:&$I76&&*&,/$
Date Process and Events 
Aug 2003 FTA roadmap confirmed by the Office of the Minister for Trade (Korea), planned to start negotiation with 50 countries for FTA by 2008 
Nov 2004 Korea-US Ministers of Trade meeting agreed to examine Korea-US FTA 
Feb-Apr 2005 Three rounds of Korea-US FTA preliminary examination meetings 
Feb 2006 Official announcement of negotiations on Korea-US FTA 
June 2006 First round of negotiations (Washington, DC) 
Dec 2006 Fifth round of negotiations (Montana) – Korea suspended the negotiation on medicine and automobiles on Dec. 6. 
Jan 2007 Sixth round of negotiations (Seoul) – Disagreements on automobiles, medicine, agriculture, services, investments, and textiles 
Feb 2007 
Seventh round of negotiations (Washington, DC) – Disagreements on customs relief 
and safeguards for certain agricultural products (especially beef with bones) and 
import quotas 
Mar 2007 Eighth round of negotiations (Seoul) – Textiles, automobiles, agriculture remain for further negotiations. Agreement reached on financial and service sectors. 
Apr 2007 Korea-US FTA reached – resolution on beef (beef tariff relief within 15 years, beef with bones still to be negotiated). Gaeseong products subject to further negotiations. 
Nov 2008 
Bush in statement to President Lee Myung Bak, says ratification of Korea-US 
agreement stalled because of a “backlash against free trade” as opposed to a “negative 
feelings towards the South Koreans.” 
Dec 2008 
President-elect Barack Obama states that he would not support the Korea-US FTA “as 
it is” because it is “badly flawed.” USA imports about 70,000 Korean vehicles 
annually, while Korea imports around 5,000 US cars annually. 
M)+6(&V$`-,-0/6D$)4$9)6&-7,$I44.-60$.,:$%6.:&$=f2D+B$!>##B$@"$\]?"
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Daily News/ News Agency Big Corporation* Foreigner A single stakeholder 
                 Owner 
 
     Object Previous Revised Previous Revised Previous Revised Previous Revised 
Terrestrial** Broadcasting 10% 10% Prohibited 
General Programming 
Provider*** 
20% 
Specialized News 
Programming Provider 
30% 30% 
10% 
30% 40% 
General/Specialized News 
Program Provider in IPTV 
 Prohibited 
49% 
Prohibited 
49% 
Prohibited 
20% - 
Programming Provider No limit 49% 
CATV SO No limit 49% 
Satellite 
33% 49% 
49% No limit 33% 49% 
IPTV 49% No limit 49% 
No limit 
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 SKT-Hanaro Telecom KT-KTF (KT) 
LGT-LG Dacom- LG 
Powercomm 
(LGU+) 
Feature Acquisition Merger Merger 
Approval 
date February 20, 2008 March 19, 2009 December 14, 2009 
Main 
arguments 
from 
industries 
- Concern about mobile 
market dominance’s 
spread into fixed market 
- Problems with exclusive 
use of 800MHz 
- Separation between 
network-operating 
organization and 
marketing organization 
- Concern about fixed 
market dominance’s 
spread into mobile market 
- Problems with owning 
large scale of subscribers’ 
network and other 
essential facilities 
- Separation between 
network-operation unit 
and service unit 
- Concern about vertical 
integration between 
manufacturer (LG 
Electronics) and service 
provider 
- Problems with whether 
LG’s benefits from 
asymmetrical regulations 
continue 
- Problems in KEPCO’s 
7.5% ownership of 
integrated entity 
Approval 
Conditions 
- Submission of plan on 
building broadband 
infrastructure in rural 
areas. 
- Non-discrimination in 
wholesale market, bundled 
services, and wireless 
Internet  
* Shared use of 800MHz 
not included in conditions. 
- Submission of plan for 
efficient use of essential 
facilities 
- Submission of plan for 
optimizing process of 
landline/VoIP number 
portability 
- Non-discrimination in 
wireless Internet market 
- Submission of plan for 
building BcN in rural 
areas 
- Non-discrimination in 
wireless Internet market  
* The government propels 
the sale of 7.5% share 
according to public 
enterprise privatization 
plan. 
Burden of 
conditions Medium Weak (almost nothing) Weak 
Company 
size after 
M&A 
(Won, Dec. 
2008) 
- Revenues: 13.5 trillion 
- Market share: 33.7% 
- Subscriber base 
(millions) 
. Wireless: 23.03 
. Fixed telephony: 1.94 
. Broadband: 3.54 
. VoIP: 0.1 
- Revenues: 18.9 trillion 
- Market share: 47.1% 
- Subscriber base 
(millions)!
. Wireless: 14.37 
. Fixed telephony: 19.87  
. Broadband: 6.71 
. VoIP: 0.33 
- Revenues: 7.72 trillion  
- Market share: 19.2% 
- Subscriber base 
(millions) 
. Wireless: 8.21 
. Fixed telephony: 0.33 
. Broadband: 2.21 
. VoIP: 1.20!
:17*5%;&<78)1*&*%3%"*5)&
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 SKT KT LGU+ Use and remarks  
Auctions in Aug 
2011 
(Unit: won) 
800~900MHz 30MHz (800MHz) 
20MHz 
(900MHz) 
20MHz 
(800MHz) 
2G (SKT) 
4G (KT, LGU+) 
 
KT 
10MHz 
(800MHz) 
261 billion 
1.8GHz - 20MHz 20MHz 
2G (KT) 
3G (LGU+) 
Better band for 4G 
LTE 
SKT 
20MHz 
995 billion 
2.1GHz 60MHz 40MHz - 
3G (SKT, KT) 
Internationally 
common band for 3G 
LGU+ 
20MHz 
445.5 billion 
2.3GHz 30MHz 30MHz - WiBro - 
Total 120MHz 110MHz 40MHz - 50MHz 
:17*5%;&<78)1*&*%3%"*5)&
&
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Round Date Results Conditions and Reasons 
Jun. 2010 KMI applied for a license. 
First Round 
Oct. 2010 Disqualified (65.5) 
Nov. 2010 KMI applied for a license. 
Second Round 
Feb. 2011 Disqualified (66.5) 
Aug. 2011 KMI applied for a license. 
Nov. 2011 IST applied for a license. Third Round 
Dec. 2011 Disqualified  (KMI: 65.8, IST: 63.9) 
Oct. 2012 KMI applied for a license. 
Dec. 2012 IST applied for a license. Fourth Round 
Feb. 2013 Disqualified (KMI: 64.2, IST: 63.6) 
In order to receive a license, an 
applicant should obtain over 70 
average assessment score and get 
over 60 in each item: (a) feasibility 
of business plan and adequacy of 
facilities, (b) technical ability, (c) 
financial stability, and (d) 
appropriateness of user protection 
plan.  
* Item (d) was first added in the 
fourth round. 
!
!
Most common reason for 
disqualification was that the KCC 
gave low scores in financial stability 
and business plan’s feasibility.!!
!
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Project CDMA IMT-2000 WiBro WIPI 
Period 1991-1996 1999-2002 2002-2006 2001-2009 
Government Roh, Tae-Woo Kim, Young-Sam Kim, Dae-Joong Roh, Moo-Hyun 
Roh, Moo-Hyun 
Lee, Myung-Bak 
Leading 
Agency MOC/MIC MIC MIC MIC/KCC 
Main  
Develop CDMA 
and make it into 
the single standard 
for wireless 
service 
Adopt CDMA and 
W-CDMA as the 
dual standard for 
3G 
Develop and 
standardize a 
wireless 
broadband 
technology 
Develop and 
standardize a 
wireless Internet 
platform 
Associated 
measure 
(License) 
License 2nd 
cellular and 3 PCS 
providers 
License 3 IMT-
2000 providers 
License 2 WiBro 
service providers - 
 
Major  
Participants 
Samsung, LG, 
ETRI, Qualcomm, 
KMT (SKT), KT, 
Hyundai 
SKT, KTF, LGT, 
Samsung, LG, 
ETRI 
ETRI, KT, SKT, 
Samsung, LG 
KWISF, ETRI, 
KTF, SKT, LGT, 
Samsung, LG 
Government 
leadership in 
the project 
Medium Strong Strong Initially strong but weakened 
K&:17*5%;&<78)1*&*%3%"*5)&
&
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Carriers SKT LGT KTF 
Platform SK-VM GVM JavaStation MAP BREW 
Developer XCE Sinji Soft Aromasoft/ Velxsoft Mobile Top Qualcomm 
Language Java C/C++ Java C/C++ C/C++ 
Environment Script Download 
Script 
Download 
Script 
Download 
Binary 
Download 
Binary 
Download 
Features Sun MIDP Mobile C Kitty Hawk/ MIDP ANSI-C - 
K&:17*5%;&<78)1*&*%3%"*5)P&,4+1*0"8,14&%-8*"58%.&+*10&51*?1*"8%&.1570%483&
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Players Strategies and Positions 
SKT 
. Support WIPI 
. Establish self-developed extended platform (T-PAK) 
. Pursue operator-centric platform strategy regardless of device type 
KTF 
. Break down SKT-dominated market structure 
. Disengage from WIPI regulation 
. Pursue competitiveness through alliances with foreign platforms and 
device providers 
. Highlight customer choice rights (non-WIPI phone) 
Service 
operators 
LGT 
. Support WIPI 
. Share T-PAK to reduce costs 
Samsung  
. Support WIPI (Oppose non-WIPI phone production) 
. Oppose the installation of T-PAK 
. Check against operator’s platform leadership 
Device 
makers 
LG and 
others 
. Agree to produce non-WIPI phone 
* Only Motorola Korea agreed to install T-PAK 
Software developers 
. Concerns about WIPI’s retreat 
. Concerns about difficulties of overseas expansion 
. Subordinated to wireless carrier’s supply chain!
K&:17*5%;&<78)1*&*%3%"*5)&
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Classification Digit Number structure Remarks 
Area code 2-3 02, 03X, 04X, 05X, 06X Sixteen areas 
Land-
line Local 
Subscriber code 7-8 
 
NYY(Y)-YYYY 
(exchange code-subscriber number) 
Seoul area: 
7~8 digits 
Other areas: 7 
digits!
 
10 
 
011-2YY-YYYY~011-8YY-YYYY 
016-2YY-YYYY~016-8YY-YYYY 
017-2YY-YYYY~017-8YY-YYYY 
018-2YY-YYYY~018-8YY-YYYY 
019-2YY-YYYY~019-8YY-YYYY 
- 
2G 
11 
011-9YYY-YYYY 
016-9YYY-YYYY 
017-9YYY-YYYY 
After M&A 
between 
service 
providers 
Wireless 
3G 11 010-NYYY-YYYY - 
K&T;&DU'P&V;&=U'P&W;&>U'(&&
KK&:17*5%;&%-8*"58%.&"4.&*%51438*758%.&+*10&@RR&.1570%48&X@RRP&D>=>"Y(&
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 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total 6,828 13,983 23,443 26,816 29,046 32,342 
SKT! 4,571 (66.9%) 
5,966 
(42.7%) 
10,110 
(43.1%) 
10,935 
(40.8%) 
11,867 
(40.9%) 
17,220 
(53.2%) Cellular 
Service SMT 
(Merged with 
SKT in 2002) 
1,125 
(16.5%) 
2,136 
(15.3%) 
3,238 
(13.8%) 
3,518 
(13.1%) 
3,312 
(11.4%) 0 
KTF 
(Merged with 
KT in 2009) 
350 
(5.1%) 
2,353 
(16.8%) 
4,267 
(18.2%) 
5,285 
(19.7%) 
9,591 
(33.0%) 
10,333 
(31.9%) 
LGT 
(Merged into 
LGU+ in 
2010) 
366 
(5.4%) 
2,116 
(15.1%) 
3,086 
(13.2%) 
3,948 
(14.7%) 
4,276 
(14.7%) 
4,790 
(14.8%) 
PCS 
Service 
HMC 
(Merged with 
KTF in 2001) 
416 
(6.1%) 
1,411 
(10.1%) 
2,741 
(11.7%) 
3,131 
(11.7%) 0 0 
K&=P>>>&?%*3143&
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 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
00Y - 
International 
Call 
(KT) 
International 
Call 
 (LGU+) 
Facility-
based 
Reseller 
- 
International 
Call 
 (SK Broadband) 
International 
Call 
(SK Telink) 
Facility-
based 
Reseller 
International 
Call 
 (Onse) 
- 
01Y IMT-2000 Cellular (SKT) 
Wireless 
Paging 
(Nationwide) 
Vessel, 
TRS, 
Mobile 
data 
Value-added 
Wireless 
Paging 
(Local) 
PCS 
(KT) 
Cellular 
(SKT) 
PCS 
(KT) 
PCS 
(LGU+) 
02 Seoul (City) 
03Y UMS Gyeonggi (Province) 
Incheon 
(City) 
Gangwon 
(Province) - - - - - - 
04Y - Chungnam (Province) 
Daejeon 
(City) 
Chungbuk 
(Province) - - - - - - 
05Y Individual Number 
Busan 
(City) 
Ulsan 
(City) 
Daegu 
(City) 
Gyeongbuk 
(Province) 
Gyeongnam 
(Province) - - - - 
06Y Telephone Information  
Jeonnam 
(Province) 
Gwangju 
(Province) 
Jeonbuk 
(Province) 
Jeju 
(Province) - - - - - 
07Y 
Voice over 
Internet 
Protocol 
- - - - - - - - - 
08Y Collect Call 
Long 
distance 
(KT) 
Long distance 
(Dacom) 
Long 
distance 
(Onse) 
Long 
distance 
(SK 
Broadband) 
Facility-based 
Reseller 
Long 
distance 
(SK Telink) 
- - - 
09Y - - - - - - - - - - 
;&<+3,=%>&?:/,"=/%6&"26&,%=+2./,3=/%6&9,+4&/1%&*@@&6+=34%2/&A*@@B&CD'D"E&
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Time Policy decisions 
February 02 The MIC decided to allocate “010” for 3G service: 
a. 2G prefixes – “011”, “016”, “017”, “018”, “019” – to be withdrawn. 
b. Mobile identification number will be integrated into “010” within five years after 
the launch of 3G service. 
c. MNP will be implemented within 6 months after at least two providers launch 3G 
services. MNP is allowed only between 3G services.!
January 03 The MIC decided to hasten prefix unification and expand MNP into 2G: 
a. Mobile phone numbers with “010” will be given when a customer activates new 
2G service or replaces existing phone numbers starting 1/1/2004. 
b. MNP will be applied to 2G service and asymmetrically adopted for each carrier 
with time difference of 6 months from 1/1/2004 (SKT ! KTF ! LGT)!
December 03 The MIC developed the transition plan and decided upon the condition of unification 
to “010”: 
a. Mapping rules for transiting existing phone numbers are determined and mapped 
numbers shall be reserved for future use after transition. 
b. “010” unification will be mandatory when the transition rate to “010” reaches 
80%. 
December 04 The MIC developed a plan for promoting “010” mobile number unification: 
a. Detailed action plan for complete unification will be determined by working with 
outside experts when the transition rate to “010” reaches 80%. 
b. The action plan will be implemented during the 5th year after the launch of 3G. 
April 06 The MIC decided to apply MNP only to “010” users.!
a. Users who do not use “010” code (010-NYYY-YYYY) cannot switch providers 
while keeping their phone numbers. 
October 07 The MIC allocated “010” for LGT’s Rev.A265 service and mandated that LGT should 
comply with MNP policy: 
a. LGT should give “010” number to its new subscribers of Rev.A and should transit 
to “010” when it accepts applicants for MNP from other 2G services.!
September 10 The KCC modified the original plan for mobile number unification: 
a. There will be no mandatory transition to “010” and the unification policy will end 
when all wireless operators terminate existing 2G service. 
b. “01X” users can use 3G service without transiting to “010” for 3 years 
(Temporary exception on MNP). 
c. “01X” will be displayed on a receiver’s phone even though a caller changes his or 
her number to “010” (“01X” calling number display service) !
<&=07+1%>&%?6+"16%2&"42&+%10436+716%2&5+0-&@"+,073&A0@%+4-%46&2017-%463)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#$!BC!&+%67+4%2&,63&DC&$,1%43%&60&6E%&A0@%+4-%46&F,6E076&$"741E,4A&6E%&3%+@,1%&#"3%2&04&12-"9:::&'?GH;IH&
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Classification SKT KTF LGT Total 
01X* 8,289 3,158 2,617 14,064 December 
2008 010 transition rate 64.0% 78.0% 68.1% 69.2% 
01X 6,620 1,437 1,956 10,013 December 
2009 010 transition rate 72.7% 90.4% 77.4% 79.1% 
01X 6,529 1,342 1,906 9,777 January 
2010 010 transition rate 73.3% 91.1% 78.1% 79.7% 
01X 6,446 1,249 1,861 9,556 February 
2010 010 transition rate 73.8% 91.8% 78.7% 80.3% 
01X 6,348 1,161 1,818 9,327 March 
2010 010 transition rate 74.4% 92.4% 79.3% 81.0% 
01X 6,265 1,092 1,782 9,139 April 
2010 010 transition rate 74.9% 92.9% 79.8% 81.4% 
01X 6,160 1,013 1,746 8,918 May 
2010 010 transition rate 75.4% 93.5% 80.3% 82.0% 
01X 6,055 946 1,716 8,718 June 
2010 010 transition rate 75.9% 93.9% 80.6% 82.4% 
01X 5,896 872 1,685 8,452 July 
2010 010 transition rate 76.6% 94.4% 81.1% 83.0% 
01X 5,735 805 1,652 8,193 August 
2010 010 transition rate 77.4% 94.9% 81.6% 83.6% 
<&W7-#%+&05&:'X&73%+3&J74,6>&6E073"42&/%+3043K&
<<&=07+1%>&!"#$%&#'"'&"'($")&**+''$$"&,")-.'-#$/"0%&#'1/"2&-#+1*/"3#&45641'+,7"4,5")&**-,+64'+&,1"4'"'($"
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 The MIC The KCC 
Period Dec 23, 1994 - Feb 28, 2008 Feb 29, 2008 - Present266 
Organization 
Type Ministry! Commission 
Rights and 
responsibility One minister 
1 Chairman, 1 Vice Chairman, and 3 
Standing Commissioners 
Appointment . Appointed by the president 
. Directly appointed by the president 
(chairman and 1 commissioner) 
. Recommended by the ruling party and 
appointed by the president 
(1 commissioner) 
. Recommended by the opposition party 
and appointed by the president (2 
commissioner)  
* Elected by mutual vote among 
commissioners (vice chairman) 
Tenure  Not guaranteed 3 years guaranteed by law 
Policy field 
. Telecommunication regulation  
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